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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
The Time of the Thriller: 
Suspense and Continuity after World War II 
 
 
by 
 
Martin Zirulnik 
Doctor of Philosophy in English 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019 
Professor Ursula K. Heise, Chair 
 
Through the analysis of a selection of thrillers written and produced in the years 
immediately following World War II, this dissertation defines the threshold conditions of 
narrative suspense in the twentieth century—the pending disappearance of continuity, not just in 
techniques of storytelling but in longstanding assumptions about time, about how it is and how it 
ought to be organized. These works, for instance, seem in various ways to prefigure a more 
general attenuation of narrative retrospection—narrative retrospection as a grammatical 
convention of realist fiction but also as a form of belief, as fidelity to the qualitative density of 
human experience as it is transmitted through time. This period of aesthetic transition, marked by 
the iconoclasm of the avant-garde, is often seen as a terminal point in the history of storytelling 
after modernism, a time (though certainly not the only time) when the novel dies along with the 
systems of value that upheld it. Alternately, as more recent scholarship has shown, it can be seen 
as the moment when the present tense starts to gain traction as the dominant mode of 
fictionalizing time. But the works examined in the following pages—including the fiction of 
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Elizabeth Bowen, Graham Greene and Raymond Chandler, as well as the postwar films of Carol 
Reed, among others—modify the constraints of genre and reshape the forms of suspense simply 
by extending the transmission, by perpetuating the same old message about time even when it 
becomes grotesque in its apparent asynchrony. The death of narrative is perpetually delayed; or, 
one might say, narrative is undead, and it remains so as it drags itself onward into the cold war 
era.   
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Introduction: The Undeath of Narrative Suspense 
 
The thrillers studied in this dissertation all seem, at least from the outset, unlikely to 
thrill: they cannot depend on a play of expectation or otherwise draw surprise and excitement out 
of the unknown because they project no future to speak of. Instead, though situated historically 
around the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century, they convey with a certain 
formal intensity the impression that time had become distorted beyond recall and that it might 
not go on and on as it always had. As the narrator of Elizabeth Bowen’s wartime thriller The 
Heat of the Day (1948) puts it, this was the “‘time being’ which war [had] made the very being 
of time,” as if what was once figured as an inner sense of duration, of time passing, were now 
just a rhetorical reflex—a special effect rather than a special feature of consciousness (109).1 
Under these conditions, the conventional forms of narrative suspense are held in relief but are 
also to a large extent emptied of affective and psychological content, and they operate in a 
manner that poses significant conceptual challenges to the phenomenological presumptions that 
dominated both philosophical and common-sense understandings of time in the period. This 
confrontation comes most sharply into focus in the years immediately following World War II 
and thus tends in retrospect to be obscured by the cultural upheavals and discontinuities more 
generally associated with postmodernism. But it indicates an important period of artistic and 
philosophical readjustment—an existential shift in the groundwork of narrative fiction that works 
not by nihilistic disruption or radical innovation, but by holding in abeyance the premise of 
aesthetic continuity on which its forms of sympathetic engagement had for so long been founded.  
                                                             
1 Elizabeth Bowen, The Heat of the Day (New York: Anchor, 2002). 
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As an initiatory example, consider the opening scene of The Heat of the Day. The novel 
was published in 1948, but it begins on the first Sunday of September, 1942, in a London still at 
war and still shaken by memories of the Blitz: 
The Sunday had been brilliant, without a stain of cloud. Now, the burning 
turquoise sky of the afternoon began to gain in transparency as it lost colour: from 
above the trees round the theatre there stole away not only colour but time. 
Music—the waltzes, the marches, the gay overtures—now began to command this 
hour-less place. The people lost their look of uncertainty. The heroic marches 
made them lift up their heads; recollections of opera moulded their faces into 
unconscious smiles, and during the waltzes women's eyes glittered with delicious 
tears about nothing. First note by note, drop by drop, then steadily, the music 
entered senses, nerves and fancies that had been parched. What first was a mirage 
strengthened into a universe, for the shabby Londoners and the exiled foreigners 
sitting in this worn glade in the middle of Regent's Park. (4) 
Suspense takes form in this scene (for it does turn out to be a scene of suspense in a novel of 
espionage) not through the introduction of a “stain”—of an “uncertainty” that disrupts the natural 
order—but rather through the privation of time and the coordinated advance of an imperious 
“now” that synchronizes the senses of natives and exiles alike, forming an affective “universe” 
emptied of content. It is a fiction “about nothing,” a “mirage”; but in the vacuum left behind 
where the hours should be, memory (in this case, music recollected) is drawn out “drop by drop” 
into the environment where, in the form of a collective habit, it continues to keep bodies in 
motion: lifting heads, contorting faces, extracting tears.    
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 Bowen is by no means considered an avant-garde writer, but the universal condition of 
suspendedness that this novel stages has little to do with the modes of anticipation and 
sympathetic identification found in conventional narrative fiction. Instead, it confronts readers 
with a conception of time and of temporality in which the classical scheme of past, present and 
future, along with the familiar metaphorics of inner and outer time, are so warped—so 
overwhelmed by the gravity of the present and the scenic dispersal of memory—that any sort of 
narrative form would seem untenable. But somehow things do keep going. Even as time steals 
away, the aesthetic effect falls short (just short, maybe) of the sublime inhumanity that Jean-
François Lyotard will ascribe nearly four decades later to the still ongoing “threat of nothing 
further happening,” of the imminent “disappearance of the temporal continuum through which 
the experience of generations used to be transmitted” (99, 105).2     
 The novels, stories and films that are the objects of study in the following chapters 
indicate the threshold conditions of narrative suspense in the 20th century, the pending 
disappearance of continuity, not just in techniques of storytelling but in longstanding 
assumptions about time, about how it is and how it ought to be organized. These works, for 
instance, seem in various ways to prefigure a more general attenuation of narrative 
retrospection—narrative retrospection as a grammatical convention of realist fiction but also as a 
form of belief, as fidelity to the qualitative density of human experience as it is “transmitted” 
through time. This period of aesthetic transition, marked by the iconoclasm of the avant-garde, is 
often seen as a terminal point in the history of storytelling after modernism, a time (though 
certainly not the only time) when the novel dies along with the systems of value that upheld it. 
                                                             
2 See “The Sublime and the Avant-Garde” in The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, translated by Geoffrey 
Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991). In this work, Lyotard is more directly 
concerned with time than he is in his better-known discussion of the Kantian sublime in the appendix to 
“The Postmodern Condition.”   
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Alternately, as Armen Avanessian and Anke Hennig have compellingly argued, it can be seen as 
a moment when the present tense starts to gain traction as the dominant mode of fictionalizing 
time.3  But the works examined in the following pages—including the fiction of Elizabeth 
Bowen, Graham Greene and Raymond Chandler, as well as the postwar films of Carol Reed, 
among others—modify the constraints of genre and reshape the forms of suspense simply by 
extending the transmission, by perpetuating the same old message about time even when it 
becomes grotesque in its apparent asynchrony. The death of narrative is perpetually delayed; or, 
one might say, narrative is undead, and it remains so as it drags itself onward into what Mark 
Seltzer has recently described as “the unreal reality of the perpetual postwar condition” that 
extends “from World War II to World War Z” (25).4   
Why should it be the province of thrillers to sustain this movement? This dissertation is 
not in a conventional sense a genre study, but one of its underlying claims is that thrillers tend to 
intensify the formal strategies that make special effects out of time, and so they must 
conceptualize time in a special way. These works depend, that is, on de facto philosophies of 
time that must be, for the sake of plausibility, solidly based in common-sense ideas about how 
time and causality are supposed to work—but that at the same time challenge and manipulate 
these conceptions in novel and peculiar ways in order to produce disturbing effects. David 
Wittenberg has made the case that time travel fiction is a privileged form in a similar sense, that 
it can be understood as a “laboratory” for conducting experiments with time. This is a useful idea 
and might aptly be transferred to some of the thrillers examined here, but Wittenberg’s concept 
of a “popular philosophy of narrative” seems to entail a somewhat strained compromise between 
                                                             
3 See Present Tense: A Poetics (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), which will be discussed at greater length 
in chapter 1.   
4 Mark Seltzer, The Official World (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016). 
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the analysis of genre as part of the domain of cultural studies and the analysis of narrative form 
in terms of the philosophy of time.5 Mark Currie avoids this apparent bind by arguing that it is 
important to think of all narrative fiction as being in some sense “about time”—even, or maybe 
especially, when it does not thematize time or (as in time travel fiction) make it the major stake 
of its plot developments. Whether or not a work of fiction explicitly theorizes time through the 
commentary of a narrator, it has access, as Currie puts it, to the “temporal resources” of narrative 
fiction in addition to the argumentative logic of philosophical discourse. Thus, regardless of 
genre, narrative fiction has a kind of purchase on time that philosophy does not (89).6  
Yet, even for Currie, the particular way in which thrillers are “about time” does wind up 
hinging on a specific generic distinction—that is, their distinction from whodunnit type 
mysteries. Following Tzvetan Todorov’s influential typology of detective fiction, Currie 
maintains that the whodunnit “is characterised by curiosity, since it proceeds from effect to 
cause” (i.e. from the examination of evidence to the description of the crime that produced it), 
whereas the thriller “is characterised by suspense and proceeds from cause to effect” (i.e. from 
the setting of a time-bomb to its detonation); or, as he rephrases it: “the whodunnit works 
backwards from a known outcome while the thriller proceeds forwards into an unknown future” 
(87). Currie doesn’t pursue the implications of this generic chiasmus very far, but perhaps there 
is no better proof of the correctness of the description than the precision and intensity with which 
the writers and filmmakers studied in the following chapters try to refute it in their various 
efforts to modify the basic constraints of genre—efforts which begin, but can never quite end, by 
questioning the premise that time moves forward, or that it moves at all. 
                                                             
5 David Wittenberg, Time Travel: The Popular Philosophy of Narrative (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2013). 
6 Mark Currie, About Time: Narrative, Fiction and the Philosophy of Time (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2007). 
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For Todorov, the distinction between the whodunnit and the thriller is typological, but it 
is also historical. The thriller, as defined by its concern with future events, is itself the future of 
the whodunnit, as defined by its concern with past events, and the thriller comes into dominance 
on both sides of the Atlantic just about exactly in the middle of the twentieth century (47).7 Some 
terminological clarification is necessary here, however. The English word thriller has been in use 
at least since the late nineteenth century to describe a certain type of detective story (and also as 
a term of disparagement for sensational art of all kinds). In this case, the term is Richard 
Howard’s translation of the French série noire, which was originally the name of a Parisian 
publishing imprint started during World War II, but which had come by the time of Todorov’s 
typology (1966) to be associated with both a literary genre in Europe and a film genre in 
America (film noir). What is lost in translation, then, is the specific sense of historicity implied 
by the distinction and also the way in which, in making it, Todorov attaches this sense of 
historicity to novelistic modes of affective involvement (a work’s capacity, say, to “thrill” or to 
shock or to surprise). What he describes, in other words, is a historical shift that is coeval with a 
general shift of interest founded in the temporal conceits of narrative fiction: in the period “just 
before and particularly after World War II,” “curiosity” transforms into “suspense.” This is the 
effect of a creative process of purification in which mystery is rendered away and, 
concomitantly, “prospection takes the place of retrospection” in the logic of the form (47).     
This canonic account of the types of detective story has been influential particularly for 
its narratological description of the temporal situation of the whodunnit, but it has been much 
less so for its description of the emergence of this new type of thing called the thriller or the série 
                                                             
7 Tzvetan Todorov. “The Typology of Detective Fiction,” The Poetics of Prose, translated by Richard 
Howard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977). 
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noire. I would suggest that one reason for this is that the thriller emerges out of Todorov’s 
account not as a distinct genre but rather as a form of time, one that is modeled in terms of the 
grammar of fiction. This becomes especially clear as he describes the transition between the 
whodunnit and the thriller, a subtype which he classifies as the “suspense novel” (51). The 
suspense novel is distinct (one might guess) for its increasing emphasis on the present, and thus 
the history of the thriller is translated into a complete rhetorical form of time: the past form is 
defined by its pastness, the future form is defined by its futureness, and both the continuities and 
discontinuities between these two forms are explained in terms of a form of presentness that is 
suspended between them. 
But this turns out to be a problematic present (as the present usually is). At issue here is 
not only the historicity of narrative forms—or the metanarrative quality of historical narratives of 
the sort that Todorov offers—but also, in a more basic sense, the way in which the grammar of 
fiction works to model time. To exemplify the genre of the present (out of which the future of the 
thriller is to evolve) Todorov cites Dashiell Hammett and Raymond Chandler, the two most 
prominent figures associated with the hardboiled style of American detective fiction of the 1930s 
and 1940s (48). The present is characterized in these stories as a time of vulnerability: the 
mysteries of the past still linger—and the past tense still dominates the prose—but now the 
detective’s own life is increasingly at risk as more immediate scenes of violence and murder 
expand and overshadow narrative developments. However, the grouping of these two authors is 
somewhat perplexing in the context of Todorov’s broader claim about the thriller’s abandonment 
of retrospection to a more precarious present. While Chandler’s detective Philip Marlowe 
certainly meets his share of physical harm, Chandler’s novels are narrated in the first person in a 
past tense that would seem to guarantee the detective’s mortal safety. A certain sense of 
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vulnerability might be attributable to what I discuss below (and at greater length in Chapter 3) as 
the uniquely unretrospective quality of Marlowe’s past tense; but the distinction makes more 
immediate sense for Hammett, who, in developing the famous detective Sam Spade from his 
anonymous prototype (known as the “Continental Op”) switched from first person to third 
person and therefore removed the assurance that the detective (or anyone) lives to tell the tale.    
The purpose of this extended discussion of Todorov’s typology is not to rehearse the 
pitfalls of French structuralism, but rather to start to bring into focus some of the ways in which 
the fictional forms of suspense, particularly in the period immediately after World War II, take 
part in a more general reconceptualization of time in the twentieth century—especially around 
the problems of continuity and the apparent expansion of the domain of present. Todorov himself 
concedes that the formal developments of the suspense novel pose a challenge to his own 
temporal scheme: as a model of time, one that stands for the present, the suspense novel cannot 
be explained in terms of succession through time because, though it is supposed to mark a point 
of transition, it also coexists with the thriller. In other words, the rhetorical distinction of the 
present collapses into asynchrony in its formulation as a mode of suspense. One reason that it is 
hard for Todorov to place the thriller within time is that the time of the thriller—its strained 
continuities, its perilous and precarious presents—seems to have formed part of the concept of 
time and of temporality that he seeks to apply to it. Thus, two years later, Gilles Deleuze is not 
just making an analogy when he insists in his preface to Difference and Repetition (1968) that “a 
book of philosophy should be…a very particular species of detective novel.” Instead, he’s 
describing the “cruel” and violent process through which empirical notions of time are formed 
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more generally: the “zones of presence” dramatized in romans noirs take their part in “the most 
insane creation of concepts ever seen or heard” (xx).8  
In using the somewhat more capacious term thriller to group the works in this 
dissertation, I mean to draw attention away from problems of generic description and towards the 
aesthetic, ethical and philosophical implications of literary and cinematic works that sought, after 
the war, to isolate the present and to disjoin suspense from the temporal continuum presumed to 
be necessary to it. This doesn’t reject Todorov’s enduring typology so much as it amplifies the 
implication in it that, whatever the thriller is and whenever it appears, it is better understood as a 
form of time than as a set of generic criteria. Or to put an even finer point on it: if the cold war 
era can be described as the time of the thriller—and not just a time of perpetual suspense—this is 
because such a claim is more a tautology than a metaphor.  
Of all the texts examined in the following pages, the efforts to isolate the present are 
perhaps most palpable in the postwar work of Elizabeth Bowen. In order to arrive at a clearer 
sense of how narrative suspense in this period is, as it were, suspended and reformulated in 
relation to shifting conceptions of time, Chapter 1 of this study is largely focused on her major 
novel of the period, The Heat of the Day (though this will be placed in the context of her other 
fiction and nonfiction writing). This novel, based to some extent on Bowen’s own firsthand 
experience of war, is quite explicit in its theorization of time, which is manifest everywhere in 
the book—from the aphoristic commentary of the narrator, to the unusual symmetries in the 
organization of the chapters, to the way that the characters act and speak, and even down to the 
way that the sentences are structured and punctuated. The existential crisis that motivates all this 
is the menace of what Bowen elsewhere calls “the immense To-day,” a pervasive fear—still 
                                                             
8 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, translated by Paul Patton (New York: Columbia Universiy 
Press, 1994). 
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quite alive today—that everything is collapsing into an all-encompassing now (437).9 Against 
this movement—or rather counter-movement—the novel stages what can be described as a 
rhetorical analysis of the present, which for Bowen is as much a problem of language as it is an 
existential and historical one. For its effect, this formal strategy must suspend narrative 
indefinitely, but this turns out to be a monumental undertaking for a novel about spies, 
blackmail, love affairs, bombings and all the other sorts of things that, in thrillers, tend to entail 
happening.  
The principal way that the novel manages this is in its unusual mode of characterization: 
rather than motivating her characters, Bowen attaches to each of them a specific rhetorical form 
of time, and then, very much on the model of a laboratory experiment, steps back and observes 
how these figures interact. As the narrator clinically puts it: “The relation of people to one 
another is subject to the relation of each to time, to what is happening” (212). Bowen’s 
underlying research question might be formulated as follows: once the present cancels or 
subsumes everything that has happened, happens, and will happen, what endures? And in what 
sense can this, whatever it is, be the subject of literature insofar as literature is a mode of relation 
that is in turn subject to its relation to time? The choice of genre proves as revealing as it is self-
defeating. This line of inquiry educes from the conventional logic of the thriller a form of 
aesthetic recursion that (in retrospect) seems much more readily assimilable to the logic of 
postmodernism than to its own literary-historical moment. And, as the chapter ultimately argues, 
it is a question to which the novel cannot quite articulate an answer within the formal terms that 
it so urgently sets for itself. Instead, it defers to an evacuated realism, a “nonhuman…hub of 
imaginary life” in which the old novelistic forms of social relation and self-formation are 
                                                             
9 Elizabeth Bowen, Bowen’s Court and Seven Winters (London: Vintage, 1999). 
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transmitted from the past into the future, but which, unbound from the present, appear only as a 
“thoughtless extension” of the scenery, devoid of human interest (52, 372).      
An equivalent “hub” situates the iconic final shot of Graham Greene and Carol Reed’s 
The Third Man (1949), which extends radially and without end from Vienna’s Central Cemetery, 
repudiating the love interest that never quite finds its way to the film’s center. But, as I will argue 
in Chapter 2, Greene (in his own writing and also in his collaborations with Reed) arrives at the 
same point from almost precisely the opposite direction. In a trivial sense, The Third Man stages 
a scenario in which it seems that, just as in The Heat of the Day, things won’t happen: we learn 
in the opening scene that the main character has just died, which leaves no reason for the plot to 
go forward even though it does anyway. But how this scenario plays out in the film, and in 
Greene’s work more generally, reverses the stakes: while Bowen maintains a certain strained 
fidelity to principles of aesthetic continuity, Greene finds continuity to be, as he puts it, “the 
enemy of life” (66).10  
From our side of the developments of poststructuralism in literary theory over the 
following decades, this might seem like a fairly banal complaint about the incommensurability of 
narrative fiction and reality—highlighting in advance of Roland Barthes, for instance, the way in 
which narrative systematically confuses temporal sequence and causal consequence. But for 
Greene, this antipathy derives not from a suspicion or skepticism towards narrative so much as a 
deep philosophical and theological unease with the prevalent belief in the first half of the 20th 
century that, as William James formulated it, the system of “relations that connect experiences” 
is as empirically real as any discrete object of sense experience.11 Such a system, by radicalizing 
the empiricism of David Hume, in effect opened consciousness out into a world of “pure” 
                                                             
10 Graham Greene, Ways of Escape (Londan: Vintage, 1999). 
11 William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976). 
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unbounded continuity, which Greene took to be as eternally bleak and confounding as disciples 
of thinkers like James and Henri Bergson took to be a promise of existential freedom.  
Against this indefinite protophenomenological background to human intuition and 
temporal experience, Greene suggests that, in film at least, mistakes of aesthetic continuity—
slight visual lapses or narrative inconsistencies that disrupt the illusion of temporal 
seamlessness—can become a form of “unconscious poetry” (66). Chapter 2 seeks first to 
discover and to describe the elusive poetry of the continuity error, and then to follow out its 
aesthetic and ethical implication in both cinematic and literary terms. The primary focus is on the 
two Greene and Reed thrillers of the postwar period—The Fallen Idol (1947) and The Third 
Man—but the analyses of the films are contextualized in relation to Greene’s novels, to Reed’s 
other postwar productions, to the short story on which The Fallen Idol was based, and to some of 
Greene’s own non-fiction writing about film and literary style.  
The chapter will show that, though the minute art of the continuity error has little in 
common with the more drastic experiments of high modernism or the avant-garde, it signals an 
important front on which the conventions of narrative suspense are provisionally discontinued as 
the “temporal resources” of storytelling adapt to the dominant figurations of time at midcentury. 
Any art of error, however, presents an intractable paradox: once an error is admitted as part of a 
work of art—once it appears deliberate, or even just accidentally meaningful—it would in effect 
be purified and drawn into the system of relations that it was supposed to contravene. And just as 
The Third Man fails properly to end as Alida Valli walks indifferently through the cemetery, 
right on past the edge of the frame, so too does the art of the continuity error fail properly to fail, 
which suggests that everything is still dragged together and onward in a grim metonymy that not 
even death can terminate. 
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Chapter 3 follows these aesthetic quandaries across the Atlantic in the postwar work of 
Raymond Chandler. Once again, there is a trivial sense in which the presumption of narrative 
continuity is suspended: Chandler’s famous hardboiled detective, Philp Marlowe, is a serial 
character who appears time and again for decades but doesn’t apparently age—even though the 
world in which he operates, one of the great literary depictions of the city of Los Angeles in the 
twentieth century, is itself very much caught up in the social and historical upheavals of the era. 
Chandler, as the chapter will show, was well aware of this temporal incongruity, which 
(especially in the years after World War II) conditions the sense of suspense in novels that 
otherwise seem suspenseless. Unlike either conventional whodunnits or conventional thrillers, 
the Marlowe novels attempt to formulate a perpetual present—a narrational method that moves 
neither backward from known outcomes to mysterious events (e.g. there are scarcely clues to be 
found) nor forward to an unknown future (e.g. the same scenes recur over and over again).  
 The aesthetic strategy runs deeper than the novels’ generic seriality or the agelessness of 
the protagonist: there is a programmatic effort in Chandler to disinvest narration of the quality of 
retrospection typical of literary language—but to do so in the past tense. This is evident, for 
instance, in Chandler’s subtle but persistent refusal to present Marlowe as a writer or storyteller, 
even as his past tense stories are told in the first person and have a self-conscious poetic quality 
that stands out from other mystery writing of the period. As suggested above, such formal 
adjustments to the resources that narrative fiction had at hand in conceptualizing time are 
intensified in the postwar years, so while this chapter offers a general account of the arc of the 
Marlowe novels from beginning to end, its analysis is focused on the later works, especially what 
Chandler wrote during and immediately after the war. This includes The Lady in the Lake 
(1943), The Little Sister (1949), and The Long Goodbye (1954), as well as a discussion of Robert 
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Montgomery’s film adaptation of The Lady in the Lake (1947)—which, as a Hollywood thriller 
based on a highly unusual experiment in cinematic point of view, helps to highlight the temporal 
aporias around which suspense is constructed in the novels. The chapter concludes with 
discussions of the last Marlowe story, “The Pencil” (1959), and the last Marlowe novel, 
Playback (1957). The former was published in England and has since been largely ignored, and 
the latter is typically written off by scholars and genre-fans alike as an unmitigated failure, but—
as the titles, observed side by side, might already begin suggest—these final statements offer a 
reflexive analysis of the forms of time in Chandler’s fiction, a kind of retrospective admission 
that the prospect of an unretrospective past had been hopelessly recursive.     
 As was Chapter 2, this Chapter is thus also to a large extent a study of error, of failure 
understood as an aesthetic principle. One gets the sense while reading Chandler that, as in 
Bowen, the prose just barely holds itself from collapsing into the present tense as Marlowe goes 
about solving mysteries that keep unfolding in real time; but, in fact, the faults seem more often 
to transpire outside of the present as the novels conceive it. The chapter will show that where 
there are continuity errors in Chandler, these produce the opposite effect from what Greene had 
hoped for in his poetry of errors: where the unretrospective past fails (though it does so very 
rarely) it lapses into continuity, accidentally betraying the “temporal continuum” that it seeks to 
hold perpetually in abeyance. As in Bowen, and in Greene’s fiction and Reed’s films, this all but 
hidden form of time is abstracted as an infinitely dense and extensive structure of metonymic 
relations, an “inhuman” system, as Marlowe puts it, in which all things “tie together” (955).12  
If this figuration of time—as a system of continuous association radiating from an 
evacuated center—seems to have a kind of eschatological weight to it, this is perhaps because it 
                                                             
12 Raymond Chandler, Farwell, My Lovely, Stories and Early Novels (New York: Library of America, 
1995). 
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continues to resound late into the twentieth century as a general description of narrative—one 
that is still revivified from time to time in the Derridean cliché that there is no “outside-text.” In 
a marginally narrower (if not much more concrete) sense, it resounds as the social-historical 
“totality” that Fredric Jameson will spend decades trying to detect in Chandler and elsewhere, 
sustained by the belief that Lyotard was mistaken in thinking that the “temporal continuum” 
through which the world used to be known had altogether disappeared.13 In any case, Marlowe 
himself is in no position, in his last moments, to see anything in its entirety or to know much at 
all. The chapter will finally show that, instead of looking backward to write himself into the 
system of relations, Marlowe tries quite literally to write himself out of it—foregoing the critical 
distance of the storyteller in favor of the aesthetic myopia of one who spends his career searching 
for continuity errors. “The Pencil,” that is to say, records no solution; but at least, as Marlowe 
puts it, “I saw the little touches that flaw the picture” (1266).14   
  
 
 
 
                                                             
13 Jameson’s essays on Chandler, which will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 3, have been 
collected as Raymond Chandler: The Detections of Totality (New York: Verso, 2016).  
14 Raymond Chandler, “The Pencil,” Raymond Chandler: Collected Stories (New York: Everyman’s 
Library, 2002). 
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Chapter 1 - The Distinctions of the Present: Elizabeth Bowen’s The Heat of the Day 
 
I.  “THE IMMENSE TO-DAY” 
While a major novel and a considerable output of short fiction and nonfiction would 
already qualify Elizabeth Bowen among the most prolific English writers of the Second World 
War, she also spent considerable effort at the time writing the story of her family. Bowen’s Court 
(first published in 1942) was not intended, she says, to be a history book, but rather a study of 
memory. Yet, as it traces the history of the Anglo-Irish from Cromwell forward in the sequential 
figures of the Bowen patriarchs—closing in on the author in her own time—a very basic 
question takes on increasing complexity and urgency: whose memory? The stakes heighten 
when, early in the process of composition, war breaks out and the project takes on the proleptic 
quality of a suspense novel: “And to what,” she departs from the 18th century to interject, “did 
our fine feelings, our intimacies, our inspiring conversations, our wish to be clear of the bonds of 
sex and class and nationality, our wish to try to be fair to everyone bring us? To 1939” (125).1   
If Bowen found her family’s story at times to be, as she puts it, “Proustian in its sinister 
reconstruction of incident, in its demolition of accepted characters,” she goes farther than Proust 
in her own study of memory, which obliquely reconstructs the outbreak of World War II as a 
kind of interminable incident—and not only demolishes character-types in the process, but links 
such a figural demolition to the literal demolition of the ancestral home, suspending memory 
outside of any typical notion of what a character might be thought to encompass. “Life in these 
house-islands,” she writes, 
                                                             
1 Elizabeth Bowen, Bowen’s Court and Seven Winters (London: Vintage, 1999). 
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has a frame of its own. Character is printed on every hour, as on the houses and 
demesne features themselves. With buildings, as with faces, there are moments 
when the forceful mystery of inner being appears. This may be a matter of mood 
or light. Come on round the last turn of its avenue, or unexpectedly seen down a 
stretch of lawn, any one of these houses—with its rows of dark windows set in the 
light façade against dark trees—has the startling, meaning and abstract clearness 
of a house in print, a house in which something important occurred once, and 
seems, from all evidence, to be occurring still (20). 
At the time Bowen’s Court was republished in 1964 with a new Afterword by the author—but 
not at the time these words were written—Bowen’s court only existed as “a house in print,” 
having been torn down a few years earlier. This striking description, however, should not be 
taken as an allegory; nor are its moods and mysteries and surprises quite as gothic as they may 
seem, coming from one of the outstanding gothic writers of the 20th century; nor even should it 
suggest that Bowen (sometimes regarded as a precursor to postmodernism) on some level 
concedes that her history is tropologically haunted by a sort of metahistory, being merely as clear 
and as meaningful as it can be framed for print.2  
Rather, it attempts to grapple in phenomenological terms with a disturbed conception of 
narrative temporality, one which is bound implicitly to impressions of war—though these had 
reached the isolated, outlandish Anglo-Irish setting of Bowen’s Court only by a single radio 
                                                             
2 I refer loosely here to “tropic” historiography in the tradition of Hayden White but mean also to imply a 
distinction between Bowen’s concerns and those of the historiographic metafiction more conventionally 
associated with postmodernism. I will return to this distinction subsequently in the discussion of Bowen’s 
fiction, but for more specific treatments of Bowen as a proto-postmodernist see, for instance, Robert L. 
Caserio, “The Heat of the Day: Modernism and Narrative in Paul de Man and Elizabeth Bowen,” Modern 
Language Quarterly: A Journal of Literary History, no. 2 (1993); or Yoriko Kitagawa, “Anticipating the 
Postmodern Self: Elizabeth Bowen’s The Death of the Heart,” English Studies: A Journal of English 
Language and Literature, no. 5, (2000).  
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installed in its library, as “wave after wave of war news broke on the quiet air of the room” 
(457). Bowen addresses her reader in a kind of dilated present, which is given as an alternative to 
retrospection: 
Knowing, as you now do, that the house is no longer there, you may wonder why 
I have left my opening chapter, the room-to-room description of Bowen’s court, 
in the present tense. I can only say that I saw no reason to transpose it into the 
past. There is a sort of perpetuity about livingness, and it is part of the character of 
Bowen’s Court to be, in sometimes its silent way, very much alive. (459)  
This mysterious sense of a silent “perpetuity,” a state of being or a quality of memory that 
exceeds grammatical tense, takes shape in the chiasmic alternation of a scene’s “livingness” 
(whatever that might mean) and its printedness: “The land outside Bowen’s Court windows left 
prints on my ancestors’ eyes that looked out: perhaps their eyes left, also, prints on the scene? If 
so, those prints were part of the scene to me” (451).  
Whose memory is signaled in the quasi-technical process of storage by which this scene 
is perpetuated? Even while recognizing Bowen’s religious convictions, it is difficult to reconcile 
such vivid, hallucinatory appearances of the structure of history—as though it were an optical 
phenomenon, a play of light—with the urgent realism and diligent historiographical 
commitments of Bowen’s Court, its attempt show a past without “false mystery,” its claim that 
“fantasy is toxic” (454, 455). If this is meant to be figurative (though I suspect that it is not) its 
metalepses are so dazzling as to more or less force one to take it literally as an empirical 
description of history staging itself—installing ancestral eyes as information technology—and in 
the process calling profoundly into question the status of Bowen’s “me” in such an inhuman 
scene.  
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In this context, it is instructive to pause to ask why Bowen, in her various generic turns, 
never wrote a historical novel (or at least one more typically historical than The Heat of the Day), 
and what it might have been like if she had.3 Elsewhere, in Bowen’s Court and also in the fiction, 
one can sense an almost Lukácsian conviction that the particular whims and movements of her 
minor characters (in this case the Bowen patriarchs in the context of the Ascendancy) can be 
scaled up through various social and national “rings” in order to portray the grander forces and 
movements that define epochs.4 This is the process, she says, through which “unhistoric figures 
are made historic”—through which they are shown (with a degree of fantasy) to grapple with 
“nightmarish big analogies everywhere” but to rise from their former state of mystification. (454-
5). Yet the passage cited above entails a dramatic narrowing of scope—or perhaps more 
accurately, a de-anthropomorphizing of scope—a total subordination of the metonymic potency 
of character to a set of optical (or textual) impressions relayed through time, more or less 
detached from even a centralized consciousness—let alone a social milieu or a nation.  
W.J. McCormack has suggested, though without quite putting it this way, that The Heat 
of the Day (as a “contemporary-historical novel”) forms a fictional counterpoint to Bowen’s 
Court, staging in dialectical terms the resolution of the “family disinclination to join in and 
personal attention to epochal change” that underlies much of the apparent ambivalence of 
                                                             
3 The Last September (1929) might vaguely qualify as one, though Bowen’s work has not often been 
approached directly in these generic terms. But see Neil Corcoran’s chapter “Discovery of a Lack: 
History and Ellipsis in Elizabeth Bowen’s The Last September,” Elizabeth Bowen: The Enforced Return 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); or Julia McElhattan Williams’ “‘Fiction with the Texture of 
History’: Elizabeth Bowen’s The Last September,” MFS Modern Fiction Studies, vol. 41, no. 2 (June 
1995): 219–42  
4 “Rings” being, in Bowen’s idiom, what Lukács tends to refer to more plainly in terms of links in The 
Historical Novel: i.e. “[The character] achieves…a many-sided and full expression of his personality, but 
only insofar as it is linked with the big events of history” (Lukács 45).  
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Bowen’s Court (239)5. Ending her chronology rather abruptly at the brink of the First rather than 
the Second World War, Bowen herself does seem to suggest a need to counterpose the history 
she has written against some other kind of book:  
Even in the little area I have covered…even in the little society…whose 
evolution, being also that of the Bowens, I have tried to describe, the events and 
plans and passions between the years 1914 and 1941 would make a book that 
should be as long again as the book I have written by now…The lives of my own 
people become a little thing; from 1914 they begin to be merged already into a 
chapter of a different history. (437) 
The end of her study of memory is marked by a faltering of style, an increased tension in her 
sentences’ tense structure as some new, apparently massive “now” takes over, an imposing 
figure of presentness that causes her ancestral figures to shrink from their metonymic 
attachments to memory: “I shall…say goodbye [to them] at the start of one war that War as we 
now know it encloses in its immense To-day” (437). 
I take it that what appears here symptomatically as the encroachment of the singularizing 
incident of total war on Bowen’s efforts to record the past, as past, is actually somewhat the 
opposite: that Bowen’s reflexive shift to an inherently fictional conception of the present begins 
to shape her impressions of the temporality of war. One can see inklings of the novel to come. In 
The Heat of the Day, such grammatical stress-points will be amplified in what seems, against the 
terrifying inclination of the present to encompass the past, an attempt to modify the past tense so 
that it can in turn encompass the excesses of the present. As Michael North puts it, Bowen “calls 
upon the past tense in order to assert [her character’s] existence in the present” because she feels 
                                                             
5 W J Mc Cormack, Dissolute Characters: Irish Literary History through Balzac, Sheridan Le Fanu, 
Yeats and Bowen (New York: Manchester University Press, 2011). 
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a “responsibility to speak of immediacy itself in terms of the past” (109, 126). Such temporal 
contortions control the novel’s sense of suspense, its calibration to a sort of general impression of 
war, with much more potency than does its generic affiliation with the spy novel: one only gets 
so far, as North suggests, by remarking that Bowen’s “prose style [is] as twisted and indirect as 
the motives of her characters” (109).6  
Much of the scholarship on The Heat of the Day, regardless of objective or method, tends 
to start by pressing the novel towards one side or the other of this apparent conflict between the 
pastness of the present and the presentness of the past. Put a bit more concretely, one seems 
forced to decide in general terms whether the governing conflictual dynamics of Bowen’s prose 
are predominantly a response to the aerial bombardment of London, which Bowen experienced 
firsthand and which comprises much of the historical present of the novel; or whether, instead, 
the Blitz serves to illuminate its preconditions; whether, that is, the past inflects the present or the 
present inflects the past. This debate can be traced back through various critical scenes at least to 
the early 1980s, in Barbara Bellow Watson’s argument that, though the novel’s “disjointed 
present” is linked to its war-time setting, “a conviction is established…by the end…that the 
unreliability of knowledge and of people has been revealed rather than created by war” (93, 82).7 
Any counterargument to—or elaboration of—this thesis might stake itself against the more 
sinister implications of this sort of faith in literary revelation, noted more recently by Brook 
Miller et al.: that such readings tend to seek out “resolutions that...ultimately posit the passage of 
the war as a solution to the human crises that drive the plot” (133).8    
                                                             
6 Michael North, What is the Present? (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2018).  
7 Barbara Bellow Watson, “Variations on an Enigma: Elizabeth Bowen’s War Novel,” Elizabeth Bowen, 
edited by Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea House, 1987) 81-101.  
8 Brook Miller, with Luke Elward, Tessa Hempel and Philip Kollar, “Narrative, meaning and agency in 
The Heat of the Day, Elizabeth Bowen: New Critical Perspectives, edited by Susan Osborn (Cork: Cork 
University Press, 2009) 132-48. The distinction between the pastness of the present and the presentness of 
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 For various critical-historical reasons, however, this debate ends up largely eliding the 
efforts Bowen took in the self-conscious historiography of Bowen’s Court (written before The 
Heat of the Day), as well as in its Afterword (written after), not only to articulate just this sort of 
question but to suggest a number of ways of answering it9: 
I do not know how much, after that September of 1939, the color of my narration 
may have altered. The values with which I set out—my own values—did, at least 
to my own feeling, remain constant: they were accentuated rather than changed by 
war. The war-time urgency of the present, its relentless daily challenge, seemed to 
communicate itself to one’s view of the past, until, to the most private act or 
decision, there attached one’s sense of its part in some campaign. Those days, 
either everything mattered or nothing mattered. The past—private just as much as 
historic—seemed to me, therefore, to matter more than ever: it acquired meaning; 
it lost false mystery. In the savage and austere light of a burning world, details 
leaped out with significance. Nothing that ever happened, nothing that was ever 
even willed, planned or envisaged, could seem irrelevant. War is not an accident: 
it is an outcome. One cannot look back too far to ask, of what? (453) 
                                                             
the past in Bowen is of narratological and historiographical interest, but it might also subtend more 
specific questions about the literary-historical placement of her wartime fiction—whether, for instance, 
this work is best considered as a response to the immediate context of wartime London or whether, in its 
gothic mode, it restores a specifically Anglo-Irish tradition. This could be a bit of a false dichotomy, but 
as Thomas S. Davis has recently pointed out in The Extinct Scene: Late Modernism and Everyday Life 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), it stands as a basic rift in studies that seek to historicize 
Bowen’s fiction. In his chapter, “War Gothic,” Davis proposes a generic resolution in which Bowen is 
seen to “appropriate for a bombed imperial metropole” “a genre initially suited for a dying settler colonial 
class,” such that her war stories “anticipate a historical recurrence of Anglo-Ireland’s fate in postwar 
Britain” (174).   
9 See, however, Anna Teekell’s “Elizabeth Bowen and Language at War,” New Hibernia Review / Iris 
Éireannach Nua, vol. 15, no. 3 (2011): 61–79. Teekell does not treat Bowen as a historiographer, but 
considers Bowen’s Court as an indispensable formal counterpart to The Heat of the Day and discovers a 
number of illuminating structural resonances between the two works. 
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It is perhaps facile to say that these lines, taken from the 1964 Afterward to Bowen’s Court, 
might just as well have been composed as an afterword to The Heat of the Day, a novel about 
nothing so much as the extreme overburdening of detail in the “savage and austere light of a 
burning world.” But certainly Bowen’s historiographical reflections help frame the novel after 
the fact and even in the present. In a trivial sense, a generic turn to suspense fiction seems apt for 
a writer concerned minutely with the operations of “false mystery,” with the narrative processes 
against which “private” details take on a sense of exaggerated momentousness—and, by 
extension, with the “historic” processes against which the general urgency of the wartime 
moment, the constant abstract stress of “the present” per se, seems (as if by reflex) to resolve into 
a state of formal clarity and distinctness that is as surprising as it ought to have been predictable. 
 But Bowen’s work indicates a substantial alteration of the terms of the conventional 
thriller. Even as her Afterward to Bowen’s Court is written in the past tense from the cold war 
vantage of the 1960s, this postscript to her war writing—its encapsulation of a certain form of 
suspense at a certain historical turning point—presents a “view of the past” that is curiously 
devoid of a sense of the future. In passing here, but with more clarity in The Heat of the Day, one 
can distinguish forms of suspense that operate largely without the anticipatory logic that would 
seem essential to them. By extension, and much more broadly, Bowen’s midcentury work marks 
a subtle but ubiquitous re-orientation of the existential ground of the 20th century novel, a literal 
and figurative mid-point between “perpetuities”: between, on the one hand, the chronic post-
humanistic suspense of the cold war world—what Mark Seltzer calls “the unreal reality of the 
perpetual postwar condition” that extends “from World War II to World War Z” (25); and, on the 
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other hand, the more humanistic conditions of narrative suspense of which these might (if only in 
retrospect) be considered the “outcome.”10  
Recently, Paul K. Saint-Amour has written of the latter in terms of the “tense future” of 
modernism, particularly as it shapes the literary experiments of the interwar years. Saint-Amour 
argues that the incidents of World War II were unusual in their capacity to traumatize 
prospectively those living at once with the memory of one war and in anticipation of another, to 
precipitate a kind of mourning-in-advance and a sense of “perpetual suspense.” Insofar as the 
narrative fiction composed between the wars could capture such experiences in “real time,” they 
instantiate a phenomenology—a “perpetual interwar” condition—that contravenes history’s 
official termini. In Saint-Amour’s retrospective view of the interminable prospects of late 
modernity, “expecting the unexpected” becomes a general state of being.11 If this being resounds 
in perpetuity as a basic experiential condition of human life, then the contours of the “immense 
To-day” that it somehow seems to precede would be far more difficult to trace: what Bowen 
outlines is the almost unimaginable experience of unexpecting the expected.  
 
II. FIGURAL EQUIVOCATION AND THE DEGRADATION OF SUSPENSE 
The grotesque distention of the present into which The Heat of the Day opens, when 
“cigarettes would be soon to be seen to glow,” a “blurting” “incontinent” sound threatens, but 
more or less fails, to put the narrative in motion.12 Issuing as it does from the peculiar vaginal 
mouth of the peculiarly named Louie Lewis—a mouth “caked round the edges, the edges only, 
                                                             
10 Mark Seltzer, The Official World (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016).  
11 See especially Chapter 2, “Perpetual Suspense: Virginia Woolf’s Wartime Gothic,” and the Conclusion, 
“Perpetual Interwar,” of Tense Future: Modernism, Total War, Encyclopedic Form (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2015)  
12 Elizabeth Bowen, The Heat of the Day (New York: Anchor Books, 2002) 
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with what was left of lipstick, inside which clumsy falsified outline the lips turned outward, 
exposed themselves—full, intimate, woundable thin-skinned, tenderly brown-pink as the 
underside of a new mushroom”—it strikes, but does not move, its target. Yet the blow is 
accidental, for it was the speaker’s “self not her sex that she had wished to assert” (8-9). This 
insoluble metonymic confusion signals not so much a characterological disposition (i.e. a sense 
that, say, Louie is as false as her lipstick) as it does a set of temporal and figural crises: the 
hallucinogenic flux of Bowen’s past tense obscures the schemes by which the most basic 
conventions of intimacy (let alone the conventions of literary love) can be sensually organized.  
Such language tends, for many readers of Bowen, to provoke nebulous, deconstructive 
fantasies of half-literal dissolution: bodies seem to come to pieces, the nature of nature, in all its 
kaleidoscopic new-mushroominess, is called into question—falsified while being rendered with 
more tenderness and distinctness than ever. This is deranged writing, as Andrew Bennett and 
Nicholas Royle put it in a frequently cited book: “more visibly and more sharply even than in the 
work of Henry James,” the novel “metamorphoses” into “stony clarity” as its “generic 
dissolution” is staged by the “telepathic network of multiple voices and identities” that 
constitutes Bowen’s “bizarre omniscient narrator” (83).13 If such studies of Bowen’s 
“strangeness”—most prominently, Maud Ellmann’s Elizabeth Bowen: The Shadow Across the 
Page—have been important in bringing Bowen out of the shadow of James, they have also 
risked in turn shrouding her in a phantasmagoria of Derridian traces and specters, which seem 
too much at home to be easily dispelled.14  
                                                             
13 Andrew Bennett and Nicholas Royle, Elizabeth Bowen and the Dissolution of the Novel (London: 
Macmillan, 1995). 
14 Maud Ellman, Elizabeth Bowen: The Shadow across the Page (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2003). 
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I raise this line of criticism up front not to critique deconstructive interpretations of 
Bowen in general, but to indicate a figural problem that is arguably quite distinct in her work. 
One confronts a tenacious reciprocity between figurative and descriptive language, a kind of 
stereoscopic quality to her sentences, which (like Louie’s confusion of sex and self) show 
symptoms of a broader tension in her “bizarre omniscient narrator” between a perspective that is 
as extreme in its dissolute myopia and shortsightedness as it is in its perspicuity—that shifts 
jarringly between descriptive rumination and theoretical pronouncement, between detail and 
aphorism, instant and eternity.  
Such tensions have often been described in terms of the suspense or suspension of 
Bowen’s prose, terms which tend to fudge generic description with something even less distinct 
to try to get at whatever it is that haunts the conventional realism in her style.15 But to the extent 
that such accounts exceed the narrowest generic definitions of suspense, they often wind up 
rehearsing, through a postructural idiom, a set of oppositions that can be regarded as central to 
                                                             
15 For instance, Julian Wolfreys, in Writing London - Volume 2: Materiality, Memory, Spectrality (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), opposes varying forms of “narrative suspense” to “temporal 
movement” in Bowen’s war writing—imagining that a spectral London manifests itself in her prose by 
way of a kind of rhetorical pausing apparatus (59-83). While critics have generally taken advantage of the 
punning flexibility of the forms of suspense (i.e. suspension, suspendedness, etc.) to figurally wrangle it 
to different ends, Claire Seiler has more recently drawn a sharper distinction between “suspense” of the 
“what-will-happen-next?” sort and “suspension” of the stopping-and-waiting-around sort. To me this 
distinction seems too rigid to account for the variability of Bowen’s own use of the forms of suspense; 
and, more generally, the temporal dynamics of the novel are not reducible to a two-way tension between 
narrative motion (things happening) and counternarrative stasis (things not happening), as this chapter 
will show. See Claire Seiler, “At Midcentury: Elizabeth Bowen’s The Heat of the Day,” 
Modernism/modernity, vol. 21, no. 1 (2014): 125-45. The ghostliness or of Bowen’s suspense is also 
more obviously a feature of her (sometimes uncertain) literary-historical placement in an Anglo-Irish 
gothic tradition. See Davis’s “War Gothic,” cited above; also W. J. McCormack, Dissolute Characters: 
Irish Literary History Through Balzac, Sheridan Le Fanu, Yeats, and Bowen (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1993); Margot Backus, The Gothic Family Romance: Heterosexuality, Child Sacrifice, 
and the Anglo-Irish Colonial Order (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999); Neil Corcoran, 
Elizabeth Bowen: The Enforced Return (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).  
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the narrative temporality of literary realism. Fredric Jameson’s recent definition in The 
Antinomies of Realism is helpful here, in which 
what we call realism…come[s] into being in the symbiosis…of storytelling with 
impulses of scenic elaboration, description and above all affective investment, 
which allow it to develop towards a scenic present which in reality, but secretly, 
abhors the other temporalities which constitute the force of the tale or récit in the 
first place. (11)  
I will return subsequently to the question of the primacy of scenic elaboration, but for now I want 
simply to suggest that Bowen’s temporalities of suspense and suspension are formally innovative 
in at least the important sense that, through an extraordinary exaggeration, they reveal just this 
sort of secret—but nevertheless preserve the fundamental symbioses of the realist narratives to 
which they so steadily refer. Considering how often Bowen herself uses variations of the term 
suspense in ways that leap out as ready-made emblems of her style, it is tempting to characterize 
the scene referenced at the start of this section as a moment of suspended intimacy—a moment 
that, as such, expresses something essential about the temporality of Bowen’s fiction. But such 
phraseology threatens to redouble rather than explain the figural predicament at hand, implying a 
certain closeness to the text, a critical grasp on its effects, while at the same time rendering it 
ineffable, visceral (which is to say, calling it literature).  
This impasse coincides with a basic definitional paradox of suspense, which is that it can 
be easily identified as something one feels even while, at the same time, understood to be strictly 
fictional or rhetorical; that one can sense it when, say, watching certain films or reading certain 
novels, or even when hearing a lecture or a speech, but that it may not be something actually ever 
experienced in real time. There is some philosophical precedent for raising this dilemma insofar 
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as it hints at the difficulty of disentangling what suspense is from its effects. The paradox I 
suggest here is correlative to what a number of theorists of suspense have approached more 
directly as the “paradox of suspense”; namely, that one can re-experience the effects of a 
suspenseful work of fiction the second time around even though suspense nominally depends on 
certain narrative manipulations of knowledge that would, by then, be spoiled.16 This crux, and 
questions related to it, have typically been approached from the perspectives of cognitive 
narratology or affect theory17; but for this study I will proceed not from the implication that 
suspense is always on some level artificial, but rather suggest that it is, in a more fundamental 
way, functionally obsolete—which is not precisely a matter of either effect or affect. 
Suspense, that is to say, always seems to have undergone a terminological degradation 
that hinders its operations: it has lost some of its meaning on two vital fronts. Aside from its 
usage in the context of basic generic identification, it does not quite retain either literalness or 
figurativeness. It is more a pun than a phenomenon. Its figurative senses, to the extent that these 
tend to refer to affective responses to fiction—its hangings, its tensions, its forces, and so forth—
are often taken up quite literally—on the faces of cliffs, across suspension bridges, in outer 
space; while its literal sense, to the extent that it refers to the holding in abeyance of a payment 
or promise, usually appears as a metaphor for a technique of narrative manipulation, a kind of 
epistemological craftwork (as in Hitchcockian suspense, which depends, as it were, on the 
granting and withholding of knowledge in careful balance). Suspense, then, is not yet a dead 
metaphor—but is one that seems in a rather unique way to be perpetually dying, is un-dead; and 
                                                             
16 For an overview of this topic in contemporary philosophy, see Noël Carroll, “The Paradox of 
Suspense,” Beyond Aesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) or Juan A. Prieto-Pablos, 
“The Paradox of Suspense,” Poetics, no. 26 (1998): 99-113.  
17 See note above, and, for a more extensive collection of cognitive approaches to suspense, Peter 
Vorderer, Hans J. Wulff, Mike Friedrichsen (eds.), Suspense: Conceptualizations, Theoretical Analyses 
and Empirical Explorations (New Jersey: Laurence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 1996). 
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so its usage pulls it at once towards and away from that particular linguistic void into which 
tired, over-stressed metaphors are so prone to plummet. 
This tenuous figure is what contextualizes the scene of suspended intimacy cited above, 
inflecting almost every word and phrase: 
Having hung for just that instant more suspended the music now broke with a 
light crash. The audience let out a breath and settled into its attitudes on the 
chairs. Evening had gained on the theatre even in that mean-time; a more 
perceptible smell of it stole from under the thickets, rose from the trodden grass. 
Cigarettes would be soon to be seen to glow. On the stage, the musicians’ grouped 
black seated bodies had fastened to them the faces and hands of ghosts. They 
were to continue to play till the clock in the distance struck—but for how long, 
how much longer, it was being wondered in the emptying ranks of chairs, would 
they be able to see their score? (11). 
The scene here is altogether bound up with the intricate uncertainty of the status of 
suspendedness as a kind of metaleptic irritant. The word itself divides the initiatory sentence into 
perfect syllabic symmetry, appearing to hold its halves in suspension before the latent puns can 
even begin to hint at what that might mean. This apparent symmetry exists in further tension 
with the word’s disruption of how the unpunctuated sentence scans: it can belong to either 
clause, or to both at once. Having first hung then crashed, its figurative connotations then begin 
to morph as the senses of suspense are concatenated from one phrase to the next, flitting in and 
out of what, in such a cinematic sequence, might with particular aptness be called the diegesis. It 
transforms into a rhetorical effect, having been, one now learns, holding the audience breathless 
on the edge of its seats. It transforms again into a metaphor for a certain type of narrative 
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temporality, the “mean-time” which pervades this scene and so many others in The Heat of the 
Day, collecting phenomenological weight as it begins to distend the prose—“cigarettes would be 
soon to be seen to glow”—before returning again to its rhetorical form, this time to attach to the 
bodies of the musicians in their capacity to captivate the crowd. Finally, the clock strikes in the 
distance to force a sudden perspectival enlargement of the scene: the locus of suspense is, in an 
instant, scaled up to encompass the whole city of London in the grim, inexorable metonymy by 
which the darkness overtaking the score and thinning the crowd is linked to the memory and 
anticipation of the arrival of the Luftwaffe.  
It is important to note that this concert takes place in the middle of the war, about two 
years after the Blitz, so that these transient forms of suspense are not quite imminent but rather a 
kind of residue, producing something like the atmosphere Bowen reports in a 1948 sketch of 
postwar Prague: 
Suspense tightened the air all the time I was there. Was this no more than 
climatic? Was this a residual suspense, left behind by the Occupation, unable, so 
far, to have dissolved because there had been so much of it? It was open to me to 
think so – I could not think so, quite. We were still in the middle of something; 
destiny was not finished. (84)18 
In capturing their protracted decay, Bowen’s prose does not mimic or redouble the forms of 
suspense that permeate it. It does not draw readers to the edge of seats but rather into a state of 
laborious, interrupted concentration, sending the eye backwards to scan and rescan words and 
phrases, the senses of which only take shape retroactively and with effort. Suspense, 
suspendedness, suspension in all its intricate transformations is depleted, depurated from the 
                                                             
18 Elizabeth Bowen, “Prague and the Crisis,” People, Places, Things: Essays by Elizabeth Bowen, edited 
by Allan Hepburn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008). 
 31 
 
scene, but kept half-alive. I doubt that anyone has ever called a Bowen novel a page turner; and I 
don’t think it would be controversial to assert that, in The Heat of the Day, the belabored, 
Hamlet-like suspension of the question of the lover’s betrayal of his nation—which will set up 
the ostensible plot—loses its pull long before the answer is blurted out incontinently and semi-
incoherently towards the end of the book, which nevertheless must be finished.19 
This technique of figural equivocation, while subtler than others that might be called 
metafictional, does function to hold some of the narrative special effects of the realist novel in 
abeyance—to reveal, borrowing again Jameson’s idiom, something of the “secret” draw of the 
“scenic present.” One can find this as a nascent quality of Bowen’s earlier fiction. In The Death 
of the Heart (1938), to take one vivid (if somewhat esoteric) example, the young protagonist 
Portia finds herself at one point “[feeling] something in the joints of her knees, which shook” 
while, half-relevantly, “the Sunday smell of the joint [the cook] was basting crept underneath the 
crack of her door” (268). Though the term is neither quite dead nor quite a metaphor, the 
excessive bodily presence and literalness of the doubled joint nevertheless gives otherwise bare 
scenic description the reflexive quality of a pun, of a figure of speech coming to life—so that 
when, a few chapters later, Portia, in a friend’s grip, feels her “joint untense,” the odd locution 
has an accumulated air of metalepsis about it that is as vague, obscure and pointless to any 
narrative or figural developments in the novel as it is conspicuous for the way it ought to produce 
a scenic effect that never quite transpires.20  
The technique seems more refined in the wartime fiction (somehow it is accomplished 
even in the mere naming of a character, say, Louie Lewis); it gains increasing prominence in her 
                                                             
19 Seiler, for instance, characterizes the novel as a “counter-thriller” and suggests that, with its lack of 
conventional suspense, it provides the “antidote” to works like Graham Greene’s The Third Man (141).   
20 Elizabeth Bowen, The Death of the Heart (New York: Anchor Books, 2000) 
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later work (A World of Love (1954), for instance, has a character who habitually sucks eggs as if 
doing so only because she’s a figurative egg-suck or to enact the familiar dismissal, go suck an 
egg); and it reaches an apparent extreme in her final work, Eva Trout (1968)—the title of which 
lends itself to all manner of fishy puns throughout the novel. The most sustained study of the 
peculiar punning quality of Bowen’s prose is to be found in Bennett and Royle’s The Dissolution 
of the Novel, which describes the “ghoulish paronomasia” of Eva Trout (151). But critics of 
Bowen continue to be (and have since her own time been) varyingly intrigued and put off by the 
word-play, which seems eccentric, disruptive or out of place in ways that have proven somewhat 
difficult to account for.     
If The Heat of the Day is thus marked by “linguistic upheaval,” as Mc Cormack puts it, 
this is perhaps most prominent in the novel’s senses of suspense. These undergo baffling 
concatenations not just at the lexical and figural levels indicated above, but in the form of the 
novel itself, which takes shape through an intricate juxtaposition of characters and character-
types, all with varying temporal orientations. More than just the critical “demolition of 
character” and sinister reconstruction of incident that she associates with Proust—and that would 
align more generally with modernist reorganizations of memory, perspective and narrative 
temporality—her reconstruction of the scene of war stages the meticulous degradation of each 
possible form of suspense that might make its incidents seem to be, or to have been, present in 
some forcefully singular way.  
This speaks directly to how, as Bowen writes in the Afterword cited above, “the color of 
my narration may have altered” in “the war-time urgency of the present.” Without ever quite 
suggesting a postmodernist reflex towards parody or humor, the figural instability of suspense 
not just as a genre or an affect but as a kind of perpetual pun holds in relief the fictionality of the 
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extreme sense of presentness with which the novel is so persistently at odds. This extended 
reflexivity amounts to an “overfulfillment of the norms inherent to the [thriller] genre,” as 
Armen Avanessian and Anke Hennig put it, speaking in particular of suspense fiction written in 
the present tense—and in doing so effects the “exposure of the gears of its affect machinery” 
(68).21 Bowen’s narrator provides the following formula, which, in accentuating the relation of 
what has been felt and what is to be felt to “what is happening,” seems also to render that 
relationship especially tenuous, forcing “now” into scare quotes:  
The relation of people to one another is subject to the relation of each to time, to 
what is happening. If this has not always been felt—and as to that who is to 
know—it has begun to be felt, irrevocably. On from now, every moment, with 
more and more of what had been “now” behind it would be going on adding itself 
to the larger story. (217)   
Aggregated, the novel’s “morphologies of suspense” (to borrow Saint-Amour’s label) outline the 
distinctions of the present in such a way that “now” comes to “untense” its phenomenological 
grip on real time.  
 
III. THE BEGINNING OF THE NEWS (THE PASTNESS OF THE PRESENT) 
In sticking to the past tense in order to write retrospectively and sometimes prospectively 
of the present, of “what is happening,” Bowen ensnares her prose in some of the most persistent 
and intractable aporias of conventional past tense narration, and for the most part she seems to be 
doing so deliberately. In a way—though without an avant-garde impulse to declare the novel 
formally extinct—The Heat of the Day functions as a kind of retrospective of the novelistic 
                                                             
21 Armen Avanessian and Anke Hennig, Present Tense: A Poetics (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015). 
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moment, a critical compendium of narrative techniques by which novels became equal to the 
present—before, so to speak, the present became what it is today.  
Bowen criticism has tended, from different angles, to track a single fundamental temporal 
distinction in her work, what I simplify in the preface of this chapter as a division between the 
pastness of the present and the presentness of the past. The former is an effect that, for much of 
the history of the novel, is inherent in the tense structure of narration, which typically renders 
events imagined to have been present as past in the act of recording or storytelling; the latter is 
an effect that seems to operate independently of grammatical tense, for instance in the ways that 
fictions are, as it were, presented to or made present to readers even if they are supposed to issue 
from a factual or imagined past. While such tensions often seem to underlie discussions of the 
historicity of Bowen’s work (as opposed to its fictionality or narrativity, per se), they proceed 
more or less directly from the canonic formalist distinction between sujet and fabula and 
comprise an instructive testing ground for theories of fictionality following Käte Hamburger’s 
influential effort to discharge the fictional present from the ordinary logic of grammatical tense.22  
But this basic dichotomy is inadequate to Bowen’s “immense To-day,” the distinctions of 
which proliferate as she delimits the present, marking it reflexively in the “relation of people to 
one another [as] subject to the relation of each to time.” A phenomenological conception of the 
pastness of the present is introduced within the first pages of the novel by way of Louie Lewis, 
whose perspective focalizes the scene of suspended intimacy discussed in the previous section. 
Even though she turns out to be a minor character, Louie’s temporal orientation will appear 
                                                             
22 Käte Hamburger, The Logic of Fiction (Bloomington: Indiana University press, 1973). Michael North 
has recently brought these traditions directly to bear on Bowen’s fiction. In his chapter, “Narrative and 
‘The Unexplained Instant,’” in What is the Present? (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2018), 
North triangulates Louie Lewis’s peculiar present in the context of theories of the novel, of fictionality, 
and of narrative in order to question some of the most basic assumptions that have been made about the 
temporal formations of narrative fiction and about the relation of tense to time more generally (109-135). 
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increasingly distinct as it is reflected in the presentness of the past of the novel’s principal 
villain, the Nazi informant Robert Kelway—but several other such relations are to be established 
first and will remain in perpetual conflict. 
“With regard to time,” Louie suffers from what Bowen’s critical narrator calls “an infant 
lack of stereoscopic vision,” though this critical distance tends to collapse when Louie is the 
focus of the scene: “she saw then and now on the same plane; they were the same” (15). Louie’s 
now—explicitly and not just as an accident of narrative convention—is identified by its thenness: 
“She now, that is to say, within these last years, never left London, having been left with no 
place to go”; “At present, though bodily seated on a chair on a darkening slope listening to 
music, she was in effect again in the park rose garden, where she had been walking that 
afternoon” (14, 15). In each case the familiar past tense of the fictional present is uniquely 
disorienting. This is especially true of the latter, in which the slight pastness of literary language 
seems only a brief, ineffectual snag in a sentence sent tumbling down a “darkening slope” of 
retrospection: “At present” slips first into a past that might as well be present (she was “bodily 
seated on a chair”) then into a past that is more definitively past by virtue of it being repeatable 
(“she was in effect again in the park”) before landing decisively in the past perfect (“where she 
had been walking that afternoon”).  
This tense predicament is, for Louie, an existential one—a crisis presented most vividly 
to Louie herself in the form of an intractable query: when was the beginning of the news? As if 
desperate to bring her retrogressive now in line with “what is happening,” Louie develops an 
intense infatuation with newspapers:  
[She] came to love newspapers physically; she felt a solicitude for their gallant 
increasing thinness and longed to feed them; she longed to fondle a copy still 
 36 
 
warm from the press, and, in default of that, formed the habit of reading 
crouching over her fire so as to draw out the smell of print…She was unable to 
watch a portion of fish being wrapped up in newspaper without a complex 
sensation in which envy and vicarious bliss merged. At the factory, she was 
drawn to girls and women in whom the same fermentation was to be felt at 
work—also, thanks to her daily build-up, she felt, and therefore appeared, less 
odd. (169-70)  
Much could be written about this extraordinary love scene for which there is not ample space 
here, but the result of its consummation is the anchoring of Louie’s perspective and its 
immediate social valuation, her discovery for the first time that “she had got a point of view, and 
not only a point of view but the right one” (168, emphasis original). In providing her with an 
“account of herself” as a human person in the context of the current of events, the news works 
something like a compressed Bildungsroman, vicariously stabilizing her character within a social 
typology otherwise at odds with her “odd” relation to time (168).  
 Yet the basic temporal incompatibility persists: in relation to the news, Louie’s infant 
consciousness suffers a “disadvantage owing to having begun in the middle,” interminably 
compelled to incorporate “how it had all begun”—for “evidently one thing must have led to 
another, as in life” (167). This “daily build-up” works as a form of inverted suspense, offering no 
promise of release, replacing the propulsive force of a tangible end with that of a formless 
beginning. Unable to pin Louie’s backsliding present to some other kind of now that might 
suspend its historical encroachment, the narrator defers to a sort of eternal narrative recursion: 
“If you could not keep track of what was happening you could at least take notice of what was 
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said—in the beginning was the word; and to that it came back in the long run. This went for 
anything written down” (167). 
If there is an air of condescension, even humor, in how the narrator treats Louie, it seems 
to me that the novel’s irony only extends so far as to cast passing doubt on the conviction that 
English wartime journalism conveyed what Louie calls “ideas”—as opposed to the mere 
ideology of German propaganda (170).23 This view is obviously suspect coming from an 
ignorant, childlike woman whose values and sense of self are produced entirely by her fanatic 
sensual engagement with newspapers. Reference to Bowen’s Court, however, lends this rather 
off-hand critique of the social function of the news a broader philosophical and theological heft. 
Louie’s quandary, though marginal to the plot of the novel, in fact gives voice to Bowen’s own 
retrogressive pursuit of the first cause of the present: “War,” to recall a key passage from her 
auto-historiography, “is not an accident: it is an outcome. One cannot look back too far to ask, of 
what?”  
Beyond seeming to encapsulate a whole phenomenology of time and philosophy of 
history, Louie’s tense crisis signals what is arguably an altogether new form of narration. When 
it is focalized through Louie, more than through any other character in the novel, the 
conventional literary past tense seems untenable. It is contorted to its breaking point. In a work 
whose prose functions as a kind of garrison against the perils of an impending now, Louie poses 
the greatest narratorial threat, insinuating that the present cannot be confined or relegated to the 
past (grammatically or otherwise) because, in the form of the novel—unlike in the news—the 
                                                             
23 As someone who worked for the Ministry of Information, reporting on Irish public opinion during the 
war as Britain shaped its strategy towards Ireland’s official neutrality, Bowen’s engagements with the 
forms of wartime propaganda are much more complex than this passing reference is meant to imply. For 
more on this topic, see Megan Faragher, “The Form of Modernist Propaganda in Elizabeth Bowen's The 
Heat of the Day” Textual Practice, vol. 27, no. 1 (2013): 49-68.  
 38 
 
two are constitutively bound up with one another. Avanessian and Hennig argue quite 
compellingly that one of the most substantial literary-historical developments of the postwar 
period is the advent of the present tense novel. This new form articulates what they call an 
“asynchronous present,” a now that is, like Louie’s, “contemporaneous with its past,” “that calls 
up an anteriority at the same time as it calls up the present” (as in Pynchon: “It has happened 
before but there is nothing to compare it to now. It is too late” [69]). Though The Heat of the Day 
appears on barely this side of the war, one finds in Louie (even against Bowen’s more 
conservative impulses) the postwar novel already on the absolute verge of shifting resolutely into 
the present tense—just at the moment when its present is most thoroughly past.  
 
IV. THAT WAS THAT (THE DIFFERENTIATED INSTANT) 
The novel’s first clear distinction of the present takes form in the contrast of Louie’s lack 
of “stereoscopic vision” with respect to time against a “curious trait” of the man (named at first 
only Harrison) with whom she feels she has shared that musical moment of suspended intimacy 
in the park: “One of his eyes either was or behaved as being just perceptibly higher than the 
other. This lag or inequality in his vision gave her the feeling of being looked at twice—being 
viewed then checked over again in the same moment” (9). Without inflecting the novel’s sense 
of immediacy with a sense of duration, per se, he does introduce a sort of qualitative 
differentiation to the present—at least insofar as anything that might qualify for him as a discrete 
moment does so twice at the same time. While the “lag” of Louie’s now draws it into the past, 
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Harrisons now and the one that lags behind it—or rather below it—occupy the same instant.24 
While Loui’s now is asynchronous, Harrison’s is asymmetrical.  
This constitutive asymmetry is registered outwardly not just as an ocular imbalance—
which seems to induce a temporal vertigo effect for anyone who sees him seeing—but more 
concisely in his “that-was-that” mustache (9). As the phrase that was that is repeated time and 
again in association with Harrison, its equation—x=x—takes on a sense of internal unevenness 
such that the second x seems qualitatively distinct from the first in much the same manner, say, 
as one apprehends the tick, tick of the clock as tick, tock. Against the destructive leveling effect 
of Louie’s temporal monocularism, Harrison’s synthetic vision of the instant works, as Deleuze 
will put it, to draw difference from repetition.25 
Even as his position is defined through a kind of obscure perceptual immediacy as 
opposed to a more perspicuous narrative teleology, he instates the closest thing the story has to a 
conventional narrative impulse: as far as visual metaphors go, Harrison’s temporal asymmetry 
seems more or less adequate to get the arrow of time, if not horizontal, at least pointed in enough 
of a direction to lay groundwork for the basic Aristotelian scheme of beginning, middle and end 
so dismally lacking for Louie. Although, naturally, he does so twice at the same time: “Odd,” 
                                                             
24 In switching somewhat loosely between these terms (i.e. now, instant, moment)—my intention is not to 
obscure or ambiguate a conception of the present, but rather to underscore the novel’s multivalent senses 
of immediacy—the way such familiar figures of speech cut across the singularity of the concept of the 
present, delineating its fictionality rather than its basis in time. The arbitrariness of such designations is a 
point the novel raises explicitly: “Sixty seconds make a minute, sixty minutes make an hour; but how 
many moments are there?... How long, compared to a minute, is a moment?” asks Robert’s niece, to 
which his gnomic reply is “That depends” (294-5, emphasis original). Even as they vary, these terms in 
their repetition do end up constituting a sort of hierarchy, albeit a tenuous and inconsistent one: now is 
generally the most arbitrary, a rhetorical marker, a zero point; an instant seems to have some minimal 
quality of human experience about it, involving the apprehension of time, the intermittent sense of it 
passing; and a moment takes on meaning or import, such that “a lifetime without moments” would be 
merely “an existence amongst tables and chairs, without rapture or mystery, grace or danger” (295).  
25 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, translated by Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1994.  
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remarks the novel’s central character, Stella Rodney, in discovering that she occurs for Harrison 
in dual plots, “that I should have turned up in two different stories.” “Yes,” he replies. “But it’s 
amazing how often that sort of thing does happen” (149).  
Perhaps, then, the novel’s most unexpected surprise—and perhaps even its most 
suspenseful turn—is the moment when Harrison himself seems suddenly to disappear from all of 
the novel’s stories: “You see, I’ve no idea how we left it,” says Stella of Harrison to her lover 
Robert Kelway (now revealed to be a Nazi informant) as the two draw out their final moment 
together, unsure of its ending. As if in acknowledgement that such things should be said twice 
with respect to Harrison, she is forced by circumstance to repeat herself: “I’ve no idea how we 
left it”—which provokes in Kelway a racking, desperate, convulsive “laughter of the entire 
being” at the sheer conventionality of the phrase—the sublime blandness of its repetition: 
The expression on those lips of hers was familiar—its many contexts, vagrant, 
social, so very much not mattering, had become too many for him to count. It had 
come as the end, or rather the fading-out of so many stories at the end of so many 
days; or, as a sort of confession as to why many stories, now that she came to tell 
them, had no ending...She had been given the slip once more. “I’ve no idea how 
we left it.” Ineffectual little expression, blent of boredom and chagrin, it had 
become conventional; but, at the same time, a sort of convention or shorthand of 
lovers’ talk, stamped with a temperament and endeared by usage. She had said 
this so many times: again it was said tonight—and the monstrous life-and-death 
disproportion between tonight’s context and all that host of others did not, could 
not, stand out as it should. (321, emphasis added) 
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Since Harrison is the counter-spy, his “monstrous” abeyance puts Kelway’s fate in suspense. But 
relegated to the endlessly repeatable “now” of conventional storytelling, the anticipation of 
Harrison’s return is rendered “ineffectual” at the moment it should be most effective. There’s a 
forceful allegorical feedback loop at work here: not knowing how things have been left with 
Harrison is cause for suspense, but the phrase “I’ve no idea how we left it” itself stands for the 
suspense it is supposed to cause, and only as such—as a “little expression,” a narratorial cliché 
“stamped with a temperament and endeared by usage” —does it re-enter the diegesis, where now 
it no longer functions as anything but a signal of the effect it does not have.  
The entire passage has a winking air about it, operating as a diffused pun: “The 
expression on those lips of hers was familiar.” This “expression” is bodily, aural, textual; it is the 
shape of lips, it issues from lips and can be read there; it is “familiar” as convention, as intimacy, 
as a figure of speech; it is sensual and rhetorical and funny for being both at the same time. And, 
indeed, Stella finds herself compelled to laugh as well—perhaps, though, only at the uneasy 
irony, “now that she came to tell” it, of committing the potent and frightening presence of 
Harrison’s that was that to the bored, conventional past of everyday storytelling: “I see how it 
sounded,” she admits, “but that was how it was” (322, emphasis original).  
 
V. EVERYTHING NOW (THE UNDIFFERENTIATED INSTANT) 
Against the qualitative differentiation of the present for which Harrison stands, the novel 
introduces the temporal predicament of Roderick, Stella Rodney's only child. As a young man 
inevitably called to the Army, Roderick presents the quintessential picture of modernity beset by 
routine, by the worst trajectories of bureaucratic social order, by the encroaching systemization 
and depersonalization of will and action: “I’ll really try to exert myself, if you’d rather,” says 
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Roderick to his mother, “But I don’t think the Army’s quite what it was in your day—everything 
now depends on so much else” (56). Stella fears not her son’s death but that “in the course of a 
process, a being processed…her son might possibly disappear…She dreaded dissolution inside 
his life, dissolution never to be repaired” (50). This expressly modern pathology extends to the 
apprehension of time, so that the “mysterious flutter…which used to emanate from the minutes 
seemed to stop”—so that, as “everything now,” each instant is as indistinguishable from as it is 
interdependent with every other (58).  
 Roderick’s relation to time becomes increasingly important as the novel’s core of 
humanism begins to appear coterminous with the forms of suspense—and by extension 
immediacy itself—that The Heat of the Day works to delimit. Roderick apprehends the world 
with “suspended, dispassionate curiosity” and has been rendered inert: “his heart had never 
moved from its place, having felt no pull from a moving thing” (66, 64). His desires, if they can 
be called that, are programmatic, positional, less than human—no more than the “idealization of 
pattern”: “What he liked about people was the order in which they could be arranged” (65). The 
result is that he lives in a world in which objects and moments alike are metonymically 
unmoored, interchangeable, de-acclimatized, such that any particular thing or instant is “without 
environment”—so that, for instance, the sofa in his mother’s flat “might have been some derelict 
piece of furniture exposed on a pavement after an air raid or washed up by a flood on some 
unknown shore” (57). The dereliction of “everything now” induces a kind of geographic 
dispersal of what should be the affective, temporal and psychological domain of the novel; it 
induces a general redistribution of suspense—of the intermittent tensions of the ticking clock and 
its bodily effects: 
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It was...as though the inner tension of London were being struck and struck 
without breaking. Heard or unheard, the city at war ticked over—if from this 
quarter, from these immediate streets, the suction of cars in private movement was 
gone, there was all the time a jarring at the periphery, an unintermittent pumping 
of vital traffic through arterial streets into arterial roads. Nor was that quite all: 
once or twice across the foreground of hearing a taxi careered as though under 
fire. (59) 
Against this collectivized, anthropomorphic background tone of the lifeform of London at 
war— of “all of the time” of the present outlined, peripheralized through its scenic elaboration—
the novel introduces an important alternate temporality, what it tentatively calls the “historic 
future,” a future that, neither quite utopian nor quite nostalgic, precludes anticipation. The single 
defining feature of Roderick’s existence is that he has been named heir, by an estranged family 
member, to Mount Morris—an Irish estate in Cork clearly modeled after Bowen’s Court. The 
“historic future” of Mount Morris—its scenic ulteriority—excludes the present but somehow 
functions to submerge the tautly suspended routine of “everything now” in a countervailing 
fantasy of absolute suspenselessness. To clarify this concept, it will be useful here to quote at 
length: 
The house came out to meet his growing capacity for attachment; all the more, 
perhaps, in that by geographically standing outside war it appeared also to be 
standing outside the present. The house, nonhuman, became the hub of his 
imaginary life, of fancies, fantasies only so to be called because circumstance 
outlawed them from reality. Submerged, soporific and powerful, these fancies 
made for his acquiescence to the immediate day. Weather he sought them out or 
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they him; whether they nourished him or he them, could not be said. They did not 
amount to desires, being without object nor to hallucinations, for they neither 
deceived him nor set up tension. Now he was in the Army, they filled those 
pockets of vacuum underlying routine. They were at their most vivid, most 
satisfying, in the bodily coma before sleep; but through the day they diversified 
those long docile will-less waits for his turn for something further to happen, 
fatigues, inspections, or simply hanging about. (52) 
“Simply hanging about”—again the nature of wartime suspense, and its imaginary counterparts 
in wartime fiction, are at once punningly undermined, accentuated and “diversified”; and though 
this passage is rich with historic and biographical resonance, it is difficult not to read its fantasy 
of a “historic future”—its illicit abjuration of “reality”—in generic terms as a dual critique of the 
temporal logic of conventional realism. It is an attempt to conceptualize, by way of some 
“nonhuman” “hub of imaginary life,” a narrative vantage that would subsume both retrospection 
and prospection at once, bypassing the present while cultivating and preserving its formal 
distinctions.  
In thus staking out an early claim to the scenic terrain of the post-human thriller, Bowen 
runs up against a unique set of formal problems—most glaring of which is that the object of the 
historic-futural novel, unlike that of the historical novel, would exist at the absolute margin of 
human interest and “attachment.” Whose memory, whose identity, whose “nourishment” is at 
stake here if it can be represented neither as the “private movement” of an individual caught up 
in the “tension[s]” of history nor as some vital intimacy or collectivity that takes form as the 
result of its cataclysms and catastrophes?26 The question is framed most poignantly, perhaps, in 
                                                             
26 Roderick’s relation to time militates against an overly optimistic or humanistic reading of one of the 
novel’s most famous descriptions of life in London during the Blitz, which is often quoted in celebration 
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the novel’s final bit of dialogue between Stella and her son, as the two grapple to make 
something of her lover's death: 
“There’s something to be said” [Stella insists.]… 
“I know…But by me? Why me? After all who am I? 
“The only person I can tell…I cannot help expecting something from you: 
I must.” 
“You want me to be posterity?…Mother today I would say anything to 
comfort you; I do wish I had enough experience…As it is, I expect really you 
know what is best for yourself.” 
“I expect I do; I know I ought to; I must.—But the thing was, you were an 
outside person.” 
“You do really think I am a person?” (337-8, emphasis original) 
 
VI. SELF-EVIDENCE (THE PRESENTNESS OF THE PAST) 
 Before returning again to this persistent quandary, it will be necessary briefly to 
enumerate the generic options and novelistic forms that The Heat of the Day seems more or less 
resolutely to desert. These can largely be grouped as conventions by which novels effect, as 
Avanessian and Hennig put it, the “presentification” of the past—by which events supposed to 
be past are made imaginatively present to the reader from the “epic” vantage of conventional 
                                                             
of the classless utopia it seems to discover amid the literal and figurative collapsing of the city: “Among 
the crowds still eating, drinking, working, travelling, halting, there began to be an instinctive movement 
to break down indifference while there was still time. The wall between the living and the living became 
less solid as the wall between the living and the dead thinned. In that September transparency people 
became transparent, only to be located by the just darker flicker of their hearts. Strangers saying 
‘Goodnight, good luck,’ to each other at street corners, as the sky first blanched then faded with evening, 
each hoped not to die that night, still more not to die unknown” (99-100).  
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past tense narration. The way such narration draws the past up as a fictional present is essentially 
the inverse of the way Louie’s (asynchronous) present is drawn into a fictional past. What’s 
largely in question here is the historicity of narrative forms: to render past events (factual or 
imagined) as if they are present is to automatically furnish them with the markers of fictionality. 
This seems to go for historical fiction as well as non-fiction; and, insofar as such temporal 
formations muddy the historiographical claims of narrative in general, they become the default 
target of postmodern historiographic metafiction, as canonically defined by Hutcheon.  
 The Heat of the Day does not fit cleanly into this genre of postmodern thought, but to the 
extent that it works to circumscribe the “presentifying” function of narrative—the 
phenomenological expression of the presentness of the past—this is, with remarkable 
consistency, associated with Robert Kelway, the Nazi informant who emerges as the novel’s 
central villain (if it can be said to have one). Kelway’s mysterious temporal predicament takes 
shape in the somewhat ironic—even grotesque—convergence of the idioms of criminology, 
psychoanalysis, and Gothic romance: “Here’s my criminal record,” the suspected traitor declares 
to his lover as she tours his childhood bedroom; for her part, Stella regards Robert’s family 
relations as his “case-history,” searching “down there” for some hidden pathology of which 
treason or Nazism might be symptomatic; and from the point of view of the narrator, the 
experience of the Kelway’s haunted country house follows Stella back to London “like a 
disaffecting ghost, undoing the reality of the city” (112, 129, 138). As familiar novelistic 
paradigms referenced directly or through the motifs of cases, criminal records and ghosts, each 
of these idioms offers Stella the (doubtful) prospect of not only explaining or understanding 
Kelway’s behavior but—in an intimate visit to the family home, to the scene of the crime—of 
experiencing first-hand his past as if it were present. Far from offering epistemological stability 
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(or, for that matter, plot development), the “presentification” of Kelway’s past has the effect, as 
the narrator puts it, of “undoing” “reality”—of staging the fictionality of the present itself at the 
very moment that the psychic conditions and preconditions of war are supposed to synchronize 
with it in the reader’s imagination. 
 The scenic effect of this process is opposite to that of Louie’s now, which careers freely 
into the past: in the Kelway home (called Holme Dene) each passing instant—what Stella labels 
“then—and then—and then,” pointing to photographs arranged like a galaxy on Robert’s 
bedroom walls—gloms together in a kind of gunky mass, which is endlessly extruded into a 
suspended present (129, emphasis original). Stella sees this family “suspended in the middle of 
nothing,” and imagines them in the future remaining “so suspended when there was nothing 
more” (emphasis original). This is so because of the persistence of the past in the present: while 
what Stella leaves behind her “dissolves behind her,” what Kelway leaves behind is “not to be 
denied,” as time itself has “clogged” the ticking of the clock and books have “gummed together 
in some sort of secretion from their disuse” (125, 117, 128).  
The paradoxical result of the excessive presentness of the past is a prevailing sense of 
emptiness: as the two examine the photographic evidence of Robert’s life, his “criminal record,” 
Stella is taken by surprise: “Robert, this room feels empty!” He agrees: “It could not feel emptier 
than it is. Each time I come back again into it I’m hit in the face by the feeling that I don’t 
exist—that I not only am not but never have been. So much so that it’s extraordinary coming in 
here with you.” Kelway seems almost to understand that he is in a novel, that his being is 
comprised not of “moments,” as he puts it, but of “imitation ones” (129). If the accumulation of 
the past in the Kelways’ present functions, as Stella reflects, to make their “position” “self-
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evident,” then the most forcefully self-evident fact (or, rather, fiction) of Robert’s being is that he 
isn’t.  
If this revelation does not add up to a characterological explanation of treason, it does 
serve to bring the novel’s various philosophical concerns more directly in line with the major 
themes of the European existential phenomenology of Bowen’s time. What is at issue in 
Kelway’s betrayal of his nation are fundamental questions about free will and authenticity—and 
more generally about the ethical implications of ontology. There isn’t space here to examine the 
novel in more rigorous philosophical terms, but the influence of Sartre rings rather loudly in the 
idea that it is not Kelway’s being—the self-evident “facticity” of his situation—but rather the 
negation of his being that condemns him to act as he will. The impulse to betray “isn’t something 
in me[,] it’s on altogether another scale, ” he will say later on to Stella in a (largely incoherent) 
attempt at self-justification—and, in a more pointed complaint, there is “no alternative” to 
freedom (301, 302).27 In its affinity with Nazism and its apparent incompatibility with 
democratic individualism, there is perhaps a more profound, if more distant, echo in Kelway’s 
temporality of Heidegger’s ekstasis—an impression that, if it is to be more authentic than an 
“imitation moment,” Kelway’s present must stand outside of itself and drag the accruals of the 
                                                             
27 If the direct influence of Sartre seems self-evident, here, it has not readily been noted, even though 
Bowen wrote two reviews of Sartre’s work for the Tatler in the late 1940s, close to the time of the 
publication of The Heat of the Day. See her “Review of The Street by Ann Petry, The Age of Reason by 
Jean-Paul Sartre, and Dangling Man by Saul Bellow,” Tatler, 184 (19 Apr 1947): 86–7 and her “Review 
of Samuel Pepys: The Man Making by Arthur Bryant and The Reprieve by Jean-Paul Sartre,” Tatler, 187 
(21 Jan 1948): pp. 86–7. The only extended study of the influence of French existentialism on Bowen is 
Nathaniel Underland’s recent “Disaffection and Realpolitik in Elizabeth Bowen’s The Heat of the Day,” 
Textual Practice (Apr 2018). Underland reads the novel in the context of the nascent Cold War (rather 
than the Blitz) as a statement of commitment to policies of liberal internationalism. This signals Bowen’s 
twofold disaffection with literary realism and with political realism (realpolitik)—a disaffection shaped, 
Underwood argues, by her reading of Sartre.  
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past along with it in its prospective involvements—involvements which, with a fall (Heidegger’s 
principal figure of being present in the world), the novel cuts dramatically short.    
  
VII. TURNING POINT (THE RHETORICAL PRESENT) 
 Perhaps the simplest reason that Kelway’s self-justification ends up being more or less 
incomprehensible is that he has devoted himself to making words meaningless, to stripping what 
the lovers call conventional “little expressions”—or what Heidegger calls “idle talk” (Gerede)—
of the dusty accumulations of common understanding: 
What is repulsing you is the idea of ‘betrayal,’ I suppose, isn’t it? [he asks Stella]. 
In you the hangover from the word? Don’t you understand that all that language is 
dead currency? How they keep on playing shop with it all the same: even you do. 
Words, words like that, yes—what a terrific dust they can still raise in a mind, 
yours even. Myself, even, I have needed to immunize myself against them; I tell 
you I have only at last done that by saying them to myself over and over again till 
it became absolutely certain they mean nothing. What they once meant is gone. 
(301, emphasis added) 
The odd shift into the present tense in the highlighted phrase, here, signals that the effect of 
repetition is not simply to bury an expression’s dead usages but also to bring whatever else 
remains of it into a kind of bare present so that no meaning at all can adhere to it. This negation 
of the instrumental function of words would seem to be a kind of linguistic reflex to Kelway’s 
self-annihilating depiction in photographs (“I not only am not but never have been”) and its 
distortive effect on his sociality (“So much so that it’s extraordinary coming in here with you”). 
It is also a gesture that draws an important distinction against the constitutive role of Harrison’s 
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that was that, which ought to be a virtually meaningless tautology but, articulated as it is from an 
asymmetrical present, does somehow seem to mean something—and to mean even more in its 
repetition.     
 In turn, Stella Rodney introduces a more substantial structural symmetry into the 
linguistic terrain of the novel, one which, like Harrison’s, functions constitutively as 
asymmetry—namely, the rhetorical figure of the chiasmus. The narrator describes Stella’s 
distinct temporal orientation as the “‘time being’ which war has made the very being of time” 
(109). The inverted syntax is not simply a stylistic flourish; it serves the important task of 
temporarily removing the idle expression “time being” from scare quotes—of using rhetorical 
convention to unfasten the present from rhetorical convention. When Stella is in the scene, 
Bowen’s prose (both in narration and in dialogue) tends to crystalize into chiasmic shapes: “I 
do—do I”; “what then?—then what? “You are, are you?”; or, in a striking exchange between 
Stella and her son:  
“You are looking more like yourself.” 
“More like myself, am I looking?” (248, 32, 46, 49) 
Such moments seem often to be marked with an m-dash rather than a less obvious punctuation 
mark or conjunction, emphasizing the visual dimension of these little symmetries of thought, the 
shadow-casting of phrases (rather than their simple repetition) that comes to express Stella’s 
experiential present—which is also, for her, the experience of love, the turning point of the novel 
as such: “To have turned away from everything to one face is to find oneself face to face with 
everything” (218). 
 Given the reflexive force of Stella’s temporality, its centering effect, it is fitting that she 
visits the ancestral home, Mount Morris, in a chapter positioned physically and numerically in 
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the middle of the novel—much as Stella’s life, “younger by a year or two than the century,” is 
suspended, now, on the edge of the middle of the century. Her story is a scaled-up version of the 
suspended intimacy of chapter 1. Just as the novel’s first instance of suspense held its sentence in 
syntactic and syllabic suspension (“Having hung for just that instant more suspended the music 
now broke with a light crash”), belonging so perfectly to the end of one clause and the beginning 
of another that it is dislodged from both—so too does chapter 9 (of 17) stand equivocally poised 
at the novel’s literal and figural center. Stella feels this as an existential crisis of historic—or, 
rather, historic-futural—proportion: “the fatal connection between the past and the future [had] 
been broken…It had been Stella, her generation, who had broken the link—what else could it be 
but its broken edges that she felt grating inside her soul?” (195) Stella’s suffering derives not 
from tension, but from its phenomenological remnants —from the broken relay between one 
generation and the next, one form of suspense and another. 
 Despite (or, perhaps, because of) the rhetorical heavy-handedness that attends Stella’s 
intricately synchronized layers of in-betweenness, one can detect in the scene at Mount Morris a 
kind of temporal cross-fading effect, the co-presence of a now that is in fact the future. It should 
be recalled here that Bowen began writing The Heat of the Day in 1944 and, though she didn’t 
complete it until 1948, she kept the war’s terminus largely outside the perspectival framework of 
the novel so as not to eclipse its sense of middleness with a sense of an ending. Claire Seiler has 
observed, however, that much of the novel’s formal and thematic emphasis on middles (which 
she somewhat imprecisely identifies with the figure of suspension) is the result of revisions made 
late in the process of composition. Seiler argues that Bowen had difficulty figuring out how to 
coordinate the relative eventlessness of the plot of the novel with the events of the war during 
which it is supposed to occur, and so she (Bowen) ends up defaulting to what is essentially a 
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postwar idiom—namely, the conceptual fixation on what it means to define an epoch by its 
middleness, to be “at midcentury,” a figure of speech that was ubiquitous across all sorts of 
discourses of the time.28  
 If the actual future is thus secreted in the fictional present here in the form of a “little 
expression,” a dying metaphor intensified to such an extreme that it threatens to dominate the 
whole shape of the story, it does not fail to have an apparent effect on Stella, generating what is 
perhaps the novel’s one distinctly recognizable instance of suspense. When she arrives at the 
house she finds herself led on by “expectancy rather than memory,” a sense of nervous 
anticipation that might as well place her in a Gothic horror story as she searches around the dark 
phantasmagoria of the mansion’s mirrored labyrinth of hallways and bedrooms (184). But, as the 
caretaker’s daughter leads her to her room, the sensation suddenly ceases—so close to the 
novel’s literal, physical center that one wonders if it is not precisely so only because of an 
unavoidable accident of the printing process: 
At midday, even, this lobby of many doors at the head of the windowed staircase 
had been always shadowy: now the doors round her were only to be felt. The 
suspense, a suspense so long anticipated, in which she waited to hear which 
handle the child would turn was, now it came to the moment, more than half 
fictitious, after all neither real nor deep. (184)  
In the moment suspense enters the novel, it is dismissed as (mostly) fiction. In its repetition and 
qualification, the definite suspense becomes an indefinite suspense, which in its stretching-out is 
downgraded to a simulacrum of suspense: an anticipation of anticipation, “neither real nor deep.” 
The “gears” of the novel’s “affect machinery” (to borrow again Avanessian and Hennig’s 
                                                             
28 See Claire Seiler, “At Midcentury: Elizabeth Bowen’s The Heat of the Day,” Modernism/modernity, 
vol. 21, no. 1 (2014): 125-45. 
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phrase) are thus exposed in the exact center of the novel at the exact instant of the machine’s 
shift into obsolescence. And, in turn, the words suspense itself, which has so far been used with 
considerable emphasis, will not be used again in any form.29  
But the effect is not to terminate the narrative. In distinction to the motionlessness of 
Roderick’s moment, its lack of “flutter,” Stella’s constant chiasmic centering of the now suggests 
that even through a sort of brute formal repetition—through the positional interchanging and 
interdependence of elements that constitute the indifferent “processes” of the encompassing 
sense of modernity that threatens her son’s existence—one might at least locate a kind of 
semantic kinesis, a vital narrative reflex—a sign that there might be even more to that was that 
than what Harrison experiences as the self-differentiation of a singular instant. At a crucial 
juncture in her visit to Mount Morris, Stella muses reflexively on her place in the novel:  
That was that—or, could there still be something more? That her own life should 
be a chapter missing from this book need not mean that the story was at an end. 
At a pause it was, but perhaps a pause for the turning point? (194).  
This center-point marks the complete distillation of the imperious now to its status as a rhetorical 
figure, a position, a zero point in any number of familiar spatial metaphors for time. This is a 
“turning” that carries with it all of the figural weight of revolution, of the movement of history, 
of the rotation of celestial bodies, of the transformation of one generation to the next. For the 
turn is calibrated to something happening—an astonishing moment in a novel of such scant 
happenings!—to the news unheard by Stella over Mount Morris’s broken radio: a major Allied 
victory in the North African Campaign.  
                                                             
29 This goes as well for suspension and its variants.  
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But for all its momentousness, as it were, this so-called “terrible victory,” the very signal 
of “the war turning,” is in this context no more and no less than a sort of pun: a turn that turns, a 
trope that tropes, a fiction of suspendedness suspended in the middle of the middle of nothing 
(198).30 If there’s a prevailing sense of disappointment about Stella’s temporality, it somehow 
winds up being Louie’s to bear. In the final pages of the novel, she will reflect on her fleeting 
acquaintance with Stella and find it impossible to get Harrison off of her mind: “That was that; 
simply that again. There was nobody to admire: there was no alternative” (346, emphasis 
original).  
 
VIII.  “UNEXPECTED-EXPECTED” 
 Could there still be something more? In her essay, “Rx for a Story Worth the Telling,” 
Bowen poses the following question: “Suspense may account for the primitive hold on us of a 
story. But when the end is known, when the suspense evaporates, what then?” As she sets out in 
the essay to enumerate the forms of suspense, she makes a suggestive elision: “The play on 
emotional suspense throughout a love story does not need comment” (327).31 If her spy thriller 
works to put this question of the aftereffects of suspense at the center rather than the end of the 
novel, keeping the minimal generic structures of mystery intact so as to sustain a sort of untense 
                                                             
30 The other significant moment in which the events of war coincide with the events of the novel is also 
coordinated with puns. In a breaking and smashing deeply reminiscent of the breaking and crashing of 
the musical suspense of chapter 1, an affective involvement with bodies is withheld in the same instant it 
seems almost to transpire: “That day whose start in darkness covered Robert's fall or leap from the roof 
had not yet fully broken when news broke: the Allied landings in North Africa. Talk was of nothing else. 
Nor had the quickening subsided when Montgomery's Order of the Day to the Eighth Army—“We have 
completely smashed the German and Italian armies”—became the order of yet another day for London. 
There came the Sunday set for victorious bell-ringing: throughout the country every steeple was to break 
silence” (327)  
31 Elizabeth Bowen, “Rx for a Story Worth the Telling,” People, Places, Things: Essays by Elizabeth 
Bowen, edited by Allan Hepburn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008).  
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tension, the extent to which the Heat of the Day winds up being a love story—a story of 
unconsummate consummation—does seem to require comment. Does the staging of the 
evaporation of suspense also entail the evaporation of some “primitive” structure of desire—or 
of, as Louie might put it, human interest—in the form of the novel, and if so, what then?   
 Somewhat by surprise, the book ends in the most conventional possible way with a series 
of conclusions that, in a manner reminiscent of a Jane Austen novel, disclose each character’s 
romantic fate. Stella is unexpectedly to be married; Harrison, expectedly alone. Louie all of a 
sudden has a baby—one assumes the father is one of her anonymous human lovers, but the 
identity is never revealed, so why couldn’t it be the news? And Roderick, who always did have a 
reciprocal extrahuman attachment to Mount Morris, ends up impregnated by its demesne.32  
The fates of the two women serve the crucial function of placing retroactive emphasis on 
the extent to which the novel’s senses of suspense have been built less on espionage and intrigue 
than on a kind of sustained moral ambivalence about the sexual adventures of women living 
without husbands in wartime London. At one point, while in Harrison’s company, Stella has a 
vision of her husband, who died years before (after leaving Stella for an older woman who 
nursed him during the war). For an instant she sees “Roderick’s father’s face, its look suspended 
and noncommittal,” and wonders, why now?:   
                                                             
32 Figures of pregnancy abound in the novel, but Roderick’s is one of the more fascinating ones: “He had 
come to the humid stoniness of the garden wall, steadied himself on the unequal metaling of the cart 
tracks, put his hand on gates, struck out a twang from wire, established by touch the vital differing 
unhumanity of rocks, corrugated iron, tree trunks. He had from all points turned and returned to trace the 
elusive river-glimmer below him. Dark ate the outlines of the house as it ate the outlines of the hills and 
drank from the broken distances of the valley. The air had been night itself, re-imprinted by every one of 
his movements upon his face and hands—and still, now that he was indoors and gone to bed, 
impregnating every part of the body it had not sensibly touched. He could not sleep during this memory 
of the air” (351).   
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One could only suppose that the apparently forgotten beginning of any story was 
unforgettable; perpetually one was subject to the sense of there having had to be a 
beginning somewhere. Like the lost first sheet of a letter or missing first pages of 
a book, the beginning kept on suggesting what must have been its nature. One 
never was out of reach of the power of what had been written first. Call it what 
you liked, call it a miscarried love, it imparted, or was always ready and liable to 
impart, the nature of an alternative, attempted recovery or enforced second start to 
whatever followed. The beginning, in which was conceived the end, could not but 
continue to shape the middle part of the story, so that none of the realisations 
along that course were what had been expected, quite whole quite final.  
The dead little expression miscarried love here activates the punning quality of conception, of 
the “shape [of] the middle” as a familiar figure of expectancy and in turn provokes an 
equivocation in the senses of suspended commitment for which the absent father stands 
(authorial, parental, matrimonial, political, sexual, etc.).  
In narrative and in existential terms—that is, in terms of stories and of choices—the 
novel here conceives of an “alternative” structure of desire, shaped not by a missing end but by a 
missing beginning—one that is as obscure as it is irrevocable. This stands as an alternative to 
suspense; it is an experience structured not by knowledge that the end is unknown and to be 
realized, but one structured by the knowledge of a forgotten beginning realized in the present. If 
suspense is typically understood as a mode of expectation—or, in Saint-Amour’s refinement, of 
expecting the unexpected, of expectancy in the present conditioned by unexpectancy of the 
future—then Stella’s absent husband introduces a far stranger experience of unexpectancy in the 
present that is conditioned by expectancy from the past, from what could have been possible. 
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What Bowen seems to be describing is a kind of noumenal instant of conception that, in a rather 
precise inversion of Heidegger’s unknowable death, perpetually draws the present out of the 
future and renders it unexpected, unwhole, unfinal. 
Thus the moment in which the terminus of the novel (if that’s the right way to put it) 
coincides with the ending of the war is not figured as an end or destination but rather as the 
realization of an irrevocable beginning in the scenic and perspectival dissolution of expectation: 
“The unexpected-expected day, with its feeling of elsewhereness, ran its broadcast-echoing 
course. You could not take back what had been done” (371). The persistent evaporation of 
suspense, its ongoing removal, cannot simply be described as counter-narrative, as the defeat, 
say, of suspense by suspension—or, as Jameson might portray it, as the defeat of the narrative 
impulse by the eternalization of the present as affect—as if, in some alternate history of the end 
of realism, “everything now” became impossible rather than possible.33 Instead, to the extent that 
the terms of this antithesis remain paronomastically interlinked, there forms a kind of metonymic 
relay between the human body and the “affect machinery” of fiction. If the perpetuation of the 
present is supposed to be endemic to late modernity, the mid-point of the front line of an 
interminable war—of a rhetorical process that severs sense from sensation, exposing words and 
bodies in mutual dereliction—one finds in Bowen an unexpected point of near-attachment: in the 
flitting animation of dead usages, of idle talk—in, as it were, the little expressions of little 
expressions. If the novel doesn’t heal wounds, it does put in place a countervailing process that 
                                                             
33 For Jameson’s somewhat perplexing distinction between what he calls the “eternal present” of the body 
and the “perpetual present” more commonly associated with postmodernism, see especially Chapter 2, 
“The Twin Sources of Realism: Affect, or, the Body’s Present,” in The Antinomies of Realism. The 
eternal present is there defined as a kind of continuum of affect, the “chromatism of the body,” which 
Jameson opposes to named emotions or feelings, as such (i.e. fear, joy, anger, etc.) (27-44). 
 58 
 
works, with puns more than half intended, to untense the long over-worked joints of realism and 
reality. 
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Chapter 2 - Graham Greene, Carol Reed and the Thresholds of Continuity 
 
I. ERRORS OF CONTINUITY 
In what I’ve previously referred to (in admittedly vague terms) as the posthuman thriller, 
Bowen and others sought, after the war, to establish artistic ground on which to de-psychologize 
a certain faith in continuity that pervaded late 19th and early 20th century understandings of 
human experience. This aesthetic territory is claimed in more or less direct opposition to 
representations of consciousness and self-experience, but its basic forms precede the 
technological restructuring of our sensibilities with which the term “posthuman” is commonly 
associated. “I wish I were God,” is in The Heat of the Day Roderick’s way of signaling the 
trouble as he ponders death and realizes that his person does not endure in any meaningful sense, 
even as he holds reflexively to a prosthetic hope that “art can go on mattering once it has stopped 
hurting” (337).1 His wish does not betray a proselytizing impulse on Bowen’s part so much as a 
strain of decadent cynicism that one can find captured in even harsher terms by Graham 
Greene’s Maurice Bendrix in The End of the Affair: “When we get to the end of human beings 
we have to delude ourselves into a belief in God, like a gourmet who demands more complex 
sauces with his food” (119).2  
The end of human beings is for Bowen marked by a general faltering of the belief in 
continuity, a belief (which realist fiction was supposed to uphold) that one’s self and the 
characters one encounters in the world persist outside of the perpetual present—the “immense 
today,” in her words—that had encroached on 20th century narrative practices. Her novels chart 
the phenomenal limits of the presiding faith that experiences link to one another in some 
                                                             
1 Elizabeth Bowen, The Heat of the Day (New York: Anchor Books, 2002). 
2 Graham Greene, The End of the Affair (New York: Penguin Classics edition, 2004).  
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infinitely dense and absolutely indistinct way; what, nearing the end of the 19th century, Bergson 
most famously called “pure duration”; and what, even now—and even while tracing the death of 
the realist tradition—Fredric Jameson still seems to find alive in the notion of affect, which he 
describes as the undifferentiated “chromaticism” of the human body, the “eternity” made 
possible in the “art of transitions” (38-9).3 For Jameson, the increasing aesthetic dominance of 
the “eternal present” (as opposed to narrative, or as he also puts it, “destiny”) heralds the end of 
realism in the same historical movement with which it delimits human consciousness (25). But in 
the sometimes fraught transposition of Bergson’s qualitative sense of duration forward through 
the idiom of 20th-century existential phenomenology and into the “impersonal present,” a 
tenacious sense of continuity seems always to be preserved against the various breaks and 
inhumanities of modernity: “at its outer limit,” writes Jameson, “affect becomes the organ of 
perception of the world itself, the vehicle of my-being-in-the-world” (43).  
But what endures, exactly, if it is not duration, per se? The question is related to the one 
that frames the previous chapter, beginning with Bowen’s suggestion that memory has a kind of 
strange externality to it, that sensations are imprinted on things in a manner that is not quite 
intelligible as an allegory of writing or some other technique of information storage. In this 
chapter, however, I want to set out a somewhat broader view of a world in which it wasn’t the 
task of answering this question that dominated aesthetic practice so much as that of finding the 
means to avoid it. This view is not meant to be comprehensive but rather to place in question the 
                                                             
3 I refer here to The Antinomies of Realism (New York: Verso, 2015) in which the discussion of affect is 
curiously devoid of substantive reference to Bergson. In Valences of the Dialectic (New York: Verso, 
2009), it is much clearer where Bergson does and does not fit into Jameson’s thinking about time and 
temporality (see in particular Part VI: “The Valences of History,” 475-612); but here there seems to be a 
more thoroughgoing attempt to repress Bergson’s vitalism, even as Jameson’s antinomy of “affect” and 
“named emotion” seems so precisely to rehearse Bergson’s canonic antithesis of qualitative and 
quantitative multiplicities—at least insofar as naming emotions would seem to amount to the same thing 
as numbering them.    
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need or nostalgia for continuity that seems so relentlessly to attach itself (albeit sometimes in 
clandestine forms) to any such attempts to inch beyond the mind.  
Doing so in philosophical terms tends to sound extreme, as in Quentin Meillassoux’s 
speculative realist argument that the only way to get there—to what he calls “the great 
outdoors”—is to stop believing that there is any reason at all for anything to continue, including 
the laws of physics.4 Such a claim sounds extreme in part because it poses a forceful challenge to 
the structure of belief that underlies the antinomies of continuity and discontinuity that are so 
frequently counted among the major conflicts of modernity. These are reflected in problems, for 
instance, of tradition conceived as fidelity to the past; but they extend down to the most 
fundamental confrontations between, on the one hand, the various forms of positivism that tend 
to define the intellectual landscape after the turn of the twentieth century and, on the other, 
enduringly mysterious human things like intuition. 
The turns or gestures toward religiosity for 20th-century writers like Bowen and Greene 
seem to indicate less an answer to the problem of continuity than a way of delimiting its aesthetic 
frontier. I would speculate that for Bowen this might have been a simple matter of moderation. 
She and Greene were apparently friends, but she retained a certain Anglo-Irish Protestant 
condescension toward Catholics partially on the grounds that she found them immoderate in their 
devoutness, quipping in her memoir Seven Winters (1942) that the frequency with which 
Catholics attend mass seemed to her to reveal “some incontinence of the soul” (508).5 Whatever 
the state of Greene’s soul may have been, one can at least say that he was endlessly conflicted 
                                                             
4 See in particular “Hume’s Problem” in After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency (New 
York: Continuum, 2008), 82-111.   
5 Elizabeth Bowen, Bowen’s Court & Seven Winters (London: Vintage, 1999) 
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about how to handle the ends of things in literary terms. “A novel, I used to think, has to end 
somewhere,” says the fictional novelist Bendrix in The End of the Affair, 
but I’m beginning to believe that my realism has been at fault all these years, for 
nothing in life now ever seems to end. Chemists tell you that matter is never 
completely destroyed, and mathematicians tell you that if you halve each pace 
crossing a room, you will never reach the opposite wall, so what an optimist I 
would be if I thought that this story ended here (121).  
The story referred to reflexively here is that of his affair with a married woman, Sarah Miles, set 
in London during World War II. The infidelity fails adequately to end when Bendrix fails 
miraculously to die after a V-1 flying bomb destroys the flat in which the two lovers carry on 
their sexual liaison. In linking a positivist injunction to believe in continuity with a religious one 
to believe in miracles, Bendrix’s pessimistic renunciation of finitude comes off as a sort of 
untimely and grotesque Bergsonism, taking the Zeno-like paradox not as a challenge to the 
notion of continuity itself but rather as bleak evidence of the unending process of creative 
evolution.  
The passage indicates some of the ways in which Greene appears not just as a troubled—
and troubling—outlier in a time of widespread secularization but also as an outlier in an era 
commonly defined by a sense that time (for humans at least) was limited. Regardless of the 
extent to which one reads Bendrix’s troubles as proxy for Greene’s own ideas about faith, the 
novel reveals how concerned Greene was at this time with the difficulty of conceiving a fiction 
of infidelity in the context of a world burdened with a general excess of faithfulness—a world, 
that is, where things just seem to go on as they always have been despite all manner of 
destruction and devastation. Thus, a basic premise of the following chapter is that the question of 
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whether Greene was a Catholic novelist or (as he famously demurred) a novelist who happened 
to be Catholic, is less significant for literary history and its philosophical upheavals than what his 
work as a novelist and screenwriter indicates more fundamentally about shifting conceptions of 
fidelity in the postwar years and how these relate to the problems of temporality that shape the 
aesthetic developments of the period.   
In his autobiographical work, Ways of Escape, Greene shares an anecdote in which, 
during the production of The Third Man (1949), David O. Selznick takes him and Carol Reed to 
task for apparent continuity problems in the film’s script. Foremost, Selznick found it 
implausible that Holly Martins (Joseph Cotton) would waste his time sticking around in Vienna 
after discovering within minutes of his arrival that his only reason for being there—a visit with 
his friend Harry Lime (Orson Welles)—had been undermined by Lime’s sudden death. Greene’s 
answer is that Martins promptly falls in love with Lime’s former lover, Anna Schmidt (Alida 
Valli); in other words, he hopes he might continue on where Lime left off (66).6 Thus, the film’s 
most basic element of suspense, its reason not to end, is built up largely around the question of 
whether or not Anna will remain faithful to her lover after he’s dead and what it might mean if 
she doesn’t—or much worse, as it turns out, if he (like Bendrix after him) continues to live.  
Greene clearly recognized the formal implications of such complicated presumptions, 
disruptions and resumptions of continuity. On this point, he holds his tongue to Selznick but 
feels a certain ambivalence. He concedes that there might have been some “grim reason” 
justifying Selznick’s criticism, but he also adds the following parenthetical reflection: “I would 
forget momentarily the lesson which I had learned as a film critic—that…continuity is often the 
enemy of life”; adding, with an obscure reference to Jean Cocteau, that “mistakes of continuity 
                                                             
6 Graham Greene, Ways of Escape (Londan: Vintage, 1999). 
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belong to the unconscious poetry of a film” (66).  It is difficult to understand just what he might 
have meant by this. It is at least clear that the problem of continuity exceeds the aesthetic 
concerns of filmmaking, assuming an ethical dimension that is somewhat counterintuitive on the 
surface—especially coming from someone whose work bears so little trace of an avant-garde 
impulse towards narrative disruption. In what sense are life and continuity opposed? This is not 
framed as a mimetic problem, per se, but what could the art of the continuity error actually look 
like? The question bears a deeper paradox, which the notion of an “unconscious poetry” cannot 
quite dispel: once admitted as part of the art, wouldn’t the error promptly cease to be in error and 
thus fall, through its own “grim reason,” into the hands of the enemy?  
One can find a hint of an answer just in the way that, by raising the point, Greene marks a 
distinction between his literary persona in the autobiographical Ways of Escape and the nearly 
forgotten version of himself that had been a film critic for many years. The implication, perhaps, 
is that there is something uniquely contingent about the process of shooting a motion picture that 
might preempt the complete habituation of editorial discontinuities. But this is undercut 
(unconsciously, no doubt) by the deferral to the language of psychoanalysis, which works to 
explain such contingencies away.  
To remain more firmly on this side of the threshold of continuity, then, would seem at 
once the most basic and the most impossible object of Greene’s postwar work. This chapter will 
show how that impossibility is most fully realized in his cinematic collaborations with Carol 
Reed after World War II (The Third Man (1949) and The Fallen Idol (1948)); but it will consider 
some of his fiction as well. In particular, I will show how the strange narrational situation of 
Greene’s story “The Basement Room,” on which The Fallen Idol was based, thwarts one of the 
most basic functions of narrative fiction: the tireless task of trying to account for how the 
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experiences of childhood are supposed to be connected to those of adulthood. While the story 
places this disarmingly familiar experience of self-persistence in doubt, the adaptation reveals 
even more sharply the devastations wrought by its faithful restoration.  
To an extent, it does make sense to uphold a practical distinction between Greene the 
novelist and Greene the screenwriter, since cinematic production requires a more clearly defined 
set of rules for managing continuity than those which novelists can more or less invent as they go 
along. But of greater concern here is how medium-specific demands for continuity are subsumed 
into a broader re-conception of fidelity, as such, in an art that absconds to the fringes of 
perception—not to draw out the relations of things, as Henry James might have put it, but to 
insist on their dissolution. Such a practice appears to correspond to Greene’s famous fascination 
with “dangerous edges,” with the literal and figurative borderlands, frontiers and zones of 
conflict that set much of his life and work. It appears, as well, to maintain his frequently quoted 
assessment of himself as a novelist of “the narrow boundary between loyalty and disloyalty, 
between fidelity and infidelity, the mind's contradictions, the paradox one carries within oneself” 
(21).7 Yet the fiction of infidelity, in its very persistence, carries with it a different sort of 
paradox, a more discomfiting suggestion that in practice such boundaries cannot be adequately 
                                                             
7 This is from a conversation with Marie-Francoise Allain, published in The Other Man. The phrase 
“dangerous edge” comes from Robert Browning’s “Bishop Blougram's Apology.” Greene recommends 
the passage as an epigraph for his novels: 
“Our interest’s on the dangerous edge of things. 
The honest thief, the tender murderer, 
The superstitious atheist, demirep 
That loves and saves her soul in new French books— 
We watch while these in equilibrium keep 
The giddy line midway.” (quoted in The Other Man, 21)  
The extent to which this recommendation has been faithfully followed is evident just in the number of 
books and articles on Greene’s work that take the phrase for a title. 
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marked at all—that the writing of the ends of affairs, as it were, finds only that there aren’t any 
such ends to speak of.      
 
II. GREENE, BOWEN, AND “THE DARK BACKWARD”  
Insofar as problems of continuity tend to work their way into the literary domain 
specifically in psychological terms, it seems hard to overstate the influence of William James. 
Greene, along with some of the other artists and writers in question in this project, might best be 
understood as setting up a confrontation with—or at least holding in relief—James’ radical 
empiricism and its lasting effects on the formal development of the novel throughout the 20th 
century. In James’ “world of pure experience,” the domain of experience is vastly expanded to 
include “the relations that connect experiences” (22).8 Connections between things are in this 
view no less than things themselves; distinct objects of perception are thus drawn into the vague, 
undifferentiated flux of their relations to other objects, to a horizon of things almost-but-not-
quite perceived—what Edmund Husserl (with recourse to James) will later call a “halo of 
background-intuitions” (70).9 Not only did such ideas provide philosophical justification for 
various mimetic experiments in art and literature, they helped establish the foundations of 
phenomenology that would exert decades of influence on the course of European literary and 
aesthetic theory from Heidegger forward.10 But by the postwar period, despite the popular 
                                                             
8 William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976). 
9 This particular figure shows up in the first book of Husserl’s Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology 
and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, translated by F. Kersten (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1983). This conception of the “halo” or “background” of direct perception is important to the 
development in Husserl’s phenomenology of the intentional character of perception, which acts to seize or 
pick out objects from their experiential context, something which before him James would describe as an 
inarticulable “feeling of tendency.”  
10 It bears remarking that, while the influence of phenomenology on European literary theory can be taken 
for granted almost as readily as the influence of William James’ writings about consciousness on literary 
practice in the 20th century, less has been studied of the direct mutual influence of American pragmatism 
 67 
 
influence of figures like Sartre and Camus, the deeper currents of existentialist thought also 
provided a great source of artistic anxiety. Bowen, for instance, felt that James Joyce’s prose had 
“infected” Europe with the stream of consciousness, which is to suggest that the lasting formal 
and psychological manifestations of James’ brand of empiricism are a disease of consciousness 
itself and that literary style was not the source but rather a carrier (247).11  
Graham Greene appears to have gone a good deal further in linking literary practice to a 
general sense that the domain of perception and self-experience had undergone a devastating 
expansion—even as he sought to trivialize the popular debate about the stream of consciousness 
technique, which crops up as an unexpected but insistent object of parody in both the novel and 
the film versions of The Third Man. I will return to these moments in the subsequent discussion 
of the film; but, for now, a clearer picture of the philosophical stakes of Greene’s work can be 
found in his 1935 essay “A Footnote: The Dark Backward.” In it, he refers to Henry James’ 
preface to Portrait of a Lady in outlining what he calls the “eternal time-question” that every 
novelist must face and that none, including Henry James, can answer. Greene quotes James 
quoting The Tempest:  
“This eternal time-question is…for the novelist always there and always 
formidable; always insisting on the effect of the great laps and passage, of the 
‘dark backward and abysm,’ by the terms of truth, and on the effect of 
                                                             
and the European philosophical traditions during the intellectual upheavals of the period. For a collection 
of recent approaches to this topic, see the Pragmatism and the European Traditions: Encounters with 
Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology Before the Great Divide, edited by Maria Baghramian and Sarin 
Marchetti (New York: Routledge, 2018). For a historical account of, in particular, the influence of James’ 
discussions of the “halo” or “fringe” of perception on Husserlian phenomenology, see in this same 
volume, Dermot Moran, “Phenomenology and Pragmatism: Two Interactions. From Horizontal 
Intentionality to Practical Coping” (269-87). 
11 Elizabeth Bowen, “James Joyce,” People, Places, Things: Essays by Elizabeth Bowen, edited by Allan 
Hepburn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008). 
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compression, of composition and form, by the terms of literary arrangement. It is 
really a business to terrify all but stout hearts.” (55, emphasis original)12  
Put simply, the problem (as Greene sees it) lies in ascribing anteriority to characters—in 
conveying the impression that each character’s life extends beyond the discrete portions of it 
which comprise the material of the novel. Though this seems like a benign technical issue of 
plotting and characterization, say, or the balance between narration and description, it gives way 
to a chasm of artistic failure: the constitutive discontinuities of novelistic style, inevitable as 
these may be, are markers of personal defectiveness on the part of the novelist. Greene implies 
that all of the various techniques of fiction-writing present nothing but an index of inadequacy, 
so that even the length of novels—their physical distention, and indeed their very being—is the 
result of their inherent vacuity, of the “dark backward” that separates this moment from that and 
divides the pure experience of time, as it were, into the dismal multiplicities of spatial 
representation (55-7).   
Greene believed—or seems very much to have wanted to believe—that Elizabeth Bowen 
worked to make peace with this particular crisis of modern storytelling by developing in her 
characters an “inhuman intuition” (which he opposes to Henry James’ “inhuman intelligence”), a 
post-Bergsonian sleight of hand that enables them to seem to sympathize with one another 
despite the fact that none of them appear as integrated selves. Rather than attempting to 
overcome inadequacy, Bowen (according to Greene) freely allows it, making “capital out of the 
gap in the records.” Greene cites The House in Paris (1935), but by the time Bowen writes The 
Heat of the Day (1949), the skeptical impressionism that he attributes to her prose seems, despite 
any admissions of inadequacy, to be as questionable an artistic practice as it is a method of 
                                                             
12 Graham Greene, “The Dark Backward,” Collected Essays (London: Vintage, 2014).  
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intuition.13 Take, for instance, the relations that connect the experiences, so to speak, of Stella 
Rodney and Harrison14: 
That, of course, was the core of their absolute inhumanity together. His 
concentration on her was made more oppressive by his failure to have or let her 
give him any possible place in the human scene. By the rules of fiction, with 
which life to be credible must comply, he was as a character “impossible”—each 
time they met, for instance, he showed no shred or trace of having been 
continuous since they last met. His civilian clothes, though one could be remotely 
conscious of alternation in suit or shirt or tie, seemed to vary much less than 
Robert's uniform; the uninterestingly right state of what he wore seemed less to 
argue care—brushing, pressing, changes of linen—than a physical going into 
abeyance, just as he was, with everything he had on him, between appearances. 
“Appearance,” in the sense used for a ghost or actor, had, indeed, been each of 
these times the word. Coming out of that vacuum, the reiterated unrelated story of 
his desire could but be unmeaning. Just now, for an instant, for the first time, in 
the darkness in which she could not even remember the colour of his coat, he had 
been for the first time palpably someone near her: a being—continuous, secretive, 
dense, weighty, locked in himself and face to face, beside her, with the 
unbounded night in which no clock struck. (155) 
                                                             
13 In the same essay, Greene associates Bowen’s technique with the more canonic literary impressionism 
of Joseph Conrad and Ford Maddox Ford. He sees Ford’s time-shift strategy as the most successful of all 
novelistic failures since Tristram Shandy to “express the passage of time directly” (59).   
14 To briefly recall the plot of the novel: in the setting of wartime London, Harrison seeks to compel the 
widow Stella Rodney into a sexual relationship with him under the uncertain threat that he is a counter-
intelligence agent and is holding out evidence that would implicate Stella’s lover, Robert Kelway, as a 
Nazi informant.  
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The passage is not entirely ironic in trying to insist that it is life that threatens to be unfaithful to 
fiction and not the other way around. Its capital—or, rather, “credit”—lies in the move to 
discredit the extreme empiric presumption that Harrison can be only insofar as he appears over 
and over again. It tries earnestly to imagine how desire, meaning, novelty, or anything one might 
call an event, can possibly be compatible with the mechanical repetition of successive nows 
across which Harrison’s character fails adequately to transpire. Belying the performative 
inadequacy that Greene describes, however, this prose stands out for its discursive clarity, its 
pseudo-philosophical tone; and rather than relying on the ex machina of extra-human intuition, it 
quite explicitly retains an existential notion of humanness that precedes the forms of intuition—a 
kind of primordial continuity that eludes perception, memory and even time but that is no less 
immanent for doing so.  
 I don’t point out these contradictions simply to quibble with Greene’s reading of Bowen, 
but rather to draw attention to the broader set of presumptions that underlie it, which both writers 
bring to bear in different ways. In retrospect, these seem familiar as presentiments of 
deconstruction: they reveal an acute concern about the temporalization of language and of 
writing, and about whether the stories through which self-experiences are constituted have 
somehow lost fidelity to an external reality—to the “human scene.” But, of course, retroactive 
assertions of prefiguration are always dubious.  
Bowen, at any rate, did not need to have read Derrida (who was just beginning his studies 
in Paris the year she published The Heat of the Day) to notice, for instance, that puns signal 
moments of linguistic infidelity (as I suggest in chapter 1). And to put it this way is not itself a 
mere pun. I hesitate too bluntly to historicize a postwar punning phenomenon, since puns seem 
no less common in Middle English poetry than in modernism (and maybe everywhere else in 
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literary history); but the clarity with which, in The Heat of the Day, wordplay becomes 
thematized as an activity intimately connected to acts of betrayal certainly stands out.  
As I argued previously, the novel’s central act of disloyalty is motivated by a linguistic 
rather than a psychological process: Stella’s lover Robert Kelway justifies his cooperation with 
the Nazis by mechanically repeating the word “betray” with the hope of rendering it senseless, of 
making “dead currency” of it. The novel itself enacts a similar procedure with its many senses of 
suspense—but, crucially, such terms prove insatiable in their paronomastic potency. These are 
not the puns of James Joyce; they do not play lightly with association, running free through the 
branching tributaries of sound and thought. Instead, there is a startling and grotesque urgency 
with which the clichés and dead metaphors of the language of love, having once deserted the 
body, rejoin it in the novel’s scenes of suspended intimacy. As words and things awkwardly 
form and re-form correspondences, as lips cleave to lips and joints untense—as the “daily build-
up” of newsprint, even when disposed in the wrapping of fish, is no less the stuff of sexual 
climax—the novel leaves one with the paradoxical sense that the unease with which such words 
and phrases are brought to life, so to speak, actually increases in proportion to the stubbornness 
with which they refuse to fall into obsolescence, to be repurposed, to desert some basic or more 
original form of livingness. They continue to raise dust in the mind, as Kelway understates it.   
 Insofar as the novel’s process of semantic satiation allegorizes the linguistic perils of 
modernity, its failure plays in reverse the history, now taken widely and often mournfully for 
granted, of the reduction of language to its contingencies. The process fails, that is, in total 
disregard for the conditions by which reality was supposed to have been arrogated to the mere 
effects or signals of reality, as Barthes’ memorably formulated it.15 Such writing contradicts 
                                                             
15 Roland Barthes, “L’effet de réel.” Communications, vol. 11, no. 1 (1968): 84–89.  
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what Jameson has more recently called the “autonomization” of affect, through which bodies and 
literary figuration are severed from one another as the antimonies of realism eventually bring 
about its generic collapse (36-7).16 One can find very few signs here of these breakdowns of 
correspondence. Indeed, Bowen depicts a world in which one might actually hope (in sympathy 
with Kelway) that words and phrases, as well as larger units of literary practice—images, bits of 
rhetoric, incipient symbols, metaphors and allegories, or even long segments of narrative—
would stop so relentlessly and so meaningfully attaching to things, especially bodily things.  
Such concerns are not unique to Bowen. There is an almost unbearable horror for 
instance when, in Greene’s The Heart of The Matter (1948), Scobie returns home after his day’s 
work as a police commissioner in coastal West Africa, walks upstairs, sees his wife on her bed 
under a mosquito net, and is struck by the sudden “impression of a joint under a meat cover”—a 
“cruel image” that needs to be “hustled away” in terms that are despairingly literal (14).17 As I 
will show in a somewhat different light in chapter 3, it is just such undead correspondences that 
are thoroughly naturalized in Raymond Chandler’s remarkable similes. In Greene they remain a 
monstrosity—a horror of metonymy that is never more keenly felt than by the wife of the 
plantation owner Fellows in The Power and the Glory (1940), who lives in a perpetual state of 
linguistic terror that perpetuates her fear of death: 
The word ‘life’ was taboo: it reminded you of death. She turned her face away 
from [Fowler] towards the wall and then hopelessly back again—the phrase ‘to 
                                                             
16 I do not want imply that Jameson betrays a nostalgia for these particular forms of correspondence. In 
fact, it is precisely his goal in The Antinomies of Realism to develop a concept of affective continuity that 
is emancipated from the structuring effects of language (but that is also somehow “impersonal”). Even the 
most technically refined impressionism would be for Jameson antithetical to the temporality of affect, to 
the “sliding scale of the incremental” (42). Bowen’s prose stakes itself against exactly this sort of 
modernist refinement—though, if Greene’s impressions of her work tend to stick, this has proved a risky 
position.  
17 Graham Greene, The Heart of the Matter (New York: Penguin Classics, 2004). 
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the wall’ was taboo too. She lay panic-stricken, while the boundaries of her fear 
widened to include every relationship and the whole world of inanimate things: it 
was like an infection. You could look at nothing for long without becoming aware 
that it too carried the germ. (40)18  
 Even without psychoanalyzing Greene’s misreading—or, rather, preemptive reading—of 
Bowen as a literary act of repression, one can at least remark that in it he laments the 
impossibility of Henry James’s realism in much the same dolorous spirit as, say, Nietzsche 
mourned the death of Greek tragedy as having been brought about by the aesthetic triumphs of 
the principle of division and individuation—but this ends up having the ironic effect of rendering 
the dark, gaping background to human intuition even darker, as though this were the goal all 
along. In other words, Greene seeks an art form capable of overdramatizing its failures as a way 
of placing the background beside the foreground, of making the “gaps in the record” part of the 
record; but in effect this pursuit only expands the “continuous, secretive, dense, weighty” and 
“unbound” darkness for which it more profoundly fails to account—but which, unwaveringly, it 
takes on faith to be there still.  
Bowen seems to have been more willing to grant that there aren’t necessarily gaps, per 
se; that whatever it is that subtends things as they appear cannot be separated from them, and 
thus—if one follows the logic towards its gloomier implications—infections of consciousness 
would be thoroughgoing. This is a distinction that William James (more optimistically) took 
pains to clarify, even, as it seems, he might almost have failed to make it himself:  
Every definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free water that flows 
round it. With it goes the sense of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo of 
                                                             
18 Graham Greene, The Power and the Glory (New York: Penguin Classics, 1991). 
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whence it came to us, the dawning sense of whither it is to lead. The significance, 
the value, of the image is all in this halo or penumbra that surrounds and escorts 
it,—or rather that is fused into one with it and has become bone of its bone and 
flesh of its flesh. (16-17, emphasis added)19 
Yet the adjustment, the quick re-fusing of the image to its background (which is somehow both a 
shadow and a light), requires that time run backward to its prelapsarian moment—because of 
course Eve was not fused into the flesh and bones of Adam’s body but rather separated out from 
him—and so in its correction, here at least, the original continuity error is seen to generate 
another.  
 
III. CHILDHOOD AND THE ACCIDENTAL FUTURE: THE FALLEN IDOL 
 I turn now to the more practical, if also somewhat more difficult, task of discussing the 
art of the continuity error as though it were actually an art. One difficulty, which I will address in 
more detail subsequently, derives from the fact that any argument along these lines must (at least 
implicitly) navigate a sometimes divisive set of questions about authorship and intentionality. 
This is especially true in the case of Greene’s later work as both novelist and screenwriter, since 
it tends to be pretty deeply bound up with the critical-historical irony of the circumstances that 
saw the development of auteurism in film studies coincide with the “death of the author” in 
literary and cultural studies.20 So it seems necessary to remark up front that the object of the 
following analysis is neither to undercut the auratic qualities of cinema by emphasizing the 
                                                             
19 William James, “On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology,” Mind, Vol. 9 No. 33 (Jan, 1884), 
1-26. 
20 For an overview of the institutional history of auteurism as it bears on the critical reception of Greene in 
the postwar period, see Brian Lindsay Thomson, Graham Greene and the Politics of Popular Fiction and 
Film (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), especially “Part III: From Author to Contested Authority,” 
117-52. 
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medial contingencies of the form; nor, in dwelling on such contingencies, is it the goal to 
subsume them into a secret, over-determined authorial purpose. The first example, here, is a 
breach of continuity in The Fallen Idol (Greene and Reed’s first collaboration) that should serve 
neither of these ends because it seems more like a literary effect than a cinematic one—a 
suggestive narrative anomaly rather than something that a fastidious contributor to the website 
IMDB.com might point out as a “goof.” Though the irregularity is not exactly obvious, it 
nevertheless constitutes the film’s most significant narrative gambit and establishes its basic 
structure of suspense.21  
The narrative of The Fallen Idol, which invites comparison to Henry James’ What Masie 
Knew (1897), is ostensibly focalized through the point of view of a young child witnessing the 
foreboding progress of an adulterous affair and its proliferating deceptions. Phillipe (Bobby 
Henrey) is the son of a diplomat living in an embassy in Belgravia and has been left temporarily 
in the care of the butler, Baines (Ralph Richardson), and his wife (Sonia Dresdel). Phillipe 
admires Baines as a paternal figure, though he comes almost-but-not-quite to understand that 
Baines is having an affair with a woman named Julie (Michèle Morgan), who works at the 
embassy. When Mrs. Baines ends up dead, Phillipe believes that Baines has murdered her and 
so, as the police investigate, he must contend with a crisis of loyalty: tell the truth (as he sees it) 
or betray his friend. His belief in the butler’s guilt is false, as it happens, but well founded. While 
peering in from a staircase on the exterior of the building, Phillipe sees Mr. and Mrs. Baines in a 
physical altercation at the top of an interior staircase (figure 2.1). As the boy descends to the next 
floor down, he is blind to what transpires inside, but arrives at a second window at the bottom of 
his staircase just in time to see Mrs. Baines fall dead, with a thud, at the bottom of hers (figure 
                                                             
21 The Fallen Idol, Carol Reed et al., dvd (New York: Criterion Collection, 2006). 
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2.2). He infers quite reasonably that Baines has pushed her—a conclusion supported by the fact 
that Baines has (untruthfully) bragged to him in the past about “killing a man in Africa.”  
What actually happens, which Reed allows us immediately to see, is far less plausible: 
once out of the boy’s view, Baines quickly steps into another room while his wife remains alone 
and intact at the top of the stairs. She then attempts to climb out of a of high window to reach a 
balcony from which she hopes she can catch the lovers out, whence she slips and falls to her 
accidental death at the exact moment that Phillipe looks in again from the window below. The 
gap in Phillipe’s record is only a few seconds, but it is of course decisive, and all of the 
subsequent narrative and ethical developments of the film follow directly from it. Crucially, this 
turning point is marked by the almost unnoticeable fact that it has been brought about by a break 
in the film’s otherwise unbroken strategy of narratorial focalization—an “error” of continuity 
that is carefully orchestrated to appear seamless. Unlike in What Masie Knows, we suddenly 
know a little bit more than what Phillipe knows, and this discrepancy organizes the suspense of 
the rest of the film. This works on something like the Hitchockian model, since it is a game 
based on epistemological manipulation and structural irony; but the more earnest nature of its 
ethical suspense derives not from the viewers’ anticipation of what will happen but, rather, from 
Figure 2.1: Phillipe’s view from the top. Figure 2.2: Phillipe’s view from the bottom. 
 77 
 
a sustained doubt about whether what already has will be adequately incorporated as the 
empirical basis upon which each of the disrupted forms of relation—marital, paternal, and 
legal—might be reconstituted in good faith.22 
Greene’s “The Basement Room” (1936), from which the film was adapted, is also 
remarkable for its own epistemological breaching effect, a slight temporal fracture in the 
narration that alters its entire ethical and psychological structure. The story is told in the third 
person in what seems to be the standard past tense of literary retrospection—and, as in the film, 
knowledge is restricted to the child’s point of view. This, however, is violated by three brief 
proleptic slips. The first occurs when the boy (named, in the story, Philip rather than Phillipe) 
peers through the window of a café and sees Baines engaged in what the reader can recognize as 
a surreptitious date. The child, however, cannot quite recognize the transgression, since he is 
unable to reconcile it with his standing impression of Baines. As it turns out, this particular 
thwarted apperception will, in startlingly decisive terms, determine the entire course of Philip’s 
life from that moment on: 
Baines was urging, hoping, entreating, commanding, and the girl looked at the tea 
and the china pots and cried…The two brains battled over the tea-cups loving 
each other, and there came to Philip outside, beyond the ham and wasps and dusty 
Pimlico pane, a confused indication of the struggle. 
 He was inquisitive and didn’t understand and he wanted to know. He went 
and stood in the doorway to see better, he was less sheltered than he had ever 
                                                             
22 Along these lines, the film’s method of focalization can also be seen as part of a broader trend in 
cinema and literature of the late 40s addressing the problems of rebuilding the structures of family life 
after the war. Peter William Evans observes that, though childhood was a “convenient focus for reflection 
on the loss of pre-1939 innocence in the crucible of war, and the promise of renewal symbolized by child-
centered narratives,” The Fallen Idol in effect betrays this promise with an “arbitrary ending providing no 
solution to the problems of a deprived child” (83).  
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been; other people’s lives for the first time touched and pressed and moulded. He 
would never escape that scene. In a week he had forgotten it, but it conditioned 
his career, the long austerity of his life; when he was dying, rich and alone, it was 
said that he asked: “Who is she?” (112)23 
The sudden and peculiar dislocation of the narrative voice as it careers into the future is held in 
relief against the confused aggregation of timeless perceptions that comprise the boy’s point of 
view (“and the girl,” “and the china pots,” and “the ham and wasps and dusty Pimlico,” etc.). It 
is tempting to read this scene as a fairly conventional set-up for a child’s lost innocence on the 
model of a 19th-century novel, or of childhood trauma on the model of 20th-century popular 
psychology.24 But in fact the boy seems to remain eternally ignorant, and Greene’s narrator is 
careful here not to concern itself with his experience, per se—with what happens to him or in 
him—but works instead to subsume the child’s sensations into a much more expansive human 
                                                             
23 Graham Greene, “The Basement Room,” Complete Short Stories, New York: Penguin, 2005). 
24 And indeed a few critics and commentators have done so; although, given that there have been decades 
of sustained scholarship on both the film and the novel versions of The Third Man and that the Fallen Idol 
has at least the colloquial status of being one of the other masterpieces of British cinema of the postwar 
era, there is a rather surprising dearth of criticism focused on the film or its literary source—and almost 
none on the relationship between the two. The critical temptation offered, here, however, would resonate 
with the general approach to childhood in Greene scholarship, which tends to center on the theme of lost 
innocence in its variety of religious and secular senses. Greene himself seems to have inaugurated this 
tradition in 1947 in his autobiographical essay, “The Lost Childhood,” when he cites lines from AE’s 
“Germinal” on “the lost boyhood of Judas” and describes himself learning to read for the first time as “the 
moment when life took a new slant in its journey towards death” (Collected Essays, 18, 13). In one early 
essay on the story and film considered together, Ana Laura Zambrano follows Greene’s lead in reading 
“The Basement Room” as a study of the “formative” pressures of childhood and of the corruptions of 
socialization—though she suggests that in the film these themes are subordinated to the epistemological 
concerns of the detective genre (324-31). See “Greene's Visions of Childhood : 'The Basement Room' and 
The Fallen Idol,” Literature/Film Quarterly, vol. 2 no. 4 (1974). I will address David Lodge’s more 
recent comments on the adaptation subsequently; but for a more general discussions along these lines, see 
for instance Peter Hollindale, “Innocence and Experience: The Condition of Childhood in Graham 
Greene’s Fiction,” Dangerous Edges of Graham Greene: Journeys with Saints and SInners, ed. Dermot 
Gilvary and Darren J.N. Middleton (New York: Continuum, 2011): 79-96, which argues that childhood, 
figured as a “condition,” is ubiquitous in Greene’s work even though his novels rarely feature actual 
children.   
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scene, exposing him to a strange exteriorization of experience in which “brains” are seen almost 
literally to converge. “Other people’s lives” “touch” and “press” and “mould”—doing so in a 
way that lacks the expected object (i.e. him) that should make these actions transitive. Philip 
cannot escape the scene, in other words, not because it deeply impresses him somehow, but 
because it stages the conditions of perception and memory in general. Even the idiom of 
narrative recollection itself dissolves in the empty (if rather insistently anapestic) form of its 
temporalization: “it was said that he asked: ‘Who is she?’”  
 The next proleptic slip goes just far enough further to encompass Philip’s death as well. 
Mrs. Baines—who is domineering, cruel and frightening to the boy before she dies—offers him a 
toy (specifically a 2A Meccano construction set) in hopes of buying his loyalty, which he 
refuses: 
He never opened his Meccanno set again, never built anything, never created 
anything, died the old dilettante, sixty years later with nothing to show rather than 
preserve the memory of Mrs Baines’s malicious voice saying good night, her soft 
determined footfalls on the stairs to the basement, going down, going down. (116)  
Philip’s career, then, is not built up out of the recollected events of his life, as literary careers 
typically are. Instead, the events of his childhood negate his career as such, and what is preserved 
in narrative form includes as if by accident the one memory among all the others that most 
absolutely cannot be his own.  
 The novelist and critic David Lodge is, as far as I know, the first to point out the 
peculiarity of the temporal framework of “The Basement Room” with an eye towards its 
implications for the film adaptation. Lodge considers the story’s prolepsis to be an “authorial 
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mistake” that produces a “puzzle,” which the film cannot solve and so must correct (275).25 
Lodge’s contention is that “in describing Philip on his deathbed, 60 years after the main action, 
[Greene’s] narrator is not prophesying but reporting” events. But, he continues, “since the story 
was first published in 1936, the character cannot have died at a later date.” It must follow that 
these events took place in the 1870s and are therefore riddled with anachronisms (cars and 
airplanes and other 20th-century things). This interpretation, however, seems to me to be less 
accountable than the temporal anomaly and doubling-effect that it purports to uncover—
especially coming from a novelist. The story’s flash-forwards are first of all too insistent to be 
formally accidental; and, in fact, the third prolepsis comes in the very last sentence and so is 
designed to leave a clear final impression of the story’s chronological framework. But this 
interpretation is perplexing just on its surface for its author’s unexplained refusal to imagine that 
the temporal intrusions project the narrator sixty years out instead of retrojecting the narrative 
sixty years back. Why should a fictional future be unreportable?  
 It is hard to say whether Lodge’s chronologic predisposition here derives from an 
unconscious fidelity to certain 19th-century storytelling conventions; but the uncanniness he 
detects does help to reveal something of the two-timing nature of 20th-century narrative practice, 
which usually goes unnoticed. One recent approach to this type of doubling effect can be found 
in Mark Currie’s suggestive argument that contemporary fiction has come to adhere more closely 
to the temporal logic of the future perfect tense than to that of the past tense typically 
presupposed for it. As opposed to reporting what has happened in the past or prophesizing what 
will happen in the future, the temporal situation of narrative fiction—the “the tense for our 
times,” as Currie puts is—orients readers towards a future imagined already to have happened. 
                                                             
25 David Lodge, “The Fallen Idol: from Story to Screen,” Studies in Victorian Literature, edited by 
William Baker (Lanham, Maryland: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2015), 275-81. 
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As an early example (if not a prophesy) of this narratorial trend, Greene’s prose does not adopt 
the future perfect tense in its sentence structure, but its jarring prolepses have the effect of 
redirecting a story that might otherwise have turned toward the streams of modernist 
psychologism instead toward what Currie describes as the “flow of unforeseeable novelty,” 
which is structured by a “doubling of temporal perspective, of what will happen with what has 
already taken place” (5).26   
This idea expands on a more restricted narratological approach to prolepsis or the 
conventional flashforward by promoting it to an existential condition, “connect[ing] the 
temporality of reading with the temporality of living” by adopting the Heideggerian view that 
lived experience is structured in a fundamental way through the “anticipation of retrospection” 
(31).27 For Currie, the conventional temporal logic of past tense narration, in its process of 
rendering a fictional past as present in the time of reading, also has the (potentially deleterious) 
effect of training readers to think of the present of lived experience in terms of how it will be 
looked back on. We take our cue from the grammar of fiction when, for instance, we record a 
video of our visual experience with the expectation that it will become the object of future 
reminiscence—or more profoundly when we do things like travel to unfamiliar countries 
specifically for the sake of looking back on what will have happened there and sharing stories. In 
this way, we come to experience and understand the present in terms of how we expect it might 
be recounted in the past tense. To some extent, Currie sees this hermeneutic feedback loop as a 
schizophrenic process that, exacerbated by technological modernity, “robs” or “deprives” the 
                                                             
26 Mark Currie, The Unexpected: Narrative Temporality and the Philosophy of Surprise (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2013) 
27 Mark Currie,  About Time: Narrative, Fiction and the Philosophy of Time (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2007) 
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present of some of its presentness, encouraging us to live in the preterite and so in a perpetual 
state of “temporal self-distance” (30, 49).  
One can read “The Basement Room” as attempting to press this form of self-difference to 
its breaking point such that the two times of the story fail, in an unexpected way, to form an 
identity. The assumed present of its events are not recorded as future memories; the adult Philip 
and the dead Philip—unlike Baines and his dead wife—make no narrative claims on the boy’s 
allegiance; and thus the “inquisitive” child, who at first “didn’t understand and…wanted to 
know” winds up defined not retrospectively by what he does come to understand but, alternately, 
against all that he does not and cannot ever presume to anticipate (112).  
If this sounds somewhat bleak, it in fact suggests a fantasy of discontinuity, a non-
suicidal alternative to self-persistence, that seems optimistic compared to the somewhat more 
typical existential situation in Greene, wherein characters are bound to recollectable childhoods 
rather than cut loose from futures known in advance—so that the dreaded but inexorable 
decades-long block of adulthood cannot be recorded as a gap. The most famous case is probably 
the villainous man-child Pinkie of Brighton Rock (1938), who is endlessly haunted by 
recollections of the moanings of parental copulation. In The Power and the Glory (1940), 
Captain Fellows fears (in a way that Philip never knows enough to fear about himself) that his 
daughter will be drawn into the future through a certain inevitable instant of experience—and 
that this will be the result of an accident, an arbitrary signal amid the aggregate of childhood 
perceptions: “But at any moment now a word, a gesture, the most trivial act might be her 
sesame—to what?...You cannot control what you love—you watch it driving recklessly towards 
the broken bridge, the torn-up track, the horror of seventy years ahead” (38).  
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It is perhaps never clearer than in moments like this why Greene might have declared 
continuity “the enemy of life”; in moments, that is, when any imaginable figure of 
discontinuity—the gap in the record, the broken bridge, the torn up track, the turn to the wall—
only extends death itself out until it is found to be in perfect continuity with life. For that sixty or 
seventy year block of adulthood tends to comprise for Greene a period of “fossilization” (to 
borrow Sarah Miles’ term from The End of the Affair), a process in which habits slowly take over 
everything that moves until, when no more change is possible, death endures as a kind of 
distillation of experience, the final shape of a life that has no end but only the “effect of an 
immense permanence” (The Power and the Glory, 44).28  
If this is sometimes Greene’s way of indicating eternity—as a continuity effect—then the 
sense of the absolute that it conveys doesn’t seem to adhere to a conventional Christian theology: 
“It needs a God outside time,” as Bendrix puts it in The End of the Affair, “to remember when 
everything changes” (119). This makes divinity out to be necessary only as a record of 
inconstancy. Situated in the “great outdoors” (to borrow again Meillassoux’s phrase), it exits in 
absolute non-correlation to human temporality and our fossil record, but it also counterposes 
itself against an Augustinian (and maybe even Jamesonian) notion of eternal presence: neither an 
“immense permanence” nor an artist of transitions, it would simply be a document of the world’s 
infidelities.29 
                                                             
28 Even Pinkie is mercifully spared this particular static endlessness—the endlessness, one might say, of 
the definite image—as he tries for the threshold: “He was at the edge, he was over: they couldn’t even 
hear a splash. It was as if he’d been withdrawn suddenly by a hand out of any existence—past or present, 
whipped away into zero—nothing” (264). Graham Greene, Brighton Rock (New York: Penguin Classics, 
2004) 
29 Such documentation would be structurally similar to duration in the Bergsonian sense, but with human 
life and consciousness somehow subtracted—and without a liberating notion of “openness.” As Deleuze 
points out in Cinema 1, one of Bergson’s major innovations was to conceive of duration as “the whole of 
relations”—as continuous, indivisible change—rather than as the static form of eternity in the classical 
sense. Deleuze quotes from Matter and Memory: “Wherever anything lives, there is, open somewhere, a 
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The Fallen Idol invites a more simplistic theological interpretation: the child after all has 
a pet serpent, which he keeps hidden in the garden outside of his bedroom, and the title too is 
rather insistent. But the serpent dies having caused no harm, incinerated by the malevolent Mrs. 
Baines, and the title was invented by the studio against Reed and Greene’s wishes. In fact, 
having corrected the story’s prolepsis and replaced it with a sort of chance omniscience, the 
film’s narrational structure and forms of suspense work pretty thoroughly to undermine any 
straightforward impression that this is a film about fallenness or the end of innocence. At first 
Phillipe lies to cover for his friend but then finally decides to tell the “truth”—yet, since he 
remains ignorant of what happened, this in effect puts him in the wrong. Practically speaking, 
however, this doesn’t matter: the police refuse to listen to him, having established their own 
empirical basis for exculpating Baines, who, wifeless, is now free to marry his lover. Never mind 
that the police too have the story wrong based on a misinterpretation of the evidence; they, at 
least, light upon the just course of action, if only accidentally and despite the boy’s horrible, 
nagging insistence that he is telling the truth—which persists as the police turn their backs on 
him and the film ends (just in time for the boy’s mother to return home). A cruel economy thus 
makes innocence and justice inversely proportional to truth and rightness, and the film winds up 
being the story of Phillipe falling not out of but into a state of innocence, where he will remain 
perpetually a child, leaving the audience with nothing so much as a stinging sense of how much 
can be lost in the production of narrative continuity.  
  But the film has another more peculiar and suggestive (if almost unnoticeable) temporal 
anomaly. In Ways of Escape, Greene expresses a certain fascination with J.W. Dunne’s An 
                                                             
register in which time is being inscribed” (10). See Gilles Deleuze “Theses on Movement: First 
commentary on Bergson,” Cinema 1: the Movement-Image, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 1-11.   
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Experiment with Time (1927), a work of pseudo-psychology that was popular enough in England 
during the interwar years to be reprinted in two new editions within a decade or so.30 In it, Dunne 
(a mathematician and aeronautical engineer by day) uses a series of observations about the 
content of dreams to develop a theory of time in which humans have unconscious access to the 
future. The implication is not that dreams are predictive, per se, but rather that there is a kind of 
generalized consciousness, encompassing all time simultaneously, of which the present of any 
one observer is only a layer.31 Greene found this idea to be disturbing and maybe even credible:  
Dunne has written…of dreams which draw their symbols from the future as well 
as the past. Is it possible that a novelist may do the same, since so much of his 
work comes from the same source as dreams? It is a disquieting idea. Was Zola, 
when he wrote of the imprisoned miners dying of poisoned air, drawing 
something from a ‘memory’ of his own death, smothered with fumes from his 
coke stove? Perhaps it is just as well for an author not to reread the books he has 
written. There may be too many hints of an unhappy future. (92)  
About half way through The Fallen Idol, Baines, accompanied by Phillipe, brings his 
lover home to the embassy under the mistaken belief that Mrs. Baines (still alive at this point) is 
safely out of town. In a small courtyard on the side of the building, the boy stops and reaches 
down to finger a grate he sees there (figure 2.3). “This is a man’s hole,” he remarks to Julie in his 
suggestively strained English. “You can get right down to the sewers through here.” She ignores 
                                                             
30 While there is no shortage of scholarship on the various ways that late 19th and early 20th century 
developments in the science and philosophy of time influenced the course of literary history, Dunne’s 
rather outlandish ideas haven’t received much attention along these lines, even though they seem to have 
drawn a fair amount of attention from the some of the major British writers of the period. For a study of 
the influence of An Experiment with Time on the literary developments of the interwar years, see Victoria 
Stewart, “J. W. Dunne and Literary Culture in the 1930s and 1940s,” Literature and History, vol. 17 no.2 
(Autumn 2008), 62-81.  
31 J.W. Dunne, An Experiment with Time (Oxford: Macmillan, 1927). 
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him, and so does the film itself: the odd moment foreshadows nothing about the plot of The 
Fallen Idol and has nothing apparently to do with the film’s symbolic developments. It is thus 
difficult, in retrospect, to see this as anything other than an unhappy hint, an obscure proleptic 
glimpse into the sewers of Vienna, where in The Third Man Harry Lime will come to his iconic 
end (figure 2.4): the boy reaches down through the holes of the grate almost to touch the 
fingertips, reaching up, of the man he could very well become—living, as he does, in a world 
that systematically rewards deception. It seems, however, that these particular words are not his 
“sesame,” and so the relation is (until now, I suppose) to be left mercifully undrawn. 
  
  
IV. CONTINUITY THRESHOLDS: CAROL REED’S POSTWAR CITIES  
If we are to understand continuity to be “the enemy of life” in the more categorical sense 
that Greene seems to mean it, in what ways do his postwar collaborations with Reed uphold the 
continuity error as a form of art? There are a number of ways in which the scholarship and 
critical reception of Reed’s work bears on this question, at least indirectly. Following Charles 
Drazin’s study of the production of The Third Man, for instance, one can approach the films in 
terms of their disbursal of authorship, so that Reed is established not as an auteur—the source 
Figure 2.3: Philipe reaches down. Figure 2.4: Lime reaches up. 
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and through line of a coherent artistic vision—but rather, in Drazin’s words, as “cinema’s 
greatest organizer of chance” (xiv).32 In this way, the films (especially The Third Man) appear to 
be artfully erroneous in the sense that they are defined by whatever it is about them that wasn’t 
and couldn’t have been intended; they are records, in Bendrix’s words, of how “everything 
changes.” Such contingencies are amplified, no doubt, by Reed’s decisions for each of his 
productions with Greene to film on location in urban centers that were in various states of 
recovery from recent war. The Third Man, of course, features a postwar Vienna still largely in 
ruins but in the process of rebuilding; The Fallen Idol began filming in the summer of 1947 in 
London’s Belgravia neighborhood, where after the war many of the houses were being converted 
into embassies; and the production crew for Our Man in Havana (1959) set up on location in 
Cuba (with Fidel Castro’s permission) just months after the fall of the Batista regime. 
 The risk of error and accident inherent to this style of filmmaking would have been 
compounded rather than mitigated by the fact that much of the filming was also done in the 
studio—so that the scenes take shape as a somewhat precarious admixture of planned and 
unplanned scenarios, of a documentary-style neorealism and a process of careful staging. This in 
fact was the method behind many of Reed’s projects, not only his collaborations with Greene—
including, just in the decade after World War II, Odd Man Out (1947), which was filmed on 
location in Belfast and at Alexander Korda’s D&P Studios in Denham, Buckinghamshire; 
Outcast Islands (1951), which was filmed in Sri Lanka and at Shepperton Studios in Surrey; The 
Man Between (1953), which was filmed in Berlin and at Shepperton Studios but also includes a 
wonderful scene of James Mason expertly ice skating on location at Richmond Ice Rink in 
London; A Kid for Two Farthings (1955), Reed’s last film with Korda and first film in color, 
                                                             
32 Charles Drazin, In Search of the Third Man (New York: Limelight Editions, 2000).  
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which features scenes of Petticoat Lane in London’s East End; and Trapeze (1956), which was 
an American production but was filmed in Paris, including at the Cirque D’hiver, where Burt 
Lancaster (a veteran circus performer) did much of his own stunt work.  
But pointing this out begins to suggest a signature style of just the sort so often denied to 
Reed—making him the master of the half-real city, a great artist of false continuity. And indeed 
many of his films are uniquely characterized by their overwrought efforts to simultaneously 
document and replicate their scenic subjects. This develops from, say, the model German 
concentration camps featured in Night Train to Munich (1940) to the elaborate reconstructions of 
the bars and nightclubs of Belfast and Berlin for Odd Man Out and The Man Between and 
extends to the magisterial compositing of the artificial and actual ruins of the metropolitan 
centers of Europe during and after the war, which comprise the chilling backgrounds to his most 
significant and memorable films.33  
This characterization of Reed’s style as fundamentally synthetic in its approach to urban 
scenes runs contrary to the more general impression that the aesthetic experience of the city in 
Reed is inherently fractured and disjointed. The visual character of these places, as Rob White 
observes, always seems to convey “disorientation and alarm,” “minds disintegrating” in “tangled 
labyrinth[s]” reminiscent not just of the German expressionism with which American film noir is 
typically associated but also of the French poetic realism of films like Duvivier’s Pépé le Moko 
(1937) (46). In this manner, as Marcia Landy puts it, the city in Reed’s films appears as “an 
extension of the characters’ personal and interpersonal divisions”—at once a psychological and 
                                                             
33 One can find an extreme limit of this style in The Agony and the Ecstasy (1965), which starts as a 
documentary about Michelangelo, then, featuring a moody Charlton Heston as the Renaissance artist and 
(somehow) Rex Harrison as Pope Julius II, re-enacts the stage-by-stage production of the Sistine Chapel 
ceiling, which culminates (only at long last as the credits roll) with a still image of the real thing in near 
entirety. Carol Reed, Dunne, et al., The Agony and the Ecstasy (Twentieth Century Fox Home 
Entertainment, 2005).  
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sociohistorical portrait of a world entering the Cold War era, of humans dividing and subdividing 
themselves into all manner of irreconcilable pieces (183).34 “Carol Reed creates a world that is 
fragmented and fragmentary,” writes Michael Sragow, “where the soul cracks and flies apart…a 
poetic summary of twentieth century harshness—of what can be called the inhuman condition.”35  
These impressions resonate to an extent with Graham Greene’s more tempered sense of 
his own art as charting the “dangerous edge,” “the narrow boundary between loyalty and 
disloyalty, between fidelity and infidelity, the mind's contradictions, the paradox one carries 
within oneself.” But, as this chapter has so far argued, the movement toward such boundaries—
the aesthetic reverence of division, disintegration and infidelity—seems always to entail a 
proportional expansion of the threshold of continuity, a refinement or realignment of the 
“effect[s] of a great permanence” that cannot be extricated from the creative process.  
This double movement is articulated with a particular poignancy and clarity in the 
opening sequences of The Man Between (1953), Reed’s second film after The Third Man.36 This 
was made without credited involvement from Greene, but he was briefly consulted on the 
screenplay37; and the film, sharing many of Greene’s thematic concerns, is often (unduly) 
maligned as a minor rehashing of The Third Man. It begins with a British woman, Susanne 
Mallison (Claire Bloom) arriving in postwar Berlin to visit her brother Martin (Geoffrey Toone), 
who now lives there with his German wife, Bettina (Hildegarde Neff). Susanne will eventually 
find herself the accidental victim of a kidnapping plot involving Ivo Kern (James Mason), with 
whom she will become romantically involved despite his wartime association with the Nazis and 
his current occupation betraying and trafficking West Germans to the East. In the film’s opening, 
                                                             
34 Marcia Landy, British Genres: Cinema and Society, 1930-1960 (Princeton University Press, 1991).  
35 Michael Sragow, “The Odd Man Out,” The Current (The Criterion Collection, 1995). 
36 Carol Reed, et al., The Man Between, digitally restored (London: Studiocanal, 2016) 
37 See Peter William Evans, Carol Reed (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005) 
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Bettina meets Susanne at the airport, and the two women travel by car to her and Martin’s home, 
occasioning a cinematographic tour of the postwar city filmed by Desmond Dickinson, who had 
been a documentarian during the war. Bettina is self-conscious about how she wants her sister-
in-law to experience Berlin: “I wanted to show you something nice first,” she explains. “They 
say first impressions last longer.” The car thus travels first through the rebuilt commercial center, 
showing the city at its best before it approaches the Brandenburg Gate and the other vaguer 
thresholds of the pre-wall East, where the ruin and rubble extend indistinctly and indefinitely 
around them.  
When they arrive, the home appears as a solitary garrison in the surreal landscape of the 
easternmost frontier of the Western bloc (figure 2.5). The dramatic force of the sequence as they 
pull up derives largely from the way the eye is drawn to follow the moving vehicle deep into the 
long shot as it approaches the front gate of the house. This right to left movement is picked up on 
the other side of a cut to a reverse shot (figure 2.6) by the left to right movement of a child who 
has been trailing the car on his bicycle. Though the two images appear in a standard sequence 
meant to establish continuity, it is not at all hard to see that the documentary realism of the 
second image stands in contrast, or counterpoint, to the aesthetic refinement and painterly quality 
of the first. Indeed, the difference is pronounced enough that one wonders whether Reed might 
 91 
 
actually have meant to emphasize the incommensurability of the two images, if in clandestine 
ways that never betray an avant-garde impulse to disrupt the narrative.  
  For example, the towering ruin in the foreground on the left side of first shot is made 
even more conspicuous by being echoed within the same shot in background of the house on the 
opposite side of the frame—but then this rather massive ruin, along with the man and child 
beginning to cross the road in front of it, do not persist across the cut. Instead, a very different 
ruin appears, but on the opposite side of the road, such that it imposes itself in the same position 
on the left side of the frame as the original structure that has now apparently vanished from 
where it should be on the right. There are other less obvious examples, but these features alone 
are sufficient to suggest at the very least that fidelity was not chief among the filmmakers’ 
aesthetic concerns here, but was subordinated to a kind of abstract visual rhyme, which works to 
emphasize the opposing views from west to east and east to west. The basic geometric forms of 
the two shots are composed so as to create a doubling effect rather than the mirroring or 
inversion that one would expect in the reverse shot, which thus holds in relief the carefully 
constructed contrast between the vertical and horizontal patterning that distinguishes each shot 
respectively. 
Figure 2.5: Looking east.  Figure 2.6: Looking west.  
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Countervailing aesthetic priorities structure these shots, a precisely articulated but 
exceedingly subtle interplay between the basic conventions of continuity editing and the poetry 
of discontinuity—an art which can only take shape at the fringes of perception. The least 
interesting, perhaps, but most prominent feature of the first shot is not in fact the ruin but the 
streetlamp. It’s hard to imagine that the filmmakers would have expected anyone to notice this, 
but the lamp seems also to be the most permanent feature of the scene. It has receded deep into 
the background of the long shot in the second image, but it looks more correct than virtually 
everything else in the shot: it is positioned where it ought to be on the corner, and it has twirled 
around on its axis in order to guarantee that—despite all appearances to the contrary—everything 
here has faithfully obeyed the spatial logic of the reverse shot, having upheld the180 degree rule 
that forms the bedrock of the laws of continuity editing. It is as if, in the instantaneous and 
unperceived gap between the two shots, the whole scene of destruction has been destroyed and 
(minus a couple of humans) recreated again around this single enduring light source. And if the 
significance of the new image comes from it being fused into its background, to recall William 
James’s figuration, this is only possible if time (or at least the movie) can be played in reverse: 
returning to the first image, we can find “the dying echo of whence” the new ruin “came to us” 
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and see in retrospect the more original lattice-worked synthesis from which its distinct 
horizontality is to be derived in error (figures 2.7 and 2.8). 
If the poetic nuance of such continuity errors is unlikely ever to be noticed, their 
construction seems too thorough and too intricate to be unconscious; their effects, too elaborate 
to be subliminal. But should they not still fall below any reasonable threshold of attention? In his 
recent “too close” study of Alfred Hitchcock, D.A. Miller finds in such continuity riddles a form 
of duplicity: once the errors are noticed, they create an immediate impression that (like a 
Barthian myth) cannot be rationally explained away afterward. “Their visual insistence…fuses 
with their semantic ambiguity to create little irresolvable cruxes all over Hitchcock’s cinema,” 
betraying the “strong narrative drive” of his films to a counter-propulsive “understyle.” This 
understyle cuts against the auteurist premise of aesthetic continuity with “a teasing insistence on 
disjuncture that asks to be factored in even when it doesn’t add up”; and though it recedes into 
Figure 7: Erroneous ruin, original streetlamp.  Figure 8: “The dying echo” behind the streetlamp. 
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the background, it becomes for Miller the “main source of…enigmatic richness” in Hitchcock’s 
films (14-18).38 
But as I’ve begun to suggest here—and as I will trace more thoroughly in the following 
section—the art of the continuity error for Hitchcock’s transatlantic foil, the “great organizer of 
chance,” would have to be more or less inverted.  If this art also suggests a certain counter-
propulsive tendency, it in contrast entails an insistent rationality, a “grim reason” as Greene 
would put it—a synthetic process that works to extend and re-articulate the thresholds of 
continuity precisely where one would expect them to be most thoroughly broken up in the 
cinema of the postwar city, in its plurality of incommensurable images and (to adopt a phrase 
from Deleuze) “irrational cuts.”  
    
V. THE “GRIM REASON” OF THE THIRD MAN39  
The most famous moment in The Third Man is of course Orson Welles (as Harry Lime) 
delivering his grim pronouncements about the last several centuries’ worth of European history 
and culture, his casual justification of “warfare, terror, murder, and bloodshed.” “Nobody thinks 
in terms of human beings,” he declares from the drone-like vantage of the Wiener Riesenrad—
the giant Ferris wheel that dominates Vienna’s Prater amusement park—as he peers at the 
moving dots below. But the way in which this inhumane view of postwar Europe has dominated 
the critical history of the film tends to obscure the image of Vienna that actually appears in the 
movie—which, in precise contrast to Lime’s version of it, seems built much more narrowly from 
                                                             
38 D.A. Miller, Hidden Hitchcock (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). 
39 Portions of this section present substantial revisions and expansions of material previously published as 
“A Second View: The Third Man from Eye Level,” Los Angeles Review of Books, November 1, 2015.  
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its human beings outward, even in the context of so much sublime footage of the city ruined and 
emptied of life. 
This disjuncture is emblematic of how Reed’s career has fallen more generally under the 
shadow of Welles’s. In Cinema 1, Deleuze (like a number of other critics before and after him) 
presumes that Welles was “closely involved in [the] construction” of The Third Man or, if he 
wasn’t, that at the very least “Reed was an inspired disciple of Welles.”40 This conclusion is 
based on the observation that the film “rediscover[s]” and “profoundly combine[s]” two distinct 
cinematographic movements that Deleuze takes to be signatures of Welles’s style: 
Orson Welles often describes two movements which are formed, one of which is 
like a horizontal linear flight in a kind of elongated, striated cage, lattice-worked, 
and the other a circular sweep whose vertical axis performs a high or a low angle 
shot from a height (21).    
Delueze has in mind a very specific concept of cinematic movement, which he derives from 
Bergson: the camera here operates like consciousness to continuously divide and reunite sets of 
                                                             
40 For a well-researched demystification of the mythology surrounding Welles’s participation in the film’s 
production, see Drazin’s chapter “Stealing the Limelight” in In Search of the Third Man, cited above.  
Figure 2.10: Welles’s high angle.  Figure 2.9: Moving dots. 
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discrete perceptual elements in a way that expresses an indivisible whole. This form of 
expression is evident in the way that, through “certain great movements,” the style that 
characterizes a director’s entire oeuvre (however heterogeneous it may be) can be traced as a 
signature in the minutest details of a single shot from a single film (21).  
 In sidelining Reed, however, Deleuze chooses not to follow up on his own curious 
suggestion that the relationship between Welles and Reed’s films entails a kind of doubling of 
cinematic consciousness, as if The Third Man was necessary to produce the more “profound” 
synthesis that had been lacking between Welles’s horizontal and vertical movements—as if, in 
other words, Reed’s style resolves the inherent duplicity of a style with two signatures. Why, 
among the other directors that Deleuze mentions in this context (e.g. Hitchcock, Kurosawa and 
Murnau) should Welles in particular need a disciple? Would his style not endure without 
believers?  
 These are unanswerable questions, of course, which Deleuze probably didn’t intend to 
raise; but the paradoxes of cinematic continuity that underlie them are addressed with remarkable 
precision in the formal construction of The Third Man. Though the film is generally recognized 
for its baffling visual obliquity—for its extreme canting, its very low and very high angles, its 
unusual off-screen vanishing points—it is also exceedingly careful to establish distinctions 
between the vertical and horizontal axes of its filmic territory, and it loads these distinctions with 
meaning. On the one hand, the great wheel rises mechanically above a kind of vast memorial—
not a memorial to the dead, exactly, but to amusement? to some prewar ideal of Machine Age 
recreation?—the Russian-occupied zone below transformed, as Graham Greene writes in his 
treatment of the film, into “great glaciers of snow and ice,” the wheel “revolving slowly over the 
foundations of merry-go-rounds like abandoned millstones, the rusting iron of smashed tanks 
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which nobody had cleared away, the frost-nipped weeds where the snow was thin.” On the other 
hand, a second Vienna has begun to appear, its streets “repaired up to the first story,” as Greene 
continues, so that upon the arrival there of Holly Martins (Joseph Cotten) the stage is set, if not 
for an entirely human point of view, then at least for a certain restricted cinematic one, built and 
populated “only at eye level,” crowded with canting bodies filmed at close range, but left 
unrendered vertically (15).41  
To the extent that the distinctions between the horizontal and vertical movements in the 
film are at once spatial and temporal, their sustained discontinuity forms a visual basis for the 
film’s ethical suspense. As long as the fugitive Lime keeps his movements outside of Vienna’s 
eye-level grid, he remains free of its jurisdictions. His evasions are more than a game of disguise 
or concealment; he keeps almost entirely to his own axis. Take, for instance, the preamble to the 
climactic chase through Vienna’s sewer system: a setup in the Hoher Markt, the city’s oldest 
square reduced mostly to shadowy ruins, which surround an improbably luminous Café Marc 
Aurel. Martins sips coffee and awaits Lime’s appearance. Major Calloway (Trevor Howard) has 
successfully convinced him of the truth and gravity of Lime’s crimes (a penicillin racket that has 
left many people, including children, dead or maimed); and Martins has, in turn, agreed to betray 
his old friend and help the police spring a trap. A shrewdly edited sequence conveys the scenario 
without dialogue: waiting in suspense, sentries are tactically positioned so that the police 
command every possible sightline radiating from the center of the square, spokes in a giant 
horizontal wheel that renders visible every possible approach. More specifically, Reed alternates 
between, on the one hand, close-ups of the statuesque guards, their eyes panning from left to 
right like rudimentary CCTV cameras, and, on the other, still images of the ostensive territory 
                                                             
41 Graham Greene, The Third Man (New York: Penguin Books, 1999). 
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these looks survey: expressionistic glimpses of Vienna’s streets at night, archetypes of the noir 
cityscape. Rigidly horizon-bound as the closed-circuit eyeballs are, however, they allow Lime, 
who enters the scene from his characteristic height (perched many levels up on a ruined building) 
to remain effectively invisible. In stark contrast, Reed provides Lime’s own view, which, angled 
downward, pans magisterially across the entire scene, and the audience is meant to understand 
that while the sentries’ looks are partial, static, limited, and fragmentary, Lime comprehends the 
whole picture. 
But his picture is wrong!—or, at least, not quite compatible with the picture that has 
already been presented. In fact, this famous set piece, which seems to be about nothing more 
than it is about visual comprehensiveness and continuity, displays a remarkable number of gaps 
and inconsistencies of vision, which are as difficult to spot as they are precise in their 
implications. For instance, immediately before we are given Lime’s view, Calloway and his 
sergeant (Bernard Lee) are approached by an old balloon-seller who, a lost wraith from the Prater 
or some other firebombed recreational zone stumbling into the wrong scene, menaces them until 
they are forced to purchase a balloon. This is one of the most vivid and memorable images of the 
film, but why doesn’t Lime see any of it? (Everyone else on set seems to.) Doesn’t the suspense, 
here, derive specifically from the fact that the transaction is comically conspicuous, that these 
men are trying to hide but have instead acquired a homing beacon to draw Lime’s eye? Shouldn’t 
he at least see the magic lantern show, the grotesque oversized shadows that the old man casts 
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against the square’s storefronts as he conducts his business? Shouldn’t he see at least one or two 
of the lookouts camped out everywhere and only partially concealed? 
Instead, looking down at the same place, he sees a different world—a past version of 
Vienna superimposed on this one, as a horse-drawn carriage enters the roundabout (not unlike an 
odd preindustrial merry-go-round) and another enters from the right of the frame, having just 
crossed in front of the Café Marc Aurel unheeded by any of the many vigilant eyes it must have 
crossed at the same time. So incongruous is Lime’s vision of the scene that his actions proceed as 
though they are, in turn, exempt from its logic. He simply steps right in through the back door of 
the café. Since the café was directly across the square from him moments before, Lime has had 
to descend from his perch and cover a great deal of territory traversing sightlines without being 
seen.42 He has dropped from his own world in his own time to this one without the need to obey 
its rules, except maybe to keep his former promise to Martins: “I will meet you any place, any 
time.” 
                                                             
42 In The Third Man's Vienna, Brigitte Timmermann suggest that the balloon transaction provides Lime 
with a diversion, but Lime himself doesn’t see it, and there are just too many eyes involved here for that 
explanation to suffice (197). The audience may be diverted, however, should it be noticed that the balloon 
that Lee holds on set at the London Films Studio doesn’t match any of those offered by the seller, who 
remains in Vienna.   
Figure 2.11: The balloon-seller’s conspicuous approach. Figure 2.12: Lime’s alternate view of the same scene. 
 100 
 
The film’s temporal incommensurability thus allows Lime to elude the ethical alliance 
formed between Calloway and Martins, and so long as the scenic composition of Reed’s Vienna 
holds the prospect of a more effective synthesis in suspense, Lime cannot be brought to justice. 
The impression that the character moves extra-diegetically works, as well, to allegorize the 
notorious circumstances of Welles’s own involvement in the film’s production, his various 
unimpugned betrayals of his contractual obligation to Korda. Indeed, the main feature of both 
Lime and Welles’s role as the third man of The Third Man is that, for the most part, they’re not 
actually in it. As Drazin reports, Welles never showed up on set when he was supposed to, 
forcing the production team to improvise, putting other actors in disguise or casting shadow-
Limes against walls when no real Lime could be apprehended. The assistant director himself, 
Guy Hamilton, plays Lime in his first appearance in the ruins above the square (68-81). In this 
way the film’s scenic two-timing does in fact produce a visible record of Welles’s own double 
signature, if not quite in the way Deleuze meant.  
But Lime’s alternate plot is not ultimately sustainable. For cats, as everyone knows, do 
not respect any rules or boundaries pertaining to the space–time continuum, nor would they 
trouble themselves with the technical and metaphysical quandaries such boundaries entail in The 
Third Man; which is why Harry Lime’s favorite cat—strutting from this world to that and back 
again with as little regard for the laws of nature as it has for the conventions of continuity editing 
(there are three cats, not one)—provides Reed with the perfect device to force Lime across the 
dark threshold into the half-light of Vienna’s horizontal grid. This is one of the film’s most 
iconic images: a drastically canted shot of Lime half-concealed in a darkened doorway, betrayed 
by the cat’s meow even before his face is lit for the first time (now nearly two-thirds of the way 
into the film) from a neighbor’s bedroom window above. Martins attempts to approach him, but 
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is blocked by a passing car; and Lime (just as he will later do in the Hoher Markt) evades contact 
by way of an apparent continuity break: when the automobile speeds past on its horizontal 
trajectory, interrupting Martins’s view for a fraction of a second — much too fast for Lime to 
escape—Lime vanishes, crossing the frame neither to the right nor to the left, rematerializing 
only as footsteps in the distance and shadows projected on the walls before disappearing again 
into the sewers below.  
This sort of editing trick, in which a shot is briefly blocked by a passing object and 
someone vanishes with supernatural haste, has now become a conventional way to initiate a 
chase in countless thrillers. But Reed, in this early example, places a special emphasis on the 
breach of continuity, allowing the moment to strain the film’s realism almost to the breaking 
point in what seems at first glance like a rather heavy-handed cinematic sleight of hand. Richard 
Misek suggests that the effect here recalls the trickery of Georges Méliès and fits a broader 
pattern in which Lime seems generally exempt from the demands of continuity editing.43 And 
Rob White has noted that, though the film mostly earned favorable reviews on its release, its 
occasional skeptics were bothered by just this sort of thing: “I feel a shade of disappointment,” 
writes one British reviewer, “at the reappearance of the familiar trick and the familiar situation”; 
                                                             
43 Richard Misek, Wrong Geometries in The Third Man (Rouge Press, 2007). 
Figure 2.13: Lime on the threshold. Figure 2.14: Martins cut off.  
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or another: “Mr. Reed has never elaborated his style so desperately, nor used so many tricks in 
the presentation of a film”; and one more from across the Atlantic: “Mr. Reed has…packaged the 
whole bag of his cinematic tricks” (quoted in White, 22).  
But a closer look at the sequence reveals that actually there’s no cinematic trick to it at all 
and that Lime in fact does not disappear in the cut—quite the contrary, as it turns out. There is, 
however, a substantial violation of continuity involved, which is perhaps what provokes the 
assumption of deceit—a trick only insofar as it tricks the audience into feeling tricked. The 
sequence is structured around the movement of the car as it divides Martins and Lime, passing 
across the frame twice—once on each side of the cut. In the first shot, we have a head-on view 
from behind Martins as the car begins to pass in front of Lime, who crouches as though he’s 
about to run. Instead, however, he disappears, and—as if to offer an obscure rebuttal to Méliès—
he seems to do so before the cut, before the car has even finished passing. His shadowy head and 
torso aren’t where they should be, framed in the window of the car as it goes by (figure 2.15); 
and, once it does, his luminous shoes are, it seems, no longer where they had formerly been 
edging their way out from the darkness at the base of the threshold (figure 2.16).  
Figure 2.15: Nothing visible behind the car.  Figure 2.16: Has Lime already disappeared? 
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But is there still a trace a toe of a shining shoe? And is that a face still receding in the 
center of the darkened doorway, just at the top left fringe of the passing car? If the quick cut does 
not seem to make the magic happen, it does frustrate the first opportunity to verify that it 
hasn’t—but the continuity error that it thereby produces seems constructed precisely to allow for 
another look. Conventionally, the second shot here should present a match on action, picking up 
the movement of the vehicle where the previous shot left off in order to create the illusion of 
continuous motion across the cut. But the illusion is broken: the shot instead sets up a parallel 
sequence, jumping back in time to show the same movement reenacted from a different angle 
(figure 2.17). In effect the cut makes Lime erroneously reappear (which is what Lime tends to 
do anyway); and providing a view behind the curtain, as it were, it allows us to be sure that the 
disappearing act had nothing to do with the cut (figure 2.18). No editing tick, this is magic of an 
older sort, a show that might as well have been performed on stage. 
  
In this manner, the continuity error—literally staged on a literal threshold—disrupts the 
illusion of cinematic continuity so as to replace it surreptitiously with a pre-cinematic illusion of 
discontinuity. A great irony, then, is that this sequence—one of the most famous in the history of 
Figure 2.17: Time rewound for a parallel sequence.  Figure 2.18: Lime disappears with no cut. 
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British cinema—is actually more realistic than it appears to be, documenting a kind of creative 
evolution of theatrical magic that manages to elude the media-technological history of its own 
form. This, in other words, is a drama of continuity that refuses to make a technical distinction 
between continuity and discontinuity.  
 Deleuze’s writing on film is helpful to consider in this context, since his adherence to 
Bergson makes him uniquely careful to maintain that there is no inherent opposition between the 
continuous and the discontinuous in cinema. Thus, the opposition that I alluded to above between 
rational and irrational cuts is not one of discontinuity and continuity between shots. “On the 
contrary,” he writes in Cinema 2, “the cuts or breaks in cinema have always formed the power of 
the continuous” (181).44 He uses the term rational cut in the mathematical sense associated with 
Richard Dedekind to indicate a point that divides two sets but that is also representable as part of 
one set or the other. An irrational cut, on the other hand, refers to an “interstice” that “does not 
form part of either set, one of which has no more an end than the other has a beginning.” 
Irrational cuts, which Deleuze finds to be more characteristic of cinema after World War II, 
produce what he calls without negative connotation “false continuity,” an “interaction of two 
images [that] engenders or traces a frontier which belongs to neither one nor the other” (181). 
False continuity thus allows for a direct presentation of duration (time), which is not 
subordinated to the mere images of movement (space) found on either side of the cut.45  
                                                             
44 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema2: The Time-Image, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta 
(Minneapolis: Minasota University Press, 1989). 
45 A similar conception of false or irrational continuity is reflected in literary terms in Bowen’s forms of 
suspense and suspension. To recall a key passage from The Heat of the Day quoted in Chapter 1: “Having 
hung for just that instant more suspended the music now broke with a light crash.” The word suspended 
divides the sentence into distinct syllabic and syntactic halves but does not itself quite belong to either 
half, and so it seems to convey the scene’s temporal duration more directly than the spatialized 
descriptions of its musical movements are able to do.  
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Insofar as Reed’s postwar frontiers and urban thresholds comprise an art of false 
continuity in this sense, uncuttable figures like the The Third Man’s unvanishing Lime, or the 
enduring streetlamp of The Man Between, trace the opposing frontiers of a rational continuity: 
even as they recede into the background, they represent an implacable metonymy that, obeying a 
stringent realism, fuses one image to the next—a series of joints that cannot be disarticulated 
even when humans sometimes seem to vanish from the human scene. 
 If the phantasmagoric fantasy of Lime’s discontinuous existence evades the media-
technical advent of cinema, then his rewound return to the threshold of continuity certainly does 
not; and by the time we get to the Hoher Markt and Lime’s subsequent demise, the inexorable 
reason of the cinematic apparatus appears to have won out over any alternatives. Though Lime’s 
first disappearing act may have been a magic show, there is no doubt that his fatal appearance in 
the full light of the Café Marc Aurel puts him in the realm of another sort of show altogether. 
Never is this technological distinction so clear as it is in the decisive moment when Calloway 
convinces Martins that Lime is a criminal, the precondition for the betrayal that brings about his 
downfall. Calloway begins the presentation of evidence with what he calls a “magic lantern 
show,” an allusion to pre-cinematic forms of theatrical image projection. But quickly, after 
entreating Martins to “look here,” his voice fades out, along with the image of the clumsy 
projecting apparatus over which the sergeant fumbles, to be replaced by what can only be found 
in a motion picture: a montage, complete with optical effects. The major ethical turn in the film 
is therefore carried out strictly in the language of film. The mechanics of courtroom 
argumentation are replaced by the more immediate (and, perhaps, more intimate) visual logic of 
cinema: a series of shots of evidentiary objects (fingerprints, photographs, notes, etc.) with no 
dialogue, one dissolving into the next until a perfect superimposition of frames encircles 
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Martins’s eyes within a magnifying glass, answering Calloway’s call for him to look by insisting 
via optical effect that now, at last, he sees. 
 Reed thus ties to the ethical argument of the film a reflexive argument about the rhetoric 
of film editing—a suggestion that cinematic ideas are best conveyed through the synthesis of 
disparate images and, further, that the dissolve is more compelling than the cut as both a 
technique of persuasion and a signal of truth. The broad context for such an argument extends 
back at least to the Soviet montage movement of the1920s, but this sequence is more 
immediately engaged with postwar concerns about the historiographic, moral and ideological 
function of documentary records of humanitarian atrocities. The scene seems to be a fairly direct 
allusion to a similar scene in Welles’s own The Stranger (1946), in which an agent of the Allied 
War Crimes Commission (Edward G. Robinson) shows a small-town New-Englander named 
Mary Longstreet (Loretta Young) real footage of the German concentration camps as part of his 
Figure 2.19: Looking at the evidence. Figure 2.20: Seeing the evidence. 
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efforts to convince her that her husband (played by Welles) is a fugitive Nazi and one of the 
architects of the genocide (figures 2.21 and 2.22).46  
A key difference between the two scenes is that, in Welles’s version, film does not speak 
for itself: the detective literally imposes himself between the spectator and the screen so that the 
images are projected onto his face as he speaks, a superimposition that supplements rather than 
subsuming the oratorical performance of the reasoning process. In The Third Man, the reflexive 
method through which still images are translated into the language of cinema transfers the focus 
of the rhetorical drama from the performer to the audience, from the voice to the image, so that 
the aesthetic experience of metonymy as such—the impression that Martins’s impressions 
connect—is sufficient to demonstrate Lime’s guilt and justify Martins’s cooperation with the 
police.  
But this of course is a trick, which depends on a belief in continuity that has no empirical 
basis. This is perhaps another one of those cinematic deceptions that bothered the few 
                                                             
46 This was the first major Hollywood production to feature documentary footage of the holocaust. For a 
study of The Stranger in the context of the rhetoric and ideology of postwar films about the holocaust and 
of Welles’s own antifascist activism, see Jennifer L. Barker, “Documenting the Holocaust in Orson 
Welles’s The Stranger,” Film and Genocide, edited by Kristi M. Wilson and Tomás F. Crowder-
Taraborrelli (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012) 45-66. 
Figure 2.21: Mr. Wilson screens his argument.  Figure 2.22: Mary listens. 
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contemporary reviewers that disliked the film. The gambit has inherent aesthetic risks. The 
optical printing process used to produce the dissolving effect involves projecting and 
rephotographing individual picture elements, which means the quality of the final image is 
compromised: there’s a slight jolting of the frame at the beginning and end of where the original 
images overlap and a loss of resolution throughout the transition. In other words, the continuity 
effect produced by the dissolve, in contrast to the standard cut, comes at the cost of a loss of 
fidelity, and threatens (if accidentally noticed) to betray the editorial hand and spoil the effect.  
It bears remarking that recent developments in digital film technology would seem to 
render this particular problem of continuity obsolete. In 2015, The Third Man was digitally 
restored by Deluxe Media on behalf of Studiocanal for a 4K release; and, as part of the process, 
the dissolves were smoothed out and so now appear seamless. In an interview, Mark Bonnici, 
who headed the restoration, explained the reasoning for this. The goal was to create a viewing 
experience as close as possible to that of the original audiences. The graininess of the original 
film is retained; but, in what Bonnici characterized as a modest intervention, corrections were 
made to small movements and other potentially distracting effects of the laboratory process of 
making composite images using an optical printer.47 In theory, these effects would have been less 
distracting to a 1940s audience than they would be to an audience today (and certainly less 
awkward than Calloway’s magic lantern) simply because the contemporary viewers would have 
been more accustomed to them.  
Such a process of habituation suggests that the thresholds of cinematic continuity are 
historically variable, and so even as its little errors and distractions are corrected by the modest 
digital touch of the future, The Third Man still remains a record of change—and it does so 
                                                             
47 Marc Bonnici, personal interview, August 5, 2015. 
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precisely for the effect of its permanence. In other words, the effect of the dissolving evidence, 
then and now, is the same: the audience experiences Martins’s transition out of the dazzling 
sphere of Lime’s influence as a refinement of the medium, a movement beyond one obsolete 
mode of theatrical presentation or another—a disillusionment, to be sure, but one that entails the 
production of a newer, sleeker form of illusion.    
While Lime’s own cinematic high ground, as it were, is ultimately meant to be ironic (the 
film hints as much early on when the porter at Martins’s hotel [Paul Hörbiger], with a weak 
grasp of the English language, gestures towards hell above and heaven below), the manner in 
which he is brought down to the restricted domain of the camera at eye level, to be trapped and 
destroyed, doesn’t necessarily suggest a better view. Beyond its symbolic resonance, the sewer 
chase provides a very literal corrective to the bungled Hoher Markt operation: Lime’s 
movements are now confined more or less to a single story worth of vertical space (except where 
his fingertips breach the sewer grate in his final, futile ascent), and, in turn, a couple of his 
pursuer’s eyeballs have enhanced their horizontal pan with a slight vertical tilt to put Lime in 
range. But his death appears to be less a victory than it is an act of mercy, one which spares the 
murderer, at the moment he’s caught, from the dismal continuity of the film’s horizontal spaces 
— precisely what he seems always to have sought. While Lime was able to indulge the fantasy 
of a view from an alternative Vienna raised beyond Vienna (a death wish perhaps), all the human 
beings he leaves behind are left to face the one that merely extends beyond the frame, just 
outside the camera’s line of sight. 
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Though the dreariness of the finale is somewhat mitigated by the subtle archness of 
Lime’s death (a kind of capstone to the film’s general tone of dark humor, its half-casual manner 
of providing lighthearted amusement), this Vienna—the one that exists on the margins of what’s 
presented on-screen, the one that only just eludes viewing—seems to be a truly miserable and 
humorless place. This is where Martins shoots and kills his closest friend. This is where he 
observes Lime’s victims, off-screen figures that we don’t see but that, through a grim metonymic 
attachment, retain their frightening continuity with the figures we do: nurses, cribs, surgical 
tools, cotton balls, and teddy-bears (figure 2.23). This is where Lime’s former girlfriend, the 
playactress Anna Schmidt (Alida Valli), is afforded no exit when, after receding far into a 
gapping darkness at the edge of her apartment but arriving at no vanishing point and no chance 
for a disappearing act (figure 2.24), she must return to face the camera and her arrest by the 
leering agent of the International Patrol. 
 Such impressions of a third Vienna, one that belongs neither to Lime nor to the camera, 
accumulate at the margins of the screen until reaching their clearest expression in the film’s final 
gesture. As Anna slowly approaches the camera from the sublime depth of the long shot, the 
cemetery’s trees to her left and right seem to extend infinitely from their horizontal vanishing 
point, but their branches have been cut short at the top, their vertical extensions dismantled in an 
Figure 2.23: Offscreen horror. Figure 2.24: Vida with no vanishing point.  
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obscure visual echo of Lime’s defeat. Martins leans on a wooden cart that appears to have been 
forgotten on the side of the road in a former century (perhaps the same century that Lime saw 
superimposed on what was left of the Hoher Markt after World War II), waiting there to haul 
away the branches that no longer top the trees. When Anna, in her choice to remain faithful to 
her dead lover, passes him by without a word or a glance and steps out of the movie at the lower 
right side of the screen, the gesture is final but provides no closure: we are given no assurance 
that she has made it safely into the wings, for she is far from the theater where she and Martins 
first met; and so we must assume that she continues her long walk, that the cemetery road 
beyond the near-infinity of what we see of it exists in perfect continuation of what we don’t, its 
inconceivable scale functioning not as some grand memorial to the many human bodies that lie 
buried there along with Lime’s, but functioning instead to extend indefinitely the radius of 
Martins’s solitude among them. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.25: No exit. Figure 2.26: No end. 
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Figure 3.1: Raymond Chandler putting on gloves. February, 1958. 
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Chapter 3 - Raymond Chandler’s Unretrospective Suspense 
 
I. “MOMENTS IN EMPTY ROOMS” 
In a remarkable coincidence of literary-critical reflection, Elizabeth Bowen seems to have 
been drawn to Raymond Chandler’s fiction by the same empty record—the same unwritten 
scenic background to human intuition—that Graham Greene had been drawn to in hers. To recall 
a bit more of Greene’s essay, “The Dark Backwards,” referred to in the previous chapter:  
Miss Bowen...has made of her omissions a completely individual method, she has 
dramatized ignorance. How with so little known of the ‘backward and abysm’ [of 
time] can she convey her characters with any clearness? She makes it the virtue of 
her characters that they are three parts mystery; the darkness which hides their 
past makes the cerebrations which we are allowed to follow the more 
vivid…[T]he characters understand each other without our losing the sense of 
mystery: they must be able to tell all from a gesture, a whisper, a written sentence: 
they have to be endowed with an inhuman intuition…Unable to convey the 
passage of time, she has made capital of the gap in the records. (58)1  
In a 1949 review of Chandler’s first postwar novel, The Little Sister (alongside a review of 
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-four), Bowen writes that Chandler’s “genius” is evident in how he 
“suggests what civilization could be by dwelling on its appalling lapses and cracks.” “Perhaps 
the secret of Chandler[’s] narrative art,” she continues, is that, much more than that the “average 
thriller,” “it conjures into being, behind the story, a sort of other dimension—a dimension of 
                                                             
The archive image of Chandler putting on gloves is from Raymond Chandler Papers, 1930-1959, UCLA 
Special Collections, Collection 638, Box 1, Folder 10.   
1 Graham Greene, “The Dark Backward,” Collected Essays (London: Vintage, 2014). 
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silences, of piercing intuitions, of untimeable moments in empty rooms, of unreadable secrets 
behind pairs of eyes that look at you, of stunning confrontations by sheer loneliness” (34, 
emphasis original).2 
 Located only in the empty recesses of another author’s work, time is figured for both 
Greene and Bowen as a kind of suspension medium, an all but contentless milieu out of which 
characters transpire in a flitting and fragmentary way—brief but vivid bursts of mental activity 
and bodily gesture that mark the limits of human sympathy. If for Greene the clarity of these 
movements derives from a sense that the past is lost to representation, for Bowen they take shape 
in Chandler’s work as an image of the future, a social vision that seems defined less by shoring 
up the fragments of what remains of “civilization” after war than it is by the sheer, vacant form 
of time itself, conceptualized as an alternate dimension. The posthuman thrill of this postwar 
world (more than that of the “average thriller”) is found once again in an aesthetic practice that 
delineates what might be called (by inverting the Husserlian formulation) the consciousness of 
external time. Bowen here imagines an art form that can depict without paradox “moments in 
empty rooms”—a not quite articulable sense that, as I put it before, perceptions and memories 
                                                             
2 “Elizabeth Bowen’s Book Reviews," The Tatler, 6 July 1949. For his part, Chandler didn’t seem to care 
at all for Bowen’s work. In a 1949 letter to his agent Bernice Baumgarten, he writes of her with a kind of 
impetuous condescension (in reference, it seems, to The Heat of the Day): “I get a lot of fun sticking pins 
in the popular balloons. The most fantastic pratfall of the moment is Elizabeth Bowen’s last book which 
sports a screaming parody of Henry James. Jamie Hamilton wrote me that the English critics are tying 
themselves in knots trying to be polite to her (because of course they know she is potentially a fine 
writer), knowing all the time that the poor girl is giving an exhibition of what happens when an over-
earnest writer completely loses her sense of humor” (quoted in The Raymond Chandler Papers, edited by 
Tom Hiney and Frank MacShane (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2000), 106). However, in 1947 he 
had expressed no small degree of pride in having the British re-issues of his own novels reviewed by 
someone so esteemed as Elizabeth Bowen (See letter to James Sandoe, quoted in Raymond Chandler 
Speaking, edited by Dorothy Gardiner and Kathrine Sorley Walker (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1997), 149. I have been unable to track down the earlier review or reviews to which he might refer, 
though Bowen’s 1949 piece on The Little Sister (cited above) does suggests that she was familiar with all 
of his previous novels.      
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are imprinted on things in a manner that is not quite intelligible as an allegory of writing or some 
other technique of information storage.  
As I argued in chapter 1, Bowen herself attempts this in The Heat of the Day through a 
rigorous formal reduction. The novel carefully isolates the various rhetorical forms of the present 
that take shape in a time when classical Aristotelian conceptions of past, present and future are 
under attack on numerous fronts, i.e. the “‘time being’ which war has made the very being of 
time” (109)—the time of suspended intimacies, of asynchronous instants, of past presents, and of 
present pasts. These temporal contortions control the novel’s sense of suspense, confounding the 
anticipatory logic that would seem essential to it and marking a broader shift in the existential 
ground of the 20th-century novel—a literal and figurative midpoint between the perpetual (and 
perpetually recursive) post-humanistic suspense of the cold war period and the more humanistic 
conditions of narrative suspense of which these might be considered the accidental result. By 
separating out the various rhetorical forms of time and pinning them with surgical precision to 
the different characters as they appear to each other, the novel envisions a world in which the 
phenomenal present—“the immense today”—is quarantined and forced into relief. In doing so, it 
uncovers “behind the story,” as it were, a “core of absolute inhumanity” (155). This figure is 
structurally akin to Bergson’s pure duration in the sense that it is absolute both in its continuity 
and in its heterogeneity—but it lacks the vital impulses of psychology: it presents itself to Stella 
Rodney as a contentless mode of sympathetic involvement, a “being” whose appearance she 
can’t remember—“continuous, secretive, dense, weighty, locked in himself and face to face, 
beside her, with the unbounded night in which no clock struck” (155).  
As I argued in chapter 2, the object of much of Greene’s work was to avoid externalizing 
time in this way—i.e. in terms of pure “unbounded” continuity—because he found aesthetic 
 116 
 
conceptions of continuity in fiction and in film to be the “enemy of life.” In a more tempered 
way than the avant-garde movements of the period, he (alone and in collaboration with Carol 
Reed) sought to delimit rather than to uphold the conventions of narrative continuity that 
dominated the forms of literary and cinematic realism in the years after the war. This was an art 
drawn, in Greene’s words, to “dangerous edges,” to “the narrow boundary between loyalty and 
disloyalty, between fidelity and infidelity, the mind's contradictions, the paradox one carries 
within oneself.” This was to be an art of error and of accident—of discontinuity and 
irrationality—but it is one that seems always to fall into a pattern of “grim reason,” an intractable 
system of metonymic attachment; and in its perpetual failure to distinguish the “edges” or 
thresholds of relation it too tends instead to produce, in Bowen’s words, “stunning confrontations 
by sheer loneliness,” a purely formal structure of continuity and attachment emptied of human 
sympathy and engagement (as in the final shot of The Third Man or in the proleptic scenes of old 
age and death in “The Basement Room”). 
In Chandler’s postwar Los Angeles, external time—the vague empty form of a future 
civilization that transpires at the phenomenal limits of the present one—is figured more 
concretely in the ruthless stereotypification of human interaction, in the “inhuman” convergence 
of irrational, will-less acts of extreme violence with the “perfection” and “cool efficiency” of the 
administrative logic of business relations (“The Pencil,” 1239).3 This recursive process—which 
resembles the military processing that, in The Heat of the Day, transforms Stella’s son Roderick 
from a person into a process—could be described as the epitome of continuity that precedes the 
“epitome of discontinuity” in Adorno’s famous formulation: “the total menace which organized 
                                                             
3 I quote here from the last published Philip Marlowe story, “The Pencil,” Raymond Chandler: Collected 
Stories (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2002), but these terms recur in similar contexts throughout 
Chandler’s work.  
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mankind poses to organized men” (320).4 In the hardboiled detective novel, the dominant figure 
for such organization is not the military but rather, to quote Philip Marlowe, “the Outfit, the 
Syndicate, the big mob, or whatever name you want to use for it” (“The Pencil,” 1238).  
Chandler’s vision of 20th-century America is defined largely by Marlowe’s unrelenting 
belief in this sort of thing, whatever it is—“you know damn well it exists…[and] you can’t beat 
it” (“The Pencil,” 1238). In the first Marlowe novel, The Big Sleep (1939), the organization is for 
the most part clearly nameable and traceable to a set of specific historical circumstances: its 
origin seems to coincide squarely with the lifting of prohibition in the United States, a market 
upheaval that demanded that bootleggers adapt, diversify, and reorganize their trades in order to 
sustain their livelihoods as pseudo-legitimate business owners. This shift is figured as an 
evolutionary process that selects for “top flight racketeers with business brains,” those whose 
behavior is directed by “good policy” rather than “personal feelings.” (The Big Sleep, 683).5 This 
figure recurs in each of the Marlowe novels, but even as early as Farewell, My Lovely (1942), the 
organization itself becomes a far more abstract and pervasive menace. If, in The Big Sleep, the 
gangster-turned-entrepreneur Edie Mars has “sidelines” of questionable legality—“black mail, 
bent cars, hideouts for hot boys from the east, and so on” (714)—in Farewell My Lovely, “all 
rackets tie together” (955);6 and as the business brains converge and the criminal networks 
become indistinguishable from the social, political and legal institutions into which they are 
imbricated, the process accelerates. 
The organization thus comes in Chandler’s later fiction to stand in its extremity for the 
structuring effects of time, so that when in the very last Marlowe story—which is about the 
                                                             
4 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge, 1973).  
5 Raymond Chandler, The Big Sleep, Stories and Early Novels (New York: Library of America, 1995).  
6 Raymond Chandler, Farewell, My Lovely, Stories and Early Novels (New York: Library of America, 
1995). 
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refinement of the Syndicate’s “technique” of killing—Marlowe’s realization that the 
administrative mechanism is “perfect all the time” bears a kind of anagogical weight to it: the 
death process is not just reliable in its technique but also eternal in its form (1233, 1267). I’ll 
address this story, “The Pencil,” in greater detail subsequently; but what it finally makes explicit, 
in a much more self-conscious way than the other Marlowe stories and novels do, is the extent to 
which time in Chandler’s fiction is programmatically externalized—and the extent to which this 
creates problems of characterization for a hero whose movements must be organized in a way 
that, on some basic level, oppose organization and technical perfection.  
In the earlier works this is vaguely evident in the discomfiting way, for instance, that 
Marlowe’s narration conveys a sense of perpetual presence—that, beyond his role of facilitating 
the conventional presentifying function of narrative retrospection, Marlowe literally doesn’t 
seem to age (even if he does seem to have memories of things having happened to him before). 
This general impression finds validation in Chandler’s own impression of his character. In a 
1951 letter addressed to D.J. Ibberson, he speculates on the topic: “The date of his [Marlowe’s] 
birth is uncertain. I think he said somewhere that he was thirty-eight years old, but that was quite 
a while ago and he is no older today” (quoted in Chandler Speaking, 227).7  
This should in theory make Marlowe’s mode of narration schematically coherent with a 
representation of society that is based on a rigid typology, a re-enactment space in which the play 
of action is exaggerated in its seriality and to which the same figures eternally return. But in 
practice, Marlowe’s style of narration tends persistently to cut against the typology it instantiates, 
so that through a somewhat more paradoxical recursion the types themselves seem to develop 
and progress from novel to novel, whereas Marlowe does not. In other words, everyone and 
                                                             
7 Raymond Chandler, Raymond Chandler Speaking, edited by Dorothy Gardiner and Kathrine Sorley 
Walker (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).  
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everything in the Marlowe novels tend to become more and more like the sorts of persons or 
things that they are—except Marlowe, whose days (as he puts in in The Long Goodbye) are “not 
exactly…typical” of days in the lives of hardboiled detectives, “but not totally untypical either” 
(549).8 
While I mean to argue here that this is primarily an effect of how time is conceptualized 
and formalized in Chandler’s novels, it does invite alternate biographical and literary-historical 
explanations. Early scholars of Chandler, always anxious about whether they were studying 
works of authentic literary genius and originality or just generic refinements of a popular 
American style of low-brow entertainment, tended to make much of the fact that Chandler was 
born in Chicago but was raised and educated in England before returning stateside, and that he 
fought with the Canadian Expeditionary Force during the first World War. This line of criticism 
originates with Chandler’s eminently quotable assessment of himself as a “man without a 
country”—and in this way echoes the line of Greene scholarship alluded to earlier, which takes 
as its starting point Greene’s sense of himself as an artist preeminently concerned with paradoxes 
of loyalty (Raymond Chandler Speaking, 25). The image of Chandler as torn in his fidelities 
between two nations and two traditions offers a preliminary but only speculative explanation of 
the conceptually awkward notion that, as R.W. Lid puts it, “Chandler’s studied American-ness 
produced an authentic American voice” (161).9 In a much more recent analysis of Chandler’s 
fiction in relation to the American noir tradition, Erik Dussere still frames this paradox in terms 
of the author’s disavowal of a British tradition; but for Dussere, Chandler’s style—what he calls 
“the Chandler effect”—is distinct not for its authenticity but for its “linguistic performance of 
                                                             
8 Raymond Chandler, The Long Goodbye, Later Novels and Other Writings (New York: Library of 
America, 1995). 
9 R.W. Lid, “Philip Marlowe Speaking,” The Critical Response to Raymond Chandler, edited by J.K. Van 
Dover (Westport: Greenweed Press, 1995), 43-63.  
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authenticity,” an “authenticity effect” that is different from a “reality effect,” in Barthes’s sense, 
because it makes itself visible as an effect (15-21).10  
Dussere refers to the reflexive quality of Chandler’s famous similes to make this case; 
but, though it is inflected with a postmodern critical sensibility, the claim is structurally identical 
to Lid’s. Itself a kind of simile, the “Chandler effect” substitutes the effect of “American-ness” 
with the effect of, to quote a term Dussere himself puts in scare quotes, ““effect-ness”” (21). 
Critical recursions like this can help highlight aesthetic problems and paradoxes in suggestive 
ways—another example that comes to mind is Fredric Jameson’s decades-long project of 
detecting in Chandler the effect of an unimaginable social “totality”; but piling up scare quotes, 
emptying out the terms of analysis, also is a practice that tends to invert the frame of reference, 
reproducing rather than comprehending the figurative process it means to undermine. For 
Jameson (not unlike Bowen), this approach eventually runs him all the way out to a stunning 
confrontation with the “end of the world,” the “void,” the “non-human space,” which is the 
“ultimate secret of the Chandlerian narrative” (86).11  
In what, exactly, does this non-human space consist? The central premise of this chapter 
is that it takes shape as the accidental effect of some fairly basic decisions that Chandler made 
about how to organize the temporal situation of his narrator. These creative decisions result—
inevitably, it seems—in a series of slight imperfections and inconsistencies, peculiar “lapses and 
cracks” in the novels’ formal strategies of generating suspense. These are difficult to notice—
thus the feeling of secrecy, of something hidden “behind the story”; so part of the task here will 
be simply to enumerate them and to dispel some of the interpretative vagueness they tend to 
provoke. But the bigger challenge is to examine the governing assumptions and beliefs about 
                                                             
10 Erik Dussere, America Is Elsewhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 112-7. 
11 Fredric Jameson, Raymond Chandler: The Detections of Totality (New York: Verso, 2016) 
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time that make such trivial little aesthetic lapses and peculiarities seem so readily assimilable to 
vast eschatological mysteries that have little to do with the mysteries at hand. 
This must be due in part to the fact that Chandler’s novels concern themselves 
thematically with over-sized existential things like big sleeps and long goodbyes. But their effect 
of sublime inhumanity is formal in a stricter sense; it arises out of the logical incommensurability 
of, on the one hand, the ways in which suspense generally operates as a mode of anticipation, 
and, on the other, the impression that Chandler’s literary practice is based on a typological 
scheme that is extreme in its recursiveness: in a world of near-perfect similitude and continuity, 
where everything always seems to be just like the sort of thing that it is, how can recognition be 
delayed and what could there possibly be to look forward to?  
 
II. VOICEOVER AND THE BLINDED IMAGE OF PERCEPTION 
This temporal aporia forms the basis of the two most commonplace critical assumptions 
about Chandler’s detective novels—assumptions which have developed with such consistency 
over time that their basic contradiction has mostly evaded detection. On the one hand, following 
a series of famous interpretations by W.H. Auden, Gertrude Stein, and, later, Fredric Jameson 
(among others), the novels are seen to be distinct for their intensely episodic character—for a 
style of realism that, in its emphasis on discrete scenic details and autonomous impressions, 
refutes the strong drive toward narrative continuity that justifies the elaborate hermeneutic 
contrivances of the British tradition.12 On the other hand, Chandler’s prose is often taken for 
                                                             
12 See W. H. Auden, “The Guilty Vicarage,” Harper’s Magazine, May 1948 and Gertrude Stein, "Why I 
Like Detective Stories," Gertrude Stein: A Study of the Short Fiction, edited by Linda S. Watts 
(Woodbridge: Twayne Publishers, 1999), 102-106. Jameson has written a number of essays on Chandler 
over the years, which have been recently collected as Raymond Chandler: The Detections of Totality 
(New York: Verso, 2016). 
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granted as the closest literary analog to the amplified form of first person retrospection 
commonly associated with the voiceovers of American film noir—a dramatic technique that 
depends for its fatalistic effect on an extreme sense of narrative continuity, one that is figured 
iconically in Billy Wilder’s Double Indemnity (1944) as a train headed “straight down the line” 
with no stops until the cemetery (or, as in the posthumous narration of Wilder’s Sunset 
Boulevard (1951), no stop there either).13  
Never is this antinomy clearer, perhaps, than in Robert Montgomery’s 1946 film 
adaptation of The Lady in the Lake, a film noir that is somewhat famous as one of the most 
original experiments in cinematographic point of view in the history of mainstream Hollywood 
production.14 This chapter will focus primarily on Chandler’s novels rather than on his 
contribution to the noir tradition in Hollywood, but this film is worth examining up front as a 
cinematic exposition of Chandler’s style that magnifies the conceptual problems inherent in 
analogies between novelistic narration and cinematic voiceover, which that style seems to invite.  
In his debut as a director, Montgomery decided to use Chandler’s novel to make a film 
shot almost entirely from the optical point of view of the main character—that is, the image on 
screen would never cut away from the visual perspective of the detective Phillip Marlowe, 
played by Montgomery himself. This technique amplifies the emphasis of Chandler’s prose on 
immediate perceptual impressions while at the same time exaggerating the narratorial quality of 
the cinematographic image by, in effect, identifying it with the voice-over. In other words, the 
technique literalizes the tired pun that suggests an equivalence between the camera “eye” and the 
“I” of narrative fiction. The optical point of view had in more limited ways been utilized before, 
                                                             
13 Chandler wrote the screenplay for Double Indemnity based on James M. Cain’s 1943 novel of the same 
name.  
14 Lady in the Lake, dir. by Robert Montgomery, Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer, Warner Home Video, 2006, 
DVD.  
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both in avant-garde and mainstream Hollywood films. But this was the first attempt to make it 
the central aesthetic premise of a feature length film, and it is thus a precursor to the now very 
popular found-footage genre—and, more suggestively perhaps, to the unique forms of 
identification generated in the aesthetic convergence of found-footage films and first-person 
shooter video games, as seen for instance in Ilya Naishuller’s Hardcore Henry (2015) (Figures 
3.2 and 3.3).15 
Montgomery’s formal gambit requires an elaborate set of framing devices to justify its 
novel technique. As I will discuss in subsequent sections, a significant but rarely remarked 
feature of Chandler’s novels is that, while they are written in the first person and utilize a more 
or less conventional form of narrative retrospection, they consistently obscure the source and 
temporal situation of the narration; that is, there’s no scene of storytelling, no moment when 
Marlowe sits down at a typewriter to recount his latest case, no cues that what we’re reading is a 
journal, a log, a transcript of a hearing, etc. Thus, in a profound and programmatic way, the 
                                                             
15 Scholarship focused on the relationship between video game and cinematic point of view is relatively 
limited and falls outside the scope of this dissertation; but for a brief and interesting overview of some of 
the main convergences and divergences of these forms, see Will Brooker, “In Focus: Moving Between 
Platforms: Film, Television, Gaming, and Convergence: Camera-Eye, CG-Eye: Videogames and the 
‘Cinematic,’” Cinema Journal, vol. 48, no. 3 (Spring 2009):122–28. See also Jamie M. Poster, “Looking 
and Acting in Computer Games: Cinematic ‘Play’ and New Media Interactivity,” Quarterly Review of 
Film and Video, vol. 24 no. 4 (July 2007): 325-339.   
Figure 3.2: Marlowe’s POV. Figure 3.3: Henry’s POV.  
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novels refuse to conceptualize Marlowe in terms of a point of view, at least insofar as point of 
view entails some sort of position—minimally a spatial position but usually a temporal one as 
well—to justify the mode or attitude in which the narration is presented.  
The film corrects this formal elision by opening with an objective shot of Montgomery as 
Marlowe sitting behind a desk, addressing the audience directly in order to introduce the story in 
retrospect. This amounts to a sort of double cameo, since the point of view of the majority of the 
film must visually exclude Marlowe (except when he passes in front of an occasional mirror); 
that is, the director appears on the wrong side of the camera as Marlowe appearing on the wrong 
side of the camera to play what amounts to a cameo role as himself. Facing the camera, he 
explains among other things that “this ‘Lady in the Lake’ business started just three days before 
Christmas,” when, tired of being a detective, he had decided to write a story about being one 
instead. The scene thus seems to present the most conventional sort of set up for a whodunit type 
detective story. In Todorov’s classic analysis of the forms of detective fiction, whodunits tend in 
just this way to present two stories at once: the first story is about a crime that has been 
committed; the second story reconstructs the story of the crime as a book about the culprit’s 
detection and makes its authorship explicit.16  
                                                             
16 Tzvetan Todorov. “The Typology of Detective Fiction,” The Poetics of Prose (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1977), 42-52. This scheme seems so deeply antithetical to Chandler’s sensibilities that 
Silver and Ward reasonably presume that this was a modification of Steve Fishers, who wrote the final 
version of the script and was (like Chandler) a veterans writer for the pulp magazine Black Mask. See 
Film Noir: An Encyclopedic Reference to the American Style (New York: The Overlok Press), 166. But, 
reviewing an early manuscript, Gene Phillips confirms that Chandler himself had transformed Marlowe 
into a writer for this film—even before knowing Montgomery’s plan for filming. He had even written 
some scenes of his own to be shot from the subjective point of view, but ultimately he disapproved of 
Montgomery’s decision to shoot the whole picture in this manner. See Creatures of Darkness: Raymond 
Chandler, Detective Fiction, and Film Noir (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 105-
116.    
 125 
 
Though Marlowe’s introductory exposition sets up the expectation that the movie will 
proceed to recount the origin and development of a story called “The Lady in the Lake,” this 
expectation is confounded once the film shifts to the subjective point of view: the next scene 
depicts Marlowe entering the office of a pulp magazine publisher to discuss the publication of a 
detective story that he’s already written. The Mobius-strip-like impression of the temporal origin 
of the narration is underscored by the title of the story in question—“If I should Die Before I 
Live”—and the subjective orientation is thus disrupted from the outset in a way that, despite the 
ostensive presentifying function of the optical point of view, the whole film proceeds in a way 
that seems both proleptic and analeptic at once.   
The setup is made even more complicated when, in Marlowe/Montgomery’s initiatory 
statement, the audience is directed to participate in the reenactment of both stories. “Right now, 
you’re reading in your newspapers and hearing over your radios about a murder,” says Marlowe. 
“What you’ve read and what you’ve heard is one thing. The real thing is something else. There’s 
only one guy who knows that. I know it.” He continues:  
You’ll meet the people. You’ll find the clues. And maybe you’ll solve it quick, 
and maybe you won’t…But let me give you a tip. You’ve got to watch them. 
You’ve got to watch them all the time, because things happen when you least 
expect them.  
The dramatic tension of the film is thus built up around both a clashing of media (what is heard 
vs. what is read vs. what is watched) and a compounding of subjectivity (this “one guy” 
incorporates the “I” of the character and the “I” of the director and the “I” of the writer and “I” of 
the viewer, and maybe the “I” of the camera too); and its structure of suspense is built up around 
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what turns out to be a very complex conflict of identification: the viewer’s experience is 
supposed to be perceptually correlated with Marlowe’s but temporally distinct from it.  
If, in the Hitchcockian model, suspense derives from viewers knowing in advance more 
about what things will happen than the characters do—but without knowing when—here, the 
tension is internalized in a different way. It derives instead from a more or less autonomous race 
towards knowledge: we are supposed to share Marlowe’s visual impressions and the mode of 
concentrated anticipation characteristic of his profession, but we should expect to be surprised by 
our own mental faculties, not his, as solutions will leap out from the screen of perception just 
when we least expect them to.  
Or to put it another way, with a metaphor often used to describe mystery stories: the 
viewer and the detective are trapped in an epistemological labyrinth—in this case forced to take 
the same path at the same pace but somehow find different exits. The process seems primed for 
failure in that its promise of participatory autonomy is premised on its incompatible promise of 
experiential solidarity and generic continuity. The situation is perhaps best summarized by the 
film’s tag line: “YOU and ROBERT MONTGOMERY solve a murder mystery together!” And 
indeed, its novelty value notwithstanding, The Lady in the Lake is generally regarded as an 
unsuccessful film, a promising concept that gets tedious after a few gags: a panning shot to 
simulate Marlowe’s distracted gaze as he ogles a secretary walking in and out of the room, a 
tracking shot to a close-up of a backward-tilting face to show an impending kiss (figure 3.4), a 
tremor then a tilt then a blur then a fade to black to indicate a knock-out punch, and so forth. For 
Pascal Bonitzer, the aesthetic error of this film—and the more general error of films that mistake 
the cinematic point of view for the “I” of narrative fiction—comes from forgetting that the 
camera is not “subjective” in its own right, that it is instead constitutive of a process of subjective 
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identification. In this psychoanalytic view, the reverse shot (which Montgomery’s film prohibits) 
is necessary: the spectator must see the hero’s face from the point of view of the “Other” (58).17  
In Bonitzer’s view, the film’s continual failure to allow for identification is on one level 
just simply annoying and tedious—but this annoyance derives from a formal imperfection that 
seems to have more far-reaching aesthetic implications. In relegating Marlowe to off-screen 
space—the space of horror, as Bonitzer notes—The Lady in the Lake in effect produces a 
massive blind spot in the place of the subject: where “YOU” have been led to expect a novel 
form of sympathetic involvement, you experience instead a “core of absolute inhumanity” (to 
borrow again Bowen’s phrase); and to the extent that this core is mobile, it expands the epistemic 
reach of a labyrinth that, though it may have a generically determinate end (i.e. a solution), has 
no referential origin. As Marlowe goes about solving the mystery, everything on screen that can 
be taken to be an object of perception (and so, in this genre, a source of knowledge) indicates 
that perception always happens elsewhere and at some other time. By virtue of a technique 
whose special feature is to offer a continuous stream of experiential access to the scene of the 
crime—a live feed, as it were—the film winds up doing the opposite, producing a “locked room” 
type whodunit, except that the viewer, like everyone else, is locked out of it.  
                                                             
17 Pascal Bonizer, “Partial Vision, Film and the Labyrinth,” trans. Fabrice Ziolkowski, Wide Angle, no. 4, 
pp. 56-63. First published in Cahiers du Cinema, no. 301 (1979).  
 128 
 
It’s hard to guess how much Montgomery was aware of the problems of identification 
and of temporality raised by his decision to film The Lady in the Lake in this manner—or of how 
these problems relate to Chandler’s own decisions about how to situate his narrator. But a few 
brief moments—where the gimmick is most pronounced in its errors—suggest that maybe he 
was. At one point, for instance, Marlowe is speaking on the phone and the blurry shape of its 
handset takes over the foreground of the point of view shot (figure 3.5). The semiotic cue is clear 
enough: as a viewer, I’m supposed to take this as a visual indication that I should imagine that I 
am Marlowe speaking. But the exaggerated implausibility of the notion that the microphone 
component of the handset would obtrude into the field of vision in this manner seems to offer an 
ironic commentary on the general awkwardness of a technique that conflates the voice with a 
cinematographic image of perception—as if Marlowe’s voice were projected directly from the 
“eye” of the camera into the microphone as proxy for both the “I” and the “eye” of the viewer. 
It’s hard to take this as anything but a reflexive gag (albeit a complicated one).  
Figure 3.5: Looking/speaking into the handset. Figure 3.4: Tracking to a kiss.  
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 In another scene marred by an error of perception, Marlowe visits the home of Chris 
Lavery, a gigolo type who is implicated in the disappearance of Mrs. Kingsby (the titular “lady”) 
but is eliminated as a suspect when he becomes the victim of a murder himself. During the 
course of the interview, Marlowe offends Lavery, who, distracting Marlowe by asking for the 
time, puts on brass knuckles and punches him out cold. To simulate Marlowe’s turn toward the 
mantel clock, the camera quickly pans ninety degrees to the right, thereby catching a reverse 
image of the whole scene in a large mirror on the wall behind the mantel (figure 3.6). Typically 
in this film, wherever mirrors show up as props, these are used to allow Montgomery to appear 
visually as Marlowe—to simulate a reverse shot in order to accent a performance that is 
otherwise strictly oral. But, in this case, no one appears as Marlowe: Lavery gets ready to swing 
at nothing; and when the camera pans back to face the attacker, the closeness of the shot verifies 
in retrospect that the mirror had indeed reflected an empty space where Marlowe should have 
been visible (figure 3.7).  
As with Hitchcock’s Rope (1949), which was billed as one, long, continuous shot (but 
which was actually several shots cut together in ingenious ways), the production crew on The 
Lady in the Lake devised all sorts of ways to manage the pitfalls of the self-imposed technical 
limitation of the film—i.e. concealing cuts, hiding production equipment, blocking elaborate 
Figure 3.6: Setting up to punch no one.  Figure 3.7: Punching Marlowe.  
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movements around a camera that must always be in the middle of the set as though it were a 
character. So there’s no technical reason for Marlowe to vanish like this—and there’s diegetic 
reason for him not to—which makes it somewhat difficult to write this off as a mistake. And the 
sense that it is not a mistake is underscored by the odd symmetry of this breach of spatial 
continuity with another one in the scene. When Marlowe first enters Lavery’s home, the camera 
pans ninety degrees to the left—also framing an image of a clock—and as Marlowe remarks, 
“Nice place you’ve got here,” the camera quickly pans ninety degrees back to the right again, 
creating a distraction meant to conceal a cut. On the other side of this cut, the entire spatial 
layout of the Lavery’s place has changed. The change is dramatic—a doorway, prominently 
filmed a moment before, has vanished, and so apparently has an entire room—but the change is 
hard to notice because of the disorienting effect of the quick pan. Once both anomalies are 
spotted, though, they have the odd combined effect of suggesting that it is the camera’s 
confrontation with the clock in each case that has instigated the distortion of space—the 
reconfiguration of the labyrinth—and that the film’s visual lapses and inconsistencies are 
perhaps symptomatic of its deeper conflicts of synchrony.  
 This little mystery of the missing Marlowe actually seems to rehearse a similar (if equally 
obscure) vanishing act in the novel on which the film was based. When, in Chandler’s version, 
Marlowe returns to Lavery’s home a second time, the narrowed perceptual intensity of the 
narration implies (even before he has seen Lavery’s bullet-ridden corpse in the bathroom) that 
the home is now a crime scene:  
Face powder was spilled around on the dressing table. There was a smear of dark 
lipstick on a towel hanging over the waste basket. On the bed were pillows side 
by side, with depressions in them that could have been made by heads. A 
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woman’s handkerchief peeped from under one pillow. A pair of sheer black 
pajamas lay across the foot of the bed. A rather too emphatic trace of chypre hung 
in the air… 
 I turned around and looked at myself in the long mirror of a closet door. 
The door was painted white and had a crystal knob. I turned the knob in my 
handkerchief and looked inside. The cedar-lined closet was fairly full of man’s 
clothes. (86)18 
In what could be called the literary equivalent of André Bazin’s door-knob effect—a close-up 
image of what is “less a fact than a sign brought into arbitrary relief by the camera”19—the 
detailed visual enumeration of the scene cuts away right when it should begin to enumerate the 
visual details of Marlowe’s face and body in the “long mirror” in front of him. The whiteout of 
the white painted door and the distractions of the crystal knob and handkerchief facilitates 
Marlowe’s sudden disappearance from the scene, his substitution for an image of empty clothes. 
And the general form of “man’s clothes” here—neither indefinitely a man’s clothes nor 
definitely the man’s clothes—suggests that Marlowe might as well be subsumed into the same 
process of elimination as everyone else who has disappeared from this scene of sheer 
evidentiality—pajamas lying deflated on the bed, hollow recesses in pillows—the sorts of things 
that could contain humans but in these cases don’t. 
 In a 1949 fragment called “Casual Notes on the Mystery Novel,” Chandler admits that 
there is a certain dishonesty intrinsic to first-person narration: 
                                                             
18 Raymond Chandler, The Lady in the Lake, Later Novels and Other Writings (New York: Library of 
America, 1995). 
19André Bazin, What is Cinema? Vol. 2, translated by Hugh Gray (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2005), 37.  
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There must come a time when…the detective suddenly stops thinking out loud 
and ever so gently closes the door of his mind in the reader’s face. Back in the 
days when the audience was still innocent and had to be hit in the face with a stale 
flounder in order to realize that something was fishy, the detective used to do this 
by saying, for example: ‘Well, there are all the facts. If you give them you careful 
attention, I am sure your thoughts will be rich with possible explanations of these 
strange events.’ Nowadays it is done with less parade, but the effect of a closing 
door is just as unmistakable. (Raymond Chandler Speaking, 68)   
The effect Chandler describes here (though he obviously doesn’t put it this way) derives from a 
technical shift from direct discourse to free indirect discourse: though the narration remains in 
the first person, there are moments of artificial disharmony between the understanding “I” and 
the free-playing one, so to speak. It is precisely this sense of the wavering continuity and 
homogeneity of Marlowe’s narration that Montgomery’s film intensifies. The heavy-handed 
compounding of “one guy” produces an aesthetic tension that tends to be more alienating in the 
film than it is engaging; but in those brief moments where this becomes extreme enough to give 
up the game, it provides a sideways glance—a kind of visual transcription—of the faltering 
temporal structure of the Marlowe novels, which otherwise remains obscure.20 
                                                             
20 This, in a way, makes the film an ideal translation of Chandler’s prose in Walter Benjamin’s sense: its 
excessive literalness succeeds precisely where it fails, at least insofar as it brings to light the general 
communicative inadequacy and fragmentary nature of both versions. Jameson makes a similar point in 
commenting on Robert Altman’s famously unfaithful film version of The Long Goodbye (1974). He sees 
its failure of translation as exemplary of a process that preserves the autonomy of each form—the novel 
and the movie each reveals what it is capable of communicating that the other is not (Detections of 
Totality, 53). But to make this point, Jameson somewhat obscures Benjamin’s prominent discussion in 
“The Task of the Translator” of “pure language,” which at its core is eschatological and concerned (as 
Benjamin’s ideal translator should be) with the end of communication not its preservation. It is the 
essential freedom of Benjamin’s translator to feel unburdened by such “abysses” of incommunicability in 
his own language—its gaps and alternate dimensions—by closely adhering to the schematic structure of 
the original, preserving the syntax of each sentence while changing only the words. See Walter Benjamin, 
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This temporal variance is signaled in the most important line of dialogue in the film 
version of the scene in Lavery’s home: “Mr. Marlowe” says Lavery at one point, “A gentleman 
never speaks disrespectfully of a lady, not even one as lovely as Mrs Kingsby was”—a slip of the 
tongue, which he corrects with emphasis: “lovely as Mrs. Kingsby is.” This of course is a clue, 
just the sort of little detail to which Montgomery’s audience is supposed to attend. Marlowe 
hears the mistake and asks Lavery about it; but since he (Marlowe) doesn’t say out loud what 
he’s made of it, or what he’s made of Lavery’s facial expressions as he retracts his error, we have 
no way to synchronize our understanding of the scenario with that of the professional detective 
(the effect of a closing door, here, is indeed unmistakable). And this is not merely a gimmick. 
The gap here between the visible and audible content of the scene and the director’s voice, as 
such, rehearses the foundational narrative conflict of the novel, whose first line expresses the 
same asynchrony in terms of a kind of glitch in the scenic presentation of Los Angeles: “The 
Treloar Building was, and is, on Olive street, near sixth”—an asynchrony that, along with the 
name of the building, alters the temporal situation of the short story on which in turn the novel 
was based, and which seems to have a firmer hold on the present: “The Avenent Building is on 
Olive street, near sixth” (The Lady in the Lake, 3; “The Lady in the Lake,” 897; emphasis 
added).   
If, in ways emphasized by the film, Chandler’s prose tends to dramatize the sudden but 
“gentle” recession and closing off of the conceptual schemes that support the detective’s 
thoughts—the subtle intensification of the scenic present, of the free play of attention—it can 
(unlike any film) also oscillate in the other direction, so that the organizing structure of the 
                                                             
“The Task of the Translator,” Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, edited by Hannah Arendt (New 
York: Schocken Books, 2007), 69-82.    
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detective’s mind is held in relief but emptied of immediate perceptual content. This is figured by 
the opening of Lavery’s closet and the sharp delimitation in that scene of the kinds of things that 
could contain things but don’t—or figured most pointedly perhaps in The Long Goodbye, when 
Marlowe spends nearly two pages categorizing types of blondes only finally to declare Mrs. 
Wade visually “unclassifiable,” leaving her image almost as blank as the notorious blank page in 
Tristram Shandy, where readers are directed to their own minds to imagine the concupiscible 
widow Wadman: she was “none of these,” says Marlowe, “not even of that kind of world” 
(Chandler 491-2).    
 
III. PROSPECTS 
And, indeed, it is the organization of sexual desire that ultimately poses the most 
formidable aesthetic challenge to Marlowe’s mode of narration. It seems to be an almost 
inevitable feature of the strong narrative drive entailed by the retrospection in Montgomery’s 
film that, in the end, Marlowe ends up falling into a conventional romantic union with the film’s 
female lead (Adrienne Fromsett, played by Audrey Totter). (That she is also his publisher is 
perhaps the inevitable feature of his deciding to become a writer instead of a detective.) Though 
Chandler himself wrote this into the original script, it stands in sharp contrast to how Marlowe is 
generally characterized as the consummate non-consummatory hero. Chandler himself makes 
this point in terms that are clear enough in his “Casual Notes on the Mystery Novel” (cited 
above): 
Love interest nearly always weakens a mystery because it introduces a type of 
suspense that is antagonistic to the detective’s struggle to solve the problem…The 
only effective kind of love interest is that which creates a personal hazard for the 
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detective—but which at the same time you instinctively feel to be a mere episode. 
A really good detective never gets married. (Raymond Chandler Speaking, 70)  
But by what instinct do episodes make themselves apparent as episodes? The idea sounds 
simple in theory, but produces bizarre results in practice. A case in point from The Lady in The 
Lake: “Her upper lip curled a little. It was a long upper lip. I like long upper lips”; then, a few 
paragraphs later: “I stood up and tapped on the edge of the desk looking down at her. She had a 
lovely neck”; and then: “I ran a finger along the edge of the desk and looked at her sideways. 
Pale ivory skin, dark lovely eyes”; and finally: “her…lips parted, waiting for more fun”—but of 
course: “I didn’t have any more. I went out” (102-6). Such leering is not out of character for 
Marlowe, who is a chronic leerer, but it nevertheless obtrudes on the narrative—not because the 
behavior might be vulgar to some and frustrating to others, but because it is unmotivated. It 
outlines a structure of impulses empty of any governing principle, and it suggests a scheme of 
perceptual organization directed by nothing, voided of goals or prospects. One can’t really be 
sure what loveliness and likeability even entail for Marlowe as he glares at these particular body 
parts; they certainly aren’t expressions of taste: they don’t include the reader, Hemingway-like, 
in a society of connoisseurs, those in the know about long upper lips. “I went out” is not only a 
misanthropic withdrawal but a thoroughgoing subjective evacuation, the narrator’s default 
operation, especially when women are involved: “Overhead the rain still pounded, with a remote 
sound, as if it was somebody else’s rain” (The Big Sleep 733); “No feelings at all was exactly 
right. I was as hollow and empty as the spaces between the stars” (The Long Goodbye 645); 
“Hold it, Marlowe, you’re not human tonight…You’re not human tonight, Marlowe… You’re 
not human tonight, Marlowe… You’re not human tonight, Marlowe…You’ve got the wrong 
 136 
 
attitude, Marlowe. You’re not human tonight” (The Little Sister 268-9); “I wasn’t even there” 
(The Little Sister 329). 
Marlowe’s transient, incoherent romantic compulsions might elicit a number of critical 
attitudes: skepticism towards the absurd chivalric idealism of a modern knight-errant, unease 
with the character’s implausible prudishness and deep-rooted misogyny, suspicions of a 
suppressed homoeroticism; but, in a more comprehensive sense, the dissolution of Marlowe’s 
proclivities correlates with a general agreement among readers—from Stein to Auden to Jameson 
to just about any fan of the genre—that, ultimately, no one cares what happens in a Raymond 
Chandler novel.21 Why this might be is a matter of taste, but the almost unfaltering consensus 
raises a more fundamental question about narrative temporality and its forms of anticipation: 
how can the promise of unfulfillment constitute a form of engagement? What can compel 
narration if its subject is a “hollow” figure that can be neither prospectively nor retrospectively 
filled?  
According to a theory of suspense based, like Bonitzer’s, on delayed or disrupted 
subjective identification—or of recognition, in the Lacanian sense—suspense in Chandler would 
seem impossible. In the note cited above, Chandler himself describes suspense in terms that are 
something like a reverse eroticism, the opposite of Bonitzer’s well-known analysis, for instance, 
                                                             
21 The point is asserted bluntly here to bring the topic into focus, but it should stir no controversy to say 
that, in some profound sense, solutions have lost their appeal in the sort of mysteries for which Chandler 
is famous; and thus, since readers are no longer lured prospectively towards finales, their interests and 
attentions are redistributed throughout the course of narration in new and unusual ways. In modern 
detective fiction, Stein finds something “soothing” about the fact that the hero (for her, the corpse) is 
already dead and that “nobody really believes in detection.” This means that “your mind [is] free to enjoy 
yourself.” For her, the best detective stories have no detection at all ("Why I like detective stories" 104-5). 
For Auden, the important question in Chandler is not what happens or why, in terms characterological 
motivation, but rather where it happen. Auden finds “serious” artistry in the explication of a “criminal 
milieu,” the study of “the Great Wrong Place,” but has no interest in Chandler’s narrative diversions, the 
process of detection or its solutions (408). For Jameson, the pleasure of Chandler is found not in reading 
but in re-reading, in which case the endings have no draw (57). 
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of how suspense operates in Hitchcock. For Bonitzer (recalling his essay “Hitchcockian 
Suspense”) tension derives from the sudden or gradual introjection of a perversion or “stain” into 
the harmonious organization of a scene—a “hazard” (to use Chandler’s word) that threatens the 
sense of a natural order. This “stain,” the visual impression that something is wrong, unnatural or 
out of place, makes the formation of a romantic couple strained or uneasy in a way that demands 
resolution (i.e. a “happy ending”).22 In Chandler, on the other hand, there seems to be a kind of 
ground-tone or vague background of perversion and presumed romantic tension and uneasiness 
that draws Marlowe on, and suspense derives from the way in which (however precariously) the 
episodes are organized and stabilized against this background.  
The success of this mode of suspense is evident in the way that fleeting but distinctly 
structured scenic impressions dominate the reader’s attention and memory—this type of scene, 
this type of place, this type of dialogue, this type of character—to such an extent that the accrual 
of anything like an overarching narrative becomes tenuous, if not impossible. Such impressions 
uphold the prevailing image of Chandler at work: not a storyteller, but rather a pulpist pounding 
feeble filaments of plot together out of vivid fragments of recycled material. This type of 
suspense is effective, in other words, where there seems to be no stabilizing aesthetic principle of 
time or well-defined sense of temporal counterpoint against which any given episode quite 
makes sense as an episode—in the term’s root meaning of an entering into or coming in besides 
(for what are these episodes in exactly, if not a series of novels in more than a nominal sense?).   
Jameson has made the clearest and most enduring case for the de-narrativization of 
Chandler by describing a practice he calls “synoptic” re-reading, wherein each “micro-episode” 
is subject to a process of formal autonomization (57-87). I’ve begun in this chapter to argue that 
                                                             
22 Pascal Bonitzer, “Hitchcockian Suspense,” Everything You Always Wanted to Know about Lacan (but 
were Afraid to Ask Hitchcock), edited by Slavoj Žižek (New York: Verso, 1992), 15-30 
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there is a significant countervailing aesthetic principle at work in the novels; but even an 
anecdotal assertion (which will provoke controversy from none but the most eccentric fans) 
might suffice to call the premise of a dissoluble Chandler into question—namely, that the novels 
are better than the short stories, they are more pleasurable to read, and they have been a much 
more durable source of textual engagement, critical and otherwise.23 This is to some extent 
attributable to the author’s maturity, to the refinement of a specific style of scenic compilation; 
but the degree to which forms of engagement and suspense obtain on a larger scale in Chandler 
goes beyond what Jameson sees as an essentially modernist practice “in which seams and 
transitions constitute the truest locus of aesthetic production” (59).  
In other words, the Marlowe novels contain latent prospects—slight correctives, one 
could say, to what Lukács calls the modernist “attenuation of reality,” the dissolution of 
personality and loss of narrative perspective which reach their nightmarish extreme in Molloy 
(1951), Beckett’s version of the detective novel.24 As the following sections will show, this 
alternate mode of engagement derives from a subtle—and often, it seems, accidental—interplay 
between the rigorous temporal immediacy of Chandler’s prose and the development, as his 
novels progress into the postwar period, of an ulterior form of temporality, a figural counterpoint 
through which the details of familiar episodes shift and cohere in unexpected ways. To be sure, 
Chandler’s “hollow” man has something in common with T.S. Eliot’s, his vacant sexuality 
coming off as a “paralyzed force, gesture without motion”—until, that is, it reaches its points of 
sudden aesthetic exhaustion and failure, moments in which it reveals an edifice of narrative 
suspense that seems as strange and inhuman in Chandler as it is perfectly conventional.    
                                                             
23 Chandler himself felt that books rather than short stories were his “natural element,” and at the height 
of his career he went 20 years without writing a Marlowe story. See “Introductory Note” to “The Pencil,” 
cited above (1233).  
24 See Lukács, “The Ideology of Modernism” in The Meaning of Contemporary Realism (17-46).   
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IV. THE SECOND MARLOWE 
Knocked cold by a hatchet man with a fistful of nickels, possibly drugged, “trussed like a 
turkey ready for the oven,” Marlowe slowly regains consciousness in the midst of one of the 
most subtly peculiar scenes in all of Chandler’s novels. The figure of a woman—Mona Mars, 
missing wife of the gangster Eddie Mars—slowly coalesces piece by piece before him with a 
kind of hallucinatory, technicolor vividness, the we’re-not-in-Kansas-anymore effect held in 
relief against the detective’s parallel encounter, a few chapters before, with the wealthy widow 
Vivian Regan. Where Regan lounges monochromatically in her “modernistic” chaise—black 
eyes, black hair, ivory drapes, white carpet, ivory pillow, a vague, colorless drink in hand, with 
mirrors and chromium and crystals to compound the effect—Mars emerges before Marlowe with 
eyes “the blue of mountain lakes,” hair “like a silver fruit bowl,” wearing a “green knitted dress,” 
wielding a “sharp-angled glossy bag” and “a glass of amber fluid” (The Big Sleep 599-600, 733). 
Mona sends a perceptual shock wave through Marlowe’s typology of the female form, her 
cartoonish figure drawn out part by part as his attention shuffles systematically among a narrow 
range of kinds of objects and body parts that he’s described before, retaining certain details, 
altering or adding others, straining to incorporate her into a representational standard.  
As suggested in the previous section, this sort of iterative and fragmentary rendering of 
character is emblematic of Chandler’s style and is central to how critics have read Chandler for 
decades. “So it is that little by little,” writes Jameson, “we begin to collect these episode types…: 
we juxtapose Harry Jones and George Anson Philips (inept private detectives); or Laird Brunette 
and Eddie Mars or Alex Morny (likeable mobsters); or Vannier, Marriot or Lavery 
(quintessential gigolos)—and a new kind of stereoscopic reading emerges in which each scene 
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retains its sharpness in our eye but designates a well-nigh Platonic (yet social-typological) unit 
behind it that the reading eye can no longer see as such but only intuit” (58). Yet, in the case of 
Mona Mars (juxtaposed with Vivian Regan, the mobster’s wives), such a figural intuition would 
be strained to its breaking point, a break that is registered in the narration as a perceptual 
dissociation: “Overhead the rain still pounded, with a remote sound, as if it was somebody else’s 
rain”—a dissociation that gives way, once Mona speaks, to a narrational quandary that is rare 
and remarkable in Chandler’s body of work: “‘How do you feel?’ It was a smooth silvery voice 
that matched her hair. It had a tiny tinkle in it, like bells in a doll’s house. I thought that was silly 
as soon as I thought it” (733). As the simile takes shape, its poesis is almost explicit: the 
alliterative phrasing facilitates a synesthetic transition as the rhythm tends towards a perfect—if 
perfectly obscure—amphibrachic meter. 
Is Marlowe a poet? To be sure, there’s a certain absurdity in posing this question (not to 
mention subjecting hard-boiled prose to prosodic analysis)25; but this momentary formal tic, 
hidden here at the very beginning of Chandler’s career as a novelist, suggests the obscure 
presence of an ulterior figure, one coeval with that more familiar form of literary subjectivity—
the proverbial private “I”—which orients the 20th-century detective story. In an instant—“I 
thought that was silly as soon as I thought it”—there are two more or less distinct Marlowes: one 
we can readily recognize as that nominal figure under which the myriad experiences of the 
narrating “I” of all of Chandler’s novels are unified; but the other, whom we’ve never heard from 
before and will rarely hear from again, composes those experiences to be written down, mulls 
over the language latent in the other Marlowe’s thoughts, thinks about the silliness of his simile 
while the other thinks about the silliness of the correlated thought.  
                                                             
25 It should be recalled, however, that while living in London in his youth, Chandler began his literary 
career as a poet. His poetry is generally marked by fastidious metrical regularity.  
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We can thus briefly glimpse how Chandler strains to consolidate the dual narrative 
structure of classical detective fiction—detective plus an intervening assistant/author—into the 
first person, cleaving what Todorov characterizes as the story that “ignores the book completely” 
and the story that is “the story of that very book” (45). The result is a fairly profound blind spot 
at the center of how Chandler’s aesthetic innovations, and their literary and cinematic legacies, 
have been approached critically: Who actually narrates Chandler’s novels? Why doesn’t that 
voice sound quite the same as the voice it represents in dialogue as Marlowe’s own? What is its 
existential character? When is it speaking? What motivates the use of first person? 
First-person narration is of course so thoroughly conventional in the 20th century that, 
epistles and certain other forms notwithstanding, its use demands no diegetic motivation, per se; 
but, for one reason or another, the modes of fiction and cinema most closely associated with 
Raymond Chandler—hard-boiled fiction and film noir—programmatically do tend to provide 
this motivation and thus locate the production of narratorial subjectivity at the formal as well as 
thematic center of one of the more substantial generic wellsprings of mid-20th-century literature 
and film. Chandler was both aware of and ambivalent about the psychological and sociological 
resonance of the genre he was working to shape: “And if you have to have significance,” writes 
Chandler in a 1948 letter to James Sandoe, “it is just possible that the tensions in a novel of 
murder are the simplest and yet most complete pattern of the tensions on which we live in this 
generation” (Raymond Chandler Speaking, 53).  
And insofar as these tensions were formalized as a ubiquitous new sort of literary “I,” the 
concurrent restructuration of narrative experience and modes of fictional and cinematic address 
really do in retrospect seem to have been synchronized with world history in some special way: 
one can look back from this side of World War II to see a new style, a new type of 
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Americanness, take shape in all its contingency as the fulfillment of certain decades-old aesthetic 
potentialities on both sides of the Atlantic, forced by the events of war to converge.26 These form 
something perhaps more aptly described as a mood than a genre—a passing historical disposition 
that would expire within a decade or so but leave behind a narratorial voice that has not yet 
ceased to resound. Raymond Chandler bears a unique relationship to this voice, not simply 
because posterity has named him the most famous of its practitioners in both literature and in 
screenwriting, but because his novels—published between 1939 and 1958—constitute its past, 
present and future in both a grammatical and a literary-historical sense. Through a unique poetic 
synchronicity, Chandler’s work articulates a generational turn, a figural movement much more 
substantial than what is evident in the mere recognition of a certain tone or attitude, a certain 
metrical signature, insinuated throughout the dialogue of postwar American cinema.  
Jameson speculates that this voice derives its unique phenomenal quality (most 
recognizable in the voice-overs of film noir) from the pervasive radio culture of the 1930s and its 
influence on other media; but, as suggestive as this premise might be, it leads him to conclude 
too readily that the voice “of the hard-boiled detective in general, and Marlowe in particular, 
offers a specifically radio pleasure which must be paid for by the closure of the case, and which 
allows the novel’s past tenses to resonate with doom and foreboding, marking the detective’s 
daily life with the promise of adventure” (62). However, though cases are closed, Marlowe’s 
                                                             
26 The principal aesthetic precursors of film noir are widely understood to be German Expressionism (and 
to some extent French Poetic Realism) in cinema and American pulp and paperback crime fiction. Since 
this study is not centrally concerned with film noir, as such, the extensive bibliography of debates about 
the genre’s origins, definitions, and demise has been omitted. The key idea here is simply that the sense of 
noir as a style and as a subjective disposition is an ex post facto formulation that carries with it a 
profound historical resonance that seems as clear as it is difficult to articulate. Noir is decisively, if not 
altogether coherently, bound up with what Hayden White calls “modernist events”—the occurrence, in 
the 20th century, of a series of unprecedented “holocaustal” events that baffle conventional historical 
inquiry and that might thus be better approached by way of the technical and aesthetic innovations of 
modernist fiction and film (66-86). 
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endless abstentions confound narrative pleasure as pleasure and defer “the promise of adventure” 
to a set of generic expectations that have little to do with the detective’s way of speaking. What’s 
more—and this crucial point has been raised above and will be drawn out in the following 
sections—Chandler seems systematically, though with a few important exceptions, to avoid 
retrospection—to, in effect, obscure the temporal origin of narration and to disinvest the past 
tense of exactly the sort of “resonance” that Jameson expects to hear there. By and large, 
Marlowe’s is precisely not the voice of, say, Fred MacMurray, broadcast from the future to 
interfere with our sense of what is present, to render impressions of the mise-en-scène liable to 
the various anxieties that closure entails (guilt, fear, apprehension, and so forth).   
Which is to say that Marlowe’s two discernable “I”s cannot be—and need not be—
resolved by way of a temporal displacement: one Marlowe is not ‘behind’ another such that a 
person is filled in over time, rendered as if in stereoscopic relief by a generic, “social-
typological” process of narratorial self-fashioning. Marlowe doesn’t write himself into the world 
(quite the opposite, as will be shown in section VII). As tempting as it always is to equate his 
literary “voice” with the cinematic voice-over, doing so would (among the other consequences) 
commit us to the unsettling, if intriguing, notion that everything that isn’t in quotes in a Chandler 
novel is non-diegetic—pure style.  
Indeed, as Stuart Burrows has recently argued, it doesn’t quite make sense to think of 
Marlowe’s narrative mode as first person. For Burrows, noir takes form as a generic world that is 
correlative not just to radio, but to mass media in general and the democratization of knowledge 
and expertise. The mass circulation of information, the sense that “everyone knows 
everything”—or that, quoting Niklas Luhmann, everything “is known to be known”—results in 
generic exhaustion: the esotericism of the classical detective is rendered obsolete, and the 
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detective’s social milieu is constrained to a narrow range of character types, which are always 
known in advance. “Every criminal—indeed, pretty much everyone—does the same thing” ( 52-
3). Thus Marlowe’s “I” can only refer to a type of person and not to a person, placing it outside 
of modes of direct address, which, as Burrows argues (following Emile Benveniste), marks it 
grammatically as a third person, as no one in particular.  
For both Burrows and Jameson (but to different ends), the reader must in a way remediate 
noir’s displaced “I.” For Burrows, this has to do with the novels’ “proxy economy,” the way they 
facilitate various forms of vicarious pleasure. For Jameson, this remediation happens as a result 
of a figural intuition that seems to require an eternal presence of mind, an impossible—if quite 
literally ideal—reader who, exempt from the operations of narrative suspense, comprehends all 
of Chandler simultaneously in order to intuit the social-historical totality that exceeds its 
narrative form.27 But this practice tends to obscure the temporal scheme that transpires in the 
form of the novels themselves, the other narrative voice that cannot be known or identified in 
advance and that addresses the reader from a historical vantage quite outside that of the private 
eye—but that seems to appear only by accident.   
 
V. WARTIME AND THE ACCIDENTS OF RETROSPECTION 
Rarely in Chandler’s novels (perhaps only once, as far as I have discovered) does 
Marlowe seem to experience history—rarely, that is, is the sort of situation one would find 
recorded in a history book recorded in the course of narration as a temporal phenomenon. In The 
Lady in the Lake, Marlowe finds himself in Santa Monica (thinly veiled as the fictional Bay 
                                                             
27 Such a method was precisely the target of Eric Rabkin’s early work on suspense, which sought to 
reorient narrative theory from the retrospective involvements of critical practice towards the prospective 
involvements of actual reading by re-defining suspense as form of “momentary engagement.” (Rabkin, 
Narrative Suspense: 'When Slim Turned Sideways…' (1973))   
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City) in the office of the captain of police (a man named Webber) when, for a fleeting moment, 
perhaps by mistake, the narrator’s usual tense—a literary past tense that is understood to 
represent a fictional now—slips into the tense of retrospection, so that all of a sudden a new 
dimension of past events recedes from the more familiar past tense of the novel’s present: “He 
[Webber] walked to the window and stood looking out over the bay. This was before the dim-out 
went into effect, and there were many lights in the yacht harbor” (140). Taken out of context, 
there is nothing unusual about this passage; indeed, it assumes one of the most basic forms of 
classical first person narrative fiction, in which the narrator, as both character and storyteller, 
recounts past events with the advantage of hindsight. Yet in Chandler, where narrator and 
character, narration and narrative subject, are systematically hewn to a single figure, this shift 
amounts to a spatial and temporal distortion—a historical vertigo-effect: the “I” bends towards 
omniscience (Marlowe seems to see what Webber sees) and time acquires unexpected 
dimensionality as the events of war contravene the novel’s sense of narrative presence by way of 
an optical discrepancy—quite literally a change of lighting.  
There is perhaps a practical explanation for this breach in Chandler’s standard practice—
what is, in effect, a continuity error. Though it wasn’t published until 1943, Chandler began 
working in earnest on what would become The Lady in the Lake in the spring of 1939, making 
progress through about two thirds of the novel before declaring it “dead” and abandoning the 
project for the next three years. It is quite plausible that the temporal glitch in this scene is an 
artifact of the process of reanimation, the result of Chandler revising in 1942 a scene composed 
in 1939 and finding it impossible to leave the fictional now entirely intact. The coastal “dim-out” 
zones went into effect for a relatively brief period in 1942, while fears of German U-boat attacks 
were rising, so that potential targets on land were not backlit by the headlamps of westbound car 
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traffic. Because the situation of narration isn’t dated with enough specificity for the decision to 
be anything but arbitrary, an ambivalent Chandler must have paused on this scene to consider the 
radius, as it were, of the novel’s moment: how far beyond the instant of putting pen to paper does 
the present extend? To sweep the present backward to the far side of the dim-outs would be an 
act of erasure; to extend it forward to some indefinite time beyond the end of the existential 
threat that the war posed to coastal U.S. cities would be presumptuous, if not unimaginable; to 
constrict it to the month or week or day of actual writing would be myopic. By the time the novel 
was published in 1943, the dim-outs had ended; yet Chandler’s inability or unwillingness to 
resolve this question—to effect a practical synthesis of the two nightscapes—results in a kind of 
blemish, the mark of a slight bifurcation of history, a crack in the fictional present.  
To be sure, these observations read a great deal into such a minute narratorial 
discrepancy; but the opening sentences of the novel are evidence enough that Chandler was 
deeply concerned in this particular work with how wartime activities were reshaping the physical 
and temporal character of southern California. The first sentence is cited above in the discussion 
of the film version, but the temporal slip, as it were, continues:  
The Treloar building was, and is on Olive Street, near Sixth, on the west side. The 
sidewalk in front of it had been built of black and white rubber blocks. They were 
taking them up now to give to the government, and a hatless pale man with a face 
like a building superintendent was watching the work and looking as if it was 
breaking his heart (3, emphasis added).  
There is an almost elegiac quality in Chandler’s strained efforts to do away with retrospection 
yet somehow crystalize an image of the material history of Los Angeles into a fictional present, 
even as that image is one of transition. The excessive specificity of the first words of the novel 
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conveys a “reality effect” in Barthes’s sense—but as the war literally subtracts material from the 
city, we witness the contraction of the scene’s presence, the rationing of descriptive and figural 
resources: what “was” and what “had been” is stripped away from what “is” and what is taken up 
“now”; the superintendent’s hat vanishes before it had ever been seen; and Chandler’s famous 
similes, though twice signaled, are divested of their vehicles, appearing as vacant figures, the 
pure “as if” structure of literary fiction.  
The formal precariousness of the present is not taken up, here or in Webber’s office 
above the harbor, as an existential theme, per se; nor is it quite accurate to suggest that it 
dramatizes the literary-historical antipathy between narrative and, say, affect, which marks (for 
Jameson, among others) a constitutive tension in the realist novel.28 Rather, it reveals in a more 
fundamental way the strange counter-humanistic framework necessary to a narrator that is 
perceptive without being retrospective—to a subject that, in a strict sense, figures as it goes 
along. This “hollow” narratorial framework is more or less masked by our familiarity with fictive 
tense structures and other generic conventions, but when it transpires—if it transpires—it effects 
a phenomenal disruption, a brief warping of the given forms of temporality and spatiality. Such 
microstructural faults in the existential quality of the narrator are slight enough to go unnoticed 
in any particular scene or work, but aggregated across the Philip Marlowe novels they constitute 
what I have suggested to be an ulterior form of narration, a figural development that shapes the 
“I” from without—an extranarrative voice that resounds locally, so to speak, only in its most 
abstract or depurated form, present enough to say “I wasn’t even there” but not much more.  
 We can thus begin to gain an impression of how suspense operates without apparent 
prospects in Chandler in the tenuous configuration of a perpetual present, a fictive now held 
                                                             
28 See, for instance, Jameson’s “The Swollen Third Person, or, Realism after Realism” in The Antinomies 
of Realism. (163-92) 
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flittingly in relief against some extrinsic form of temporality. If this obscure, extranarratorial 
figure begins to make itself detectible in Chandler’s only novel published during World War II, it 
seems—in remarkable historical synchrony—to leak out, as it were, into the external terrain of 
his first postwar novel, The Little Sister (1949): “Outside on Sunset Boulevard, traffic went by 
distantly, monotonously. The minutes dropped silently down a well” (294); “I looked out of the 
window. The crowd was seething on the boulevard, the kitchen of the coffee shop next door was 
pouring the smell of Blue Plate Specials out of its ventilator shaft. Time passed and I sat there 
hunched over the desk” (335); “Time seemed to have lost its grip on me. And almost everything 
else.” (373) It is difficult to convey the subtle shift in how time operates in this novel with a few 
brief quotes, but these should suffice to suggest that the temporal character of Marlowe’s world, 
its movements, its seething and pouring and passing and dripping, has appeared, has gone 
“outside”—but has, in turn, moved “next door,” leaving not just “me” but “almost everything 
else” in place.  
This dissociative tendency has been latent in how Marlowe is fashioned as a narrator, but 
in Chandler’s postwar novels, the subtle counterpoint of his particular narrative mode indicates a 
more universal condition, the suspended state of “almost everything.” It is almost tempting to 
call this a metaphysical or existential turn, since it suggests a general structure of experience and 
has to do with Being and Time in the abstract; but this would minimize the fact that the 
reconfiguration of narrative temporality does, as in Bowen and to some extent Greene and Reed, 
indicate an epochal or periodic shift in the forms of the midcentury thriller (and the novel more 
generally), a shift to a form of posthuman suspense in which anticipation is recursive and has 
been evacuated of a sense of sympathetic engagement—but a form which remains deeply, if at 
times even grotesquely and parasitically, attached to the most basic temporal schemes of 
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narrative realism. And, indeed, between The Lady in the Lake (1943) and The Long Goodbye 
(1953), the figure of the veteran—perhaps the most potent imaginable figure of retrospective 
involvement and its distortive, agonized relation to the present—will work its way to the 
foreground of Chandler’s aesthetic preoccupations as he prepares to say goodbye to his narrator, 
toeing the line of vapid, nostalgic sentimentalism even as he finally empties Marlowe of all 
manner of sentimental attachment never supposed to have been there to begin with.  
 
VI. THE AUTHOR SHOWS HIS HANDS: PLAYBACK’S REVERSALS 
The governing temporal conflict of the Marlowe novels, and its amplification in 
Chandler’s later work, can be seen quite vividly in the recurring character of Bernie Ohls, the 
“old cop” type. When Olhs visits Marlowe in his office in The Long Goodbye, 15 years after he 
was introduced in The Big Sleep, Marlowe is apparently still about 38 years old but Ohls has 
become older in his oldness: 
He [Ohls] put his hard blunt hands on the desk and looked at the big brown 
freckles on the backs of them. “I’m getting old. Keratosis, they call those brown 
spots. You don’t get them until you’re past fifty. I’m an old cop and an old cop is 
an old bastard.” (648) 
Marlowe ignores the comment as though it could have no possible relevance to him; and the 
strangeness of the moment is emphasized, as in Webber’s office in The Lady in the Lake, by the 
subtle breaching of perspective—as though the hands are observed from Ohls’s point of view. 
The reflexive peculiarity of the scene is amplified by the impression that these hands constitute a 
cameo appearance of the author’s hands. Later in life, Chandler wore gloves in public to cover 
what his biographers describe as a painful and unsightly skin condition; and knowing this makes 
 150 
 
it hard not to imagine the scene playing out from Chandler’s point of view, as he sits in private at 
his desk looking down at the “hard blunt” form of his own disagreeable hands nakedly typing up 
an indifferent Marlowe. 
 The moment is echoed in a much more pronounced way in a scene from another novel 
more readily recognized for its cameo. In the last Marlowe novel, Playback, Chandler (who 
probably picked up the trick from Hitchcock) shows up to meet his hero in the form of a hotel 
lobby-sitter type named Henry Clarendon IV.29 As Marlowe is being grilled by the hotel’s 
“house dick” (another recurring type, here named Javonen), he points out Clarendon observing 
them from across the room. For this more public appearance, the gloves are on; and, like the 
author, the old man carries a cane: 
“Watch yourself,” I [Marlowe] cut in. “The elderly gent with the walking stick is 
interested in your reactions.” 
He looked halfway across the lobby to where a thin, old, bloodless man sat 
in a very low round-backed padded chair with his chin on gloved hands and the 
gloved hands on the crook of a stick. He stared unblinkingly in our direction. 
(825)  
And a few lines later, the creator summons his creation: 
Then I noticed that the old party in the low chair had lifted a gloved hand off the 
crook of his stick and was curving a finger at me. I pointed a finger at my chest 
and looked the question. He nodded, so over I went.   
He was old, all right, but a long way from feeble and a long way from 
dim. His white hair was neatly parted, his nose was long and sharp and veined, his 
                                                             
29 I may be the first to notice the cameo appearance of the author’s hands in The Long Goodbye, but it is 
more widely understood among readers of Chandler that the Clarendon scene is the official cameo.   
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faded-out blue eyes were still keen, but the lids drooped wearily over them. One 
ear held the plastic button of a hearing aid, grayish pink like his ear. The suede 
gloves on his hands had the cuffs turned back. He wore gray spats over polished 
black shoes. 
“Pull up a chair, young man.” His voice was thin and dry and rustled like 
bamboo leaves. (825-6) 
Beyond the odd, insistent repetition of the image of “gloved hands,” the clue that clinches the 
case of the old man’s identity, Chandler adds to his proxy an ailment that was not apparently his 
own. In a poignant irony, Clarendon’s deafness means that he will not hear Marlowe, whose 
“voice” had become so deeply associated with the particular timber and cadence of the voice-
overs of film noir—a genre that had reached its height in the late 1940s and early 1950s, but by 
1957 (when Playback was published) had already been for some time displaying the 
symptomatic convulsions of reflexive parody that mark the dying days of every genre.  
Clarendon calls attention to his deafness by explaining to Marlowe that he reads lips—a 
trick he picked up as a young man determined that, as an old man, he shouldn’t have to carry an 
ear trumpet. This youthful determination has now been rendered obsolete by the invention of the 
hearing aid, which adds to the more general distancing effect of the temporal situation of the 
scene—a scene into which Clarendon’s own voice enters through a synesthetic process only 
possible in poetry: “his voice was thin and dry and rustled like bamboo leaves.” Chandler has 
gone to considerable effort here, it seems, to offset Marlowe’s world as something to be read and 
not to be heard—an effort encapsulated in the choice of the name Clarendon, a word that doesn’t 
sound at all like Chandler but that does look very much like it on the page. These gestures are, 
however, undercut to some extent by the camouflaged presence of the hearing aid, a prosthetic 
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device that is as functional in this scene as it is unnecessary—a device that, blending in with the 
“grayish pink” of the old man’s flesh, hints at an aesthetic rivalry that Chandler, caught up in a 
larger process of creative evolution, seems bound to lose.  
But the more basic temporal problem of the scene is that its quasi-allegorical opposition 
of youth and old age in the figures of “young man” and “old man” is unsettled by the fact that 
Marlowe doesn’t age in a world where everyone else does. This is a problem that Chandler 
seems to have deliberated over while writing the scene. Consulting an early manuscript draft of 
the novel, one can see that he fussed over the details of the encounter, adding in more corrections 
by hand than he did for most of the other scenes in the novel. A notable consistency in these 
hand written changes is that Chandler removed several instances of Clarendon referring to 
Marlowe as “young man.” In the final version, he does address him as “young man” a few times, 
but the effect of the revisions is that, by the end of the exchange, the oldness of the old man type 
is given much greater emphasis than the youngness of the young man type, a shift that seems 
very much to have been deliberate.30  
                                                             
30 “Playback: Half-sheet original,” Raymond Chandler Papers, 1930-1959, UCLA Special Collections, 
Collection 638, Box 5, Folder 17. 
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And the same shift of emphasis is evident where Marlowe refers to his own age. Where 
the first typewritten version reads “I stayed deadpan polite, just a nice young guy (young by his 
standards anyway) being polite to an old gentleman who liked to talk,” Chandler changes this to 
“I stayed deadpan polite, just a nice youngish guy (by his standards) being polite to an old 
gentleman who liked to talk” (figure 3.8). In this context, the corrective ish doesn’t seem to mean 
that Marlowe considers himself sort of young (young has been removed too); rather, he considers 
himself able to act sort of like the sort of person that, by the “standards” of another, would be 
considered young—whereas the old man remains squarely an old man type. While the change 
seems subtle, it indicates how—practically speaking—the temporal peculiarities of the Marlowe 
novels produce a figure that is, so to speak, typicalish in a way that structures and accents the 
more rigid typicality of those around him.  
The exchange between the old man and the youngish man is also remarkable in the 
context of all of the other the Marlowe novels for being overtly religious, centering on what 
Clarendon calls the “grave difficulties of the afterlife.” While he sarcastically insists to Marlowe 
that it is a great comfort to believe in “an omniscient and omnipotent God who intended 
everything exactly the way it was,” he tries to convince Marlowe (who doesn’t need convincing) 
Figure 3.8: From young to youngish.  
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that if such a god existed, he would not have bothered to create the universe—or if he had, he 
would have made it much simpler (829).  Clarendon’s theological musings are somewhat 
rambling—and out of respect for Marlowe’s impatience to get on with the story, Clarendon 
refrains from subjecting him to the whole of what he calls “the overlong book of my words”—
but the dominant theme is the recurrence in nature of complex patterns and detailed similitudes: 
Very small things amuse a man of my age. A hummingbird, the extraordinary 
way a strellitzia bloom opens.  Why at a certain point in its growth does the bud 
turn at right angles? Why does the bud split so gradually and why do the flowers 
emerge always in a certain exact order, so that the sharp unopened end of the bud 
looks like a bird’s beak and the blue and orange petals make a bird of paradise? 
(829) 
Clarendon believes that an omnipotent god could not be responsible for such patterning effects, 
the inexorable movements of “small things” toward states of perfect similarity—of unlikely 
likenesses—since these can also result in recurrent situations of misery, cruelty and violence. 
(Consider, for instance, how the Marlowe novels don’t really concern themselves as much with 
solving crimes as they do with reenacting crimes or recreating in detail scenes of violence that 
precede the events depicted within the story.) His position is not ultimately an atheistic one; 
rather it seeks to articulate a form of divine imperfection, a god that is unnaturally simple and 
inexact and that, unlike everything else, fails always to fulfill its function—and even sometimes, 
as Clarendon puts it, “has very, very long days” (830). 
 There’s some irony to this position since Clarendon himself is true to type in a number of 
ways—an old man type, a hotel-sitter type, and an author type (authored in the image of his 
author)—and since the movements of his body and mind seem mechanistic and extrinsically 
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determined: “He moved one gloved hand over the other. He tilted his stick and followed it with 
his body. He stared at the pattern in the carpet. Finally he clicked his teeth. He had solved the 
problem. He straightened up again” (828). Yet nevertheless, he has dedicated himself to a life-
program of “reversing the pattern,” even while conceding that doing so is impossible (829). This 
is an aesthetic commitment more so than a religious one: “there is no success where there is no 
possibility of failure,” he says, “no art without the resistance of the medium”—and the medium, 
in his case, is a woman (830). His plan for reversing the pattern is to marry a rich divorcee type 
named Margo West, who resides at the hotel. She, however, only marries gigolo types; and, 
having done so and divorced seven times already, she shows no indication that she will ever do 
anything else. So upon parting company with Chandler’s imaginary proxy, there is a rather deep 
ambivalence implied in Marlowe’s impression that the man is “smooth operator” (825): as both a 
component of the machine and the one who operates it in all its complexity, Clarendon has 
succeeded precisely where he means to fail.     
The ambivalence of the situation resounds in the final scene of Playback, notorious for a 
sudden encroachment of apparent sentimentality that loyal readers of Chandler tend to interpret 
as a grotesque betrayal of all that has come before it. Defending the novel doesn’t seem like it 
would be a good use of space here, but I do think it’s useful to consider this work (even more so, 
maybe, than the Long Goodbye) as the culminating work of the Marlowe series insofar as it takes 
the general formal strategy of the other novels to its reflexive extreme—resisting the medium, as 
it were, but at the same time internalizing the basic temporal structure that has so far been 
evident only where it flittingly fails, where the perpetual present slips into the “very, very long 
days” that must somehow encompass it.  
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The meaning of the novel’s title remains somewhat vague, but it refers to the plight of 
Betty Mayfield, a femme fatale type who, because she is a femme fatale type, has been 
wrongfully convicted of killing her husband, a veteran who had sustained a precarious neck 
injury during the war. The husband, in fact, was an abusive drunk, and one night he had removed 
his neck brace as a way of terrorizing her. While doing so, he managed to break his own neck; 
but, while Betty attempts to reattach the brace and save him, his wealthy, corrupt and politically 
powerful father walks into the room and immediately accuses her of murder. He raises the 
town’s suspicions against her, and she is convicted by a mindless jury, but a magnanimous judge 
throws out the verdict. Despite the father’s pledge to hunt her to the ends of the earth, she 
changes her name, skips town and re-settles in a fictionalized La Jolla, California (where 
Chandler himself lived at the time of writing the novel)—only to find the whole situation 
“playing back” again in the new place: once again, she finds herself in a room with a dead man, 
surrounded by a similar cast of characters, and wrongfully suspected of murder.   
Her existential bind is metadramatic in way that calls Hamlet to mind—she knows 
exactly what sort of play she’s trapped in and playing back, but can’t figure a way out. Chandler 
summarizes the basic idea in a note accompanying an early manuscript version of the screenplay 
on which the novel was based:   
The crucial week in the life of a girl who decides to spend it in a tower suite in a 
hotel, under an assumed name, her identity thoroughly concealed with great care, 
to accept what comes, and at the end of the week to jump to her death.  
During this week the frustrations and tragedies of her life are repeated in 
capsule form, so that it almost appears that she brought her destiny with her, and 
that wherever she went the same sort of thing would happen to her. 
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You don’t know whether Betty killed her husband or not. You don’t know 
whether she shot Brandon or not.31  
The film (which was never produced) was not intended to feature Marlowe, and one of the many 
disorienting effects of the story being re-focalized through Marlowe’s first person narration, is 
that, though Mayfield’s plan to kill herself is suppressed, the intense patterning effect of her 
existential bind inflects the entire milieu of the novel as Marlowe travels down the coast of 
California in pursuit of the missing woman. Thus, the whole temporal and social-typological 
scheme of Chandler’s literary vision of Los Angles seems to follow his hero and recur “in 
capsule form,” its tragedies and frustrations suddenly confined almost exclusively to a single 
hotel in La Jolla, playing out as destiny rather than remaining in the state of perpetual presence 
usually assumed for them.     
 The resounding effect of this allegorical compression is a kind of generic claustrophobia, 
a sense that the organizing structure of the novel has encroached on the diegesis and has begun to 
collapse in on itself. One gets the sense, as in a Thomas Pynchon novel, that in the course of 
figuring out whether Betty killed her husband or whether she shot someone, Marlowe might 
almost (but never quite) be in a position to figure out that he’s actually just a character in a 
novel—and even that he’s met its author!—and thus he might almost be in a position 
retroactively to better understand why it is that he’s felt so inhuman for all the years he’s spent as 
a 38-year-old. The result is a peculiar formal reflexivity: a series of reversals that give the 
impression that the novel, not unlike Clarendon, spasmodically reacts against the aesthetic 
schemes around which all of the previous novels have been organized. The first and most 
obvious symptom of this is that Marlowe inexplicably begins having sex with the various types 
                                                             
31 “Story idea,” Raymond Chandler Papers, 1930-1959, UCLA Special Collections, Collection 638, Box 
9, Folder 6. 
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of women whom he’s always refused—and that he dreams of reuniting with Linda Loring 
(whom he’d spent the night with near the end of The Long Goodbye, his first fully realized erotic 
encounter in any of the novels). In another major reversal, he solves the mystery but lets the 
killer go because, though the man still thinks about killing and seems like the killer type, he 
confides to Marlowe that “I just don’t seem to be that kind of guy anymore” (867). 
 But the most dramatic reversal (one that is a frequent target of derision among readers of 
Chandler) is that the novel ends with a romantic cliffhanger—the impending return of Linda 
Loring—which is totally extraneous to its plot. Marlowe sits in his apartment dreaming of what it 
will be like when she arrives:  
I looked around the empty room—which was no longer empty. There was a voice 
in it, and a tall slim lovely woman. There was a dark hair on the pillow in the 
bedroom. There was that soft gentle perfume of a woman who presses herself 
tight against you, whose lips are soft and yielding, whose eyes are half blind. 
(817)  
His fantasy is interrupted by his ringing telephone, the lawyer Clyde Ulmney calling on behalf of 
a client, but Marlowe hangs up. When the phone rings again it goes unanswered and the novel 
ends:  
There were sounds of strangled fury as I hung up on him. Almost immediately the 
telephone started to ring again.  
I hardly heard it. The air was full of music. (871) 
If the prospect of Mayfield’s suicide was suppressed in the novel, it returns here in the obscure 
but unmistakable allusion to Macbeth’s speech following the suicide of Lady Macbeth—who is, 
at least by some interpretations (Orson Welles’s prominent among them in Chandler’s time) one 
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of the great femme fatale types in the history of English literature. Though this figure has been 
diminished, the scene is hardly one of perfect domestic harmony, introducing a new element of 
suspense, which, rather than sustaining the “forever and forever and forever” of Marlowe’s 
eternal present, indicates for the first time a series of tomorrows.  
That the killer, for once, has not been punished, would seem to cast the first shadow over 
the affair. In his notes on the mystery novel, Chandler puts forward the view that, “despite 
popular opinion,” the ends of murder mysteries should have “nothing to do with morality.” He 
continues: the criminal’s punishment “is part of the logic of the form. Without this the story is 
like an unresolved cord in music. It leaves a sense of irritation” (Raymond Chandler Speaking, 
66)—which is to suggest that the music filling the air at the end of Playback is not likely to be 
marriage bells. Rather, it is a noise that accompanies the formal dissolution of the femme fatale 
into the scenery of domesticity, conveying a lingering sense of disharmony and irresolution—
and even, perhaps, of mounting conflict. The dialectical confrontation of sight and sound that has 
been a running motif in the novel is here coordinated with what is arguably the single most 
intractable social conflict of all of the Marlowe novels: the epic and unending collision between 
the various generic formulations of masculinity and femininity, between archetypes of Man and 
Woman. Here Man seems temporarily vanquished—strangled, furious—the world of 
professional duty shut out by a confounding sensualism. But if the most enduring social-
typological scheme of the Marlowe novels seems, in its endless playback, to have undergone a 
process of atomization—dissipating in air—it has not thereby “conjure[d] into being” an image 
of the future; rather, it has outlined a new structure of suspense, a perfect crisis in the “logic of 
the form.”  
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VII. PERFECT TIME: “THE PENCIL” 
This is a crisis that Chandler will not himself resolve before his death in 1959, about two 
years after Playback was published. He did begin a draft of another Marlowe novel under the 
working title “The Poodle Springs Story” (named after his fictionalized Palm Springs). In the 
brief fragment of this that was published posthumously, Marlowe has married Linda Loring after 
all (despite Chandler’s earlier interdiction against married detectives); but there seems to be 
every indication that the relationship will encroach too much on the detective’s autonomy to be 
more than an episode. He did, however, complete one more Marlowe story, mentioned in the 
introduction here, called “The Pencil.”32 In this story, though he complains about beatniks being 
too loud, time still doesn’t seem to have affected Marlowe; and there’s no evidence that he has 
ever been married. The noisy eroticism that filled the air in Playback and continued to affect the 
climate in “The Poodle Springs Story” has now been sublimated into a platonic partnership with 
the reprise nearly 20 years later of an un-aged Anne Riordan, who had been introduced in 
Farewell, My Lovely (“‘How come I’m still a virgin at 28?,” she asks Marlowe” [“The Pencil,” 
1241]).  
The title of the story refers to what Chandler calls, in a brief introductory note, “the 
technique of the Syndicate’s murders” (1233). “The Outfit, the Syndicate, the big mob, or 
whatever name you want to use for it” is an administrative system, a set of autopoetic operations 
rather than characters or even character types, and its murders are determined, as Marlowe 
explains it, by “reason” rather than by “kicks” (1238-9). This is all official business, and death 
has become a matter of bookkeeping: “You have a list. You draw a line through a name with a 
pencil. The guy is as good as dead.” The process works by conjuring into being two killers who 
                                                             
32 Raymond Chandler, “The Poodle Springs Story,” Raymond Chandler Speaking, edited by Dorothy 
Gardiner and Kathrine Sorley Walker (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 253-64. 
 161 
 
will “look like anybody who’s in a quiet well-run business or profession,” carrying handguns in 
briefcases.33 The killer couple will be strangers to the victim and strangers to each other, but they 
will appear on the same airplane, take the same taxi, live together, and together grow intimately 
familiar with the guy who has been penciled as they observe his movements. They are 
professionals, and when the time comes, they will do exactly what is always done exactly 
because it is always done that way: they will calmly approach the target to a distance of 3 feet, 
state the person’s name out loud, fill him with bullets, drop their guns, and then vanish in a 
getaway car driven by a “blameless citizen” with no criminal record who will be wearing a 
monogrammed shirt (1239-40). 
The set-up provides a concise example of what, in his recent study of suspense, Mark 
Seltzer describes as the “serial reenactments, compulsive mobilities, and lethal but reincarnative 
drives” that comprise the operations of an “official world” (10). This is an autogenic mode of 
suspense that functions as “a structure held in place and supported by its own tensions, and 
nothing else” (10-1). One result of a situation in which, as Marlowe observes, “all rackets tie 
together,” is that rackets no longer do much else but sustain the general tying together of rackets, 
since there’s nothing in particular to tie them together. In the case of “The Pencil,” Marlowe 
identifies the man to be killed, Ikky Rosenstein, as a former “troubleshooter” for the 
organization—which is to say that his function in the organization is to observe and to correct 
dysfunctions in the organization for the sake only of supporting the organization. And so, though 
the troubleshooter assures Marlowe that he has never killed anyone, he is a literal shooter in the 
sense that his troubleshooting ensures that, in cases where troubleshooting fails, the process of 
                                                             
33 This a technical refinement of the elaborate and bulky modes of covert weapons conveyance and 
storage of, say, Stanly Kubrick’s The Killing, a film that had been produced three years before based on a 
Jim Thomson novel and is also about super-organized crime 
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shooting will be put in motion as always—and this comprises the story’s structure of suspense. 
The key issue here is that, since this is a recursive operation that depends on processes of 
observation that are always organized at a higher level, Ikky’s failure is rendered inevitable by 
the second-order observation of the system (or whatever name you want to use for it), a situation 
of which—being a great observer—Marlowe is well aware: “He [Ikky] was a pretty good 
observer. Trouble was the Outfit would know what he had seen” (1237). In this sense, the 
necessary correlative to the “fusion of extreme formality and extreme violence,” as Seltzer 
phrases it, is the perpetuation of a certain form of blindness, which can be understood as a 
systematic amplification of the blind-spot previewed in Montgomery’s The Lady in the Lake 
(17).  
The troubleshooter’s trouble, in other words, is that he has been out-observed, which, 
when translated back into the longstanding generic terms of the novel of detection, means he has 
been outsmarted (“They outfigured me. What I did been done before, but I didn’t know it” 
[1235]). In this case, however, the process of ratiocination has been externalized as a process of 
tiered observation—it is no longer lingeringly thematized as a mental or psychological or even 
human act and thus confounds identification in any familiar sense. In a way, Marlowe, as a 
literary detective, has always been a figure that stands for the obsolescence of the sort of figure 
that he is (consider how often he’s still defined as Sherlock Holmes’s antitype); and a number of 
strong cases could be made that even he, at various moments throughout his career, becomes 
obsolete; but here in what is actually his final public appearance, his formal precariousness 
seems most absolute. How could Marlowe possibly persist in this world?  
As I suggested earlier, the organization comes in Chandler’s later fiction to stand in its 
extremity for the structuring effects of time, and accordingly Marlowe’s impending extinction is 
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figured in terms of his profound temporal incompatibility with it. “We could use you,” says an 
operative to Marlowe, “But it’s a long time for you and no time at all to us”—a sentiment that 
echoes Marlowe’s own impression of the professional killers at work: “In no time at all they 
were completely gone” (1263, 1255). The incompatibility arises from the fact that the 
organization’s mode of temporalization—its manner of going on and on—is observation, 
whereas Marlowe’s mode of temporalization is narration. This differential, as I have tried to 
show in the previous sections here, has been operating in the background throughout the 
Marlowe novels as an uneasy tension between the “very, very long days” of Marlowe’s perpetual 
present and the gaping void suggested by the lack of a narrative situation—and thus a point of 
view—from which the present transpires. But now the formal mechanism—the “gears” of its 
“affect machinery” (to recall Avanessian and Hennig’s term from chapter one)—have been 
exposed: the “core of inhumanity” persists only so long as Marlowe speaks, as Chandler writes, 
of having seen it see.  
In this sense (if not in all senses) the abstract menace of the organization is mitigated by 
the impression that it might just be an accidental effect of the creative process, a more or less 
schematic index of the difference, not just between media, but between the senses—and of the 
sorts of tensions this produces for any aesthetic practice. The suppression in Chandler of a 
conventional narrator—and, as it were, a “grand” narrative—need not be taken as a 
protopostmodernist skepticism about the mimetic claims of an outmoded realism; rather, it 
indicates one stage (early or late, depending on your point of view) in a more general process 
through which aesthetic sensibilities are reorganized as forms of suspense grow increasingly 
recursive, tuning less and less on modes of anticipation than on (as was already evident in 
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Bowen’s The Heat of the Day) the empty formalization of anticipation, the anticipation of 
anticipation, or suspense suspended.  
While Chandler’s organization may have been conceived in reference to historically 
specific events (i.e. the consolidation of black market economies following the repeal of 
Prohibition), in the end it comes to represent pure formality as distinct from perception. It is 
“inhuman” because it is “perfect all the time”; and Marlowe’s relation to it is not critical per se, 
since he still doesn’t have a point of view. He is, however, an excellent observer, and so there’s 
not much else for him to do but study and describe the organization’s imperfections. Having 
accepted the Syndicate’s troubled troubleshooter for his last client, he thus positions himself as a 
troubleshooter on behalf of trouble; instead of solving anything, he watches the reenactment of a 
perfect murder and comments on its faults: “gradually I saw the little touches that flaw the 
picture” (1266). 
But to what end? Midway through the story, he receives in the mail “a longish narrowish 
box,” marked “Special Delivery.” The box contains no letter, “nothing at all but a new freshly-
sharpened pencil” (1253). If the scene feels faintly familiar, it is because it echoes a similar one 
from a decade before in which the context is entirely obscure: “I picked up a pencil and felt the 
point. It was a good sharp point, if anybody wanted to write anything. I didn’t.” This is from The 
Little Sister and has nothing to do with any narrative or symbolic developments in that novel; it 
seems to be there only as an oblique reminder that Marlowe is not a writer (397). The reprise of 
this moment in the context of “The Pencil,” however, carries a different weight. One could 
expect that this would be the moment, in his final episode, that Marlowe—having now officially 
studied the perfection of murder—would sit down to write the story that we’ve been reading all 
these years. Instead, in a demonstration for Bernie Ohls (who is still an old cop and too old to 
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understand these things), he uses the pencil to enact the organizing principle of the story’s 
suspense: “I opened the middle desk drawer and took out the nice sharp pencil. I wrote my name 
on a piece of paper and ran the pencil through it” (1258). Nothing happens, of course: the act of 
inscription is perfectly autonomous; but, even if there’s no communication to the outside, this 
guy like the others is as good as dead.  
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